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Abstract
Node misbehavior has attracted much research interest. However, much of the
focus of prior research is on detection of node misbehavior, and little work has
been done on counteracting that misbehavior. Those who do address this issue
lack robustness, flexibility, or feasibility for implementation on real hardware.
As the IEEE 802.11 standard’s medium access mechanism is decentralized,
stations can potentially refuse to abide by the standard and gain performance
benefit at the cost of the performance of compliant stations. In this thesis, we
study, extend, and implement a policing algorithm that has been previously
introduced for IEEE 802.11 b/g networks, and make it practically feasible
for implementation on real hardware. We provide proof that the extended
algorithm is robust and can effectively address the problem of policing IEEE
802.11 node misbehavior by eliminating the performance advantage for non-
compliant stations. We outline the domain of scenarios this algorithm can be
adapted to, and those it is not designed for.
To prove the effectiveness of the scheme in a real network, we implement it
on real wireless adapters using the OpenFWWF firmware, conduct a wide
range of experiments for different network scenarios. We provide results that
confirm the extended algorithm’s correct functionality for cases it is designed
to support. We also consider the results in light of newer features of IEEE
802.11 standard. We conclude that the extended policing algorithm can in fact
force stations to comply with the IEEE 802.11 standard (although some new
IEEE 802.11 features may impair its functionality) and its application does
not result in network degradation, and it is effective even under undesirable
network conditions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we discuss the motivations behind the work of this thesis and provide
an overview of the material presented in the following chapters.
1.1 Motivation
WLANs have attracted much research interest in recent years. This ranges
from models to analyze the performance of existing network protocols (e.g.
[1, 2]), to the experimentally evaluated modifications of standards (e.g. [3,
4]). The focus of this thesis is on Wi-Fi networks, not only from a theoretic
perspective, but also from a practical point of view. The term Wi-Fi is a
trademark used to denote any wireless local area network (WLAN) that is
based on the IEEE 802.11 standard [5].
One of the interesting subjects in IEEE 802.11 research is the study of node
misbehavior. The protocol used in the initial version of this standard is de-
signed to provide fair medium access to all users. 1 However, as we will see
later in Chapter 2, the decentralized nature of the channel access mechanism
used in the protocol clears the way for some greedy users to gain benefit by
cheating on the standard. With the wide availability of open-source wire-
1Though we will see in Section 3.2.1 that fairness itself is a complicated concept. Besides,
new features such as service differentiation prioritize some traffic, which means that the
medium is not shared among users in a fair manner.
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less drivers and firmware, this has become a real issue in IEEE 802.11-based
networks.
Different methods have been proposed to detect and mitigate the effects of
such misbehavior in the wireless network. One of these methods is the polic-
ing algorithm, introduced in Chapter 5. Proposed by Dangerfield et al. [6]
for IEEE 802.11 b/g networks, this algorithm has a few benefits over other
methods, namely (i) it is agnostic to the type of misbehavior: it only takes
into account the throughput, (ii) it provides a countermeasure against non-
compliance without dissociating the greedy stations, and (iii) it involves no
modification on the (possibly misbehaving) stations, or any message-passing
among stations and/or with the access point. The algorithm’s implementation
scope includes only the access point.
There are, however, shortcomings to the policing algorithm. The first problem
is when it comes to the measurement of the compliant throughput. In the
original work, this measure is assumed to be known. The second issue involves
the amount of penalty applied to non-compliant stations, which is only enough
to equalize the throughput of all stations, but not enough to mitigate the
channel degradation caused by the penalty. Thirdly, a station that is aware of
the policing algorithm might be able to play smart and gain benefit regardless.
There is yet another shortcoming to said algorithm, which is that it fails to
consider the more recent advancements in the IEEE 802.11 standard.
The main contribution of this thesis is to amend the policing algorithm and
address the said issues. We verify that we have addressed the challenges
above by showing that our estimator provides a satisfactory estimate of com-
pliant throughput, and that compliant stations achieve close to their expected
throughput when policing is applied.
We supplement analysis with experiments to show that non-compliant stations
with either constant or bursty traffic do not see a gain under the policing
scheme. We provide a series of experiments that test the performance of
the extended policing algorithm under different traffic types and conditions.
We use commercial off-the-shelf devices in our testbeds. These are the same
wireless adapters that come in your laptop or your desktop PC. The ability
of some of these devices to be reprogrammed enables us to use them as test
devices. Thus we can implement the policing algorithm (and possibly others)
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and put it to practice in a cost-effective setting.
1.2 Overview
We begin by providing a background of the IEEE 802.11 protocol in Chap-
ter 2. Details provided in this chapter will equip the reader with enough
information about IEEE 802.11 required for this work. The complete IEEE
802.11 standard and its amendments are far beyond the scope of this thesis.
Further, Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature around the subject, and
helps put the work in this thesis into perspective.
Chapter 4 covers the programmability of Broadcom BCM43xx-based wireless
cards, which are used extensively in this work. We describe how we reprogram
the cards and their Linux drivers to implement our algorithms. Online docu-
mentation on this highly flexible hardware is not sufficient for a beginner to
start implementing their ideas on it. Our main goal in Chapter 4 is to provide
this introduction and help the keen developer understand the architecture and
thus be able to reprogram the cards.
Further into the thesis, we tackle the problem of node misbehavior that can
occur in an IEEE 802.11 network as we mentioned in the previous section.
We introduce Dangerfield’s policing algorithm, and amend it to address its
shortcomings in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 we implement the policing algorithm
on real hardware, and provide experimental results from our testbed where
the scheme is implemented at the access point.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we summarize what we talk about throughout the thesis
and discuss possible extensions to the present work.
1.3 Publications
The following journal publication was prepared and published in the course
of this doctorate:
P. Patras, H. Feghhi, D. Malone, and D. Leith, “Policing 802.11 MAC
Misbehaviours,” Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, accepted
and to appear, pp. 1–15, 2015 [7]
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The following conference publications were also prepared and presented in the
course of this doctorate:
H. Feghhi, P. Patras, and D. Malone, “Practical node policing in 802.11
WLANs,” World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoW-
MoM), 2013 IEEE 14th International Symposium and Workshops on a,
pp.1,3, 4-7 June 2013 [8]
H. Feghhi, and D. Malone, “WiFo: A diagnostic tool for IEEE 802.11
MAC,” World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoW-
MoM), 2015 IEEE 16th International Symposium on a, pp.1,10, 14-17
June 2015 [9]
1.4 Resources
There are some resources available online for extra work generated during the
course of this doctorate, which the reader may find useful to refer to. The
following three videos are taken from a demo presented duringWoWMoM 2013
for policing[8]. The description of each video describes the exact scenario for
the particular test case.
• Scenario 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPPhnG4mNQc
• Scenario 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cyGrJdT3ERM
• Scenario 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVnoYfafWZc
Below are the GitHub repositories for the diagnostic tool described in Ap-
pendix A:
• WiFo front-end: https://github.com/hessan/wifo
• WiFo back-end: https://github.com/hessan/wifoserver
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CHAPTER 2
IEEE 802.11 Background
This chapter provides a description of the IEEE 802.11 protocol and its aspects that
are relevant to the purpose of this thesis.
2.1 Introduction
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) have become popular during the
past decade. The flexibility and the convenience they provide has made them
the dominant type of network for home users and nowadays you can find
them in many public places such as department stores, hotels, restaurants
and even public transport vehicles. For home users, getting stuck near a
network socket in order to surf the Internet has nearly become a myth. They
can now move around and surf with speeds comparable to wired internet. The
ease of installation adds to the value and popularity of these networks.
Today the dominant protocol for WLANs is IEEE 802.11 [5] which is main-
tained by the IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee (IEEE 802). Since its
original release in 1997, IEEE 802.11 has been developed and many amend-
ments have been introduced to the standard, such as IEEE 802.11b [10], IEEE
802.11g [11], IEEE 802.11e [12], and IEEE 802.11n [13]. We will provide details
on some of these amendments later in this chapter. The need for higher con-
nection speeds, efficiency, and increasingly larger numbers of users has been
the reason behind all the effort. In this chapter we will describe the IEEE
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802.11 protocol as background information for this thesis. We will cover the
basics, but the focus will be on what is relevant to our work.
Figure 2.1: Network protocol stack
Figure 2.1 demonstrates a simplified version of the network model described in
[14]. The top three layers are responsible for taking information to its rightful
destination for consumption, once it is transmitted successfully. The bottom
two layers are responsible for transmission and are involved in the IEEE 802.11
standard. In this thesis we are particularly interested in the MAC layer which
is a sublayer of the data link layer.
We use the term “frame” to refer to a transmission unit in the data link layer.
A frame is a small piece of data along with MAC-level headers. The structure
of a frame depends on the protocol used in the data-link layer. An IEEE
802.11 frame can be of three main types: data, management, or control.
A data frame contains the actual information that is to be carried. Con-
trol frames assist in the delivery of data frames; they administer access to
the wireless medium and provide MAC-layer reliability functions. Manage-
ment frames are used to provide services that are simple on a wired network;
for example, establishing the identity of a network station (STA)1 is easy on
a wired network because network connections require dragging wires from a
central location to the new workstation, but this requires an “association”
1The terms “node” and “station” are used to describe each user in a network, such as
a laptop or a mobile device.
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procedure in IEEE 802.11 and is carried out using the corresponding manage-
ment frames. We will describe the detailed structure of an IEEE 802.11 frame
later in Section 2.7.2.
2.2 Modes of Operation
IEEE 802.11 WLAN architecture provides a number of operational modes,
corresponding to different network topologies. This section provides a brief
description of the types of networks IEEE 802.11 supports.
2.2.1 Basic Service Set (BSS)
A basic service set consists of a set of wireless STAs connected to a central
node called the access point (AP), which could be connected to a wired net-
work. This mode of operation is commonly known as the infrastructure mode.
Coordination between the AP and the stations is managed through a special
kind of frame called beacon2. APs send beacon frames at regular intervals
(usually every 0.1 second). Timing synchronization is one of the applications
of beacon frames and is described in Section 2.7.1.3 A basic service set is
identified by a service set identifier (SSID), which is selected and advertised
by the access point.
2.2.2 Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS)
If there is no central node, and stations in a WLAN connect to each other in
a peer-to-peer fashion, the network is called an independent basic service set
(IBSS). The IBSS is the most basic type of IEEE 802.11 LAN. A minimum
IEEE 802.11 LAN may consist of only two STAs. This mode of operation is
possible when IEEE 802.11 STAs are able to communicate directly. Because
this type of IEEE 802.11 LAN is often formed without pre-planning, for only
as long as the LAN is needed, this type of operation is often referred to as an
ad hoc network. The SSID for an IBSS is determined by the node that starts
the network.
2Beacon is an example of management frames.
3They are also used for network identification and to broadcast network capabilities.
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2.2.3 Mesh Basic Service Set (MBSS)
A mesh BSS is an IEEE 802.11 LAN consisting of autonomous STAs. Inside
the mesh BSS, all STAs establish wireless links with neighbor STAs to mutu-
ally exchange messages. Further, using the multi-hop capability, messages can
be transferred between STAs that are not in direct communication with each
other over a single instance of the wireless medium. From the data delivery
point of view, it appears as if all STAs in a mesh BSS are directly connected
at the MAC layer even if the STAs are not within range of each other. The
multi-hop capability enhances the range of the STAs and benefits wireless
LAN deployments.
2.2.4 Extended Service Set (ESS)
An extended service set is a set of two or more interconnected BSSs that share
the same SSID. The ESS network appears the same to the link layer as an
IBSS network. STAs within an ESS may communicate and mobile STAs may
move from one BSS to another (within the same ESS) transparently. The
difference between an ESS and an MBSS is that, unlike an MBSS, an ESS
does not have access to a distribution system (DS), so different BSSs cannot
be located in disjointed areas.
2.3 Distributed Coordination Function
The MAC layer consists of a series of rules that determine how nodes should
access the medium and send information. How transmissions are physically
performed is the responsibility of the PHY layer. In this section we will de-
scribe the scheme used in the MAC layer in IEEE 802.11 networks. Before we
begin, two points are worth mentioning. First, when we talk about medium
or “carrier”, we simply mean the air (or any space that conducts electromag-
netic waves), since we are transmitting over the air via antennas and the air
is responsible for carrying our signals as wires would in a wired LAN. We may
also refer to the air as “channel” since the medium is split into different fre-
quency ranges and we usually use only one per network and this makes that
particular channel our medium. The second thing worth noting is that the
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radio transmission is half-duplex. This means that devices cannot send and
receive simultaneously: at any given time only one of these can be done.4
2.3.1 Carrier Sensing
The scheme used in the MAC layer is called Distributed Coordination Func-
tion (DCF), which employs a Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) system. As the name suggests, the method depends
on carrier sensing. Carrier sensing is the act of observing the medium for
incoming signals. In CSMA/CA, whenever we have a frame to transmit, we
first sense the medium to make sure it is idle (i.e. nobody else is already
transmitting). One of the two situations will occur:
1. The channel is sensed idle and has been idle for more than a time interval
called DCF Inter-frame Space (DIFS)5: In this case the transmission
begins immediately.
2. The channel is sensed busy: In this case the station waits until the
channel is idle again for a DIFS period, and prepares for the exponential
backoff procedure.
In addition to physical carrier sensing, a complementary mechanism called the
Network Allocation Vector (NAV) is used in IEEE 802.11. NAV is a “virtual”
carrier sensing mechanism or, in other words, a logical abstraction which limits
the need for physical carrier sensing at the air interface to facilitate power
saving. The MAC layer frame headers contain a duration field that specifies
the transmission time required for the frame, during which time the medium
will be busy. The stations listening on the wireless medium read the duration
field and update their NAV, which is an indicator for a station on how long it
must defer from accessing the medium.
4If a radio transceiver can send and receive at the same time, it is called full-duplex.
Full-duplex radio has attracted attention like many areas of wireless networking, and there
has been great progress in this area. For instance, in [15] they propose a technique for
full-duplex radio using self-interference cancellation, and in [16] they design and prototype
a full-duplex Wi-Fi. However, the IEEE 802.11 standard is still based on half-duplex radio.
5This is in the original IEEE 802.11 MAC standard. Newer versions of the standard in-
troduce arbitration inter-frame space (AIFS) instead, which will be described in Section 2.4.
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Standard Slot Time (µs) SIFS (µs) DIFS (µs)
IEEE 802.11-1997 (FHSS) 50 28 128
IEEE 802.11-1997 (DSSS) 20 10 50
IEEE 802.11b 20 10 50
IEEE 802.11a 9 16 34
IEEE 802.11g 9 or 20 10 28 or 50
IEEE 802.11n (2.4 GHz) 9 or 20 10 28 or 50
IEEE 802.11n (5 GHz) 9 16 34
Table 2.1: DCF parameters for different IEEE 802.11 standards.
The NAV may be thought of as a counter that counts down to zero at a
uniform rate. When the counter is zero, it is an indication that the medium is
idle; when nonzero, the medium busy. The medium shall be determined to be
busy when the STA is transmitting. In IEEE 802.11, the NAV represents the
number of microseconds the transmitting STA intends to hold the medium
busy (maximum of 32,767 microseconds). Wireless stations are often battery
powered, so in order to conserve power the stations may enter a power-saving
mode. A station decrements its NAV counter until it reaches zero, at which
time it is awakened to sense the medium again.
2.3.2 Binary Exponential Backoff
The backoff procedure is the collision-avoidance mechanism of DCF. If nodes
in a network transmit at the same time, the signals overlap and the resulting
signal will be undecodable by the receiver or receivers. We call this situation
a “collision”. Collisions cause data to be lost, and lost information needs to
be retransmitted. Imagine a situation where a station is transmitting on the
channel. Let’s assume the scheme used by the stations to send as soon as they
see the channel idle. Using this scheme, all stations begin to transmit once
the currently-transmitting station has finished its transmission. This will lead
to a collision if there is more than one station with information to send. For
this reason, according to the standard, each station should wait for a random
period before sending, once the channel is sensed idle for a DIFS after a busy
period. DIFS here is a fixed amount of time (see Table 2.1 for more details).
This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The time after each busy period is divided into discrete time-slots. The slot
time is also a fixed duration, although it can be different for different protocol
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Figure 2.2: Distributed coordination function: random backoff (top) and ac-
knowledgements (bottom) are illustrated in this figure.
amendments (see Table 2.1). The initial backoff procedure can be described
as follows:
1. Choose a random integer w in the range [0, CWmin) which is the number
of time-slots the node will wait.
2. Start a count-down decrementing w for each time-slot.
3. If the channel becomes busy, freeze the count-down until it is idle again
for at least a DIFS period.
4. When w reaches zero, transmit the frame.
Contention Window (CW) is the size of the window from which we choose
the random number. It is originally set to CWmin. Despite random backoff
being performed by all stations, the chances of collision are not eliminated. A
collision is an indication of a crowded channel. In such case, stations repeat
the backoff procedure, but this time in a window of [0, 2CWmin).
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This trend continues and each time a collision occurs, CW is doubled until
a maximum of CWmax. There is also a limit on the number of retries, after
which the frame will be considered lost and the failure reported back to the
host machine. We will describe this in more detail in Section 2.3.4. On a
successful attempt, the value of CW is reset to its original value CWmin.
The scheme described here reduces the likelihood of a collision. We call this
scheme “binary exponential backoff” (BEB). The default values for CWmin and
CWmax are different for different IEEE 802.11 protocols. For IEEE 802.11b
for example, CWmin is 31 and CWmax is 1023. For IEEE 802.11a and IEEE
802.11g, CWmin is 15 and CWmax is 1023.
2.3.3 Acknowledgements (ACKs)
Now that we know how stations coordinate their transmissions to avoid col-
lisions, one important question remains unanswered. Since stations have a
half-duplex radio system (as we mentioned earlier), then how can they know
whether their transmissions have been successful if they cannot listen to the
channel for colliding signals? The answer is also part of the DCF. For this very
reason, each data frame from a sender should be followed by another frame
called an acknowledge frame (ACK) from the receiver.6 After a station sends
a frame, it starts listening to the channel almost immediately. The receiver
should normally send an ACK, after a period of time called SIFS following the
completion of the received frame. SIFS is smaller than DIFS so other stations
will not view the channel as free before the ACK is sent. If the sending station
does not receive an ACK in a timely manner, it takes this as an indication
that the receiver has not received the frame due to a collision or channel noise,
and it starts the exponential backoff.
2.3.4 RTS/CTS Mechanism
RTS/CTS is an additional method to provide virtual carrier sensing in CS-
MA/CA to overcome the problem described later in Section 2.6.2. A node
wishing to send data initiates the process by sending a Request to Send (RTS)
frame. The destination node replies with a Clear To Send (CTS) frame. Any
other node receiving the RTS or CTS frame should refrain from sending data
for a given time (solving the hidden node problem). The amount of time the
6Not to be confused with ACKs in the transport layer.
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node should wait before trying to get access to the medium is included in both
the RTS and the CTS frame. Since RTS/CTS are actual frames and introduce
overhead to the medium, they are typically not used unless the packet size
exceeds a certain threshold. If the packet size that the node wants to transmit
is larger than the threshold, the RTS/CTS handshake is triggered; otherwise,
the data frame is sent immediately.
This mechanism reduces the chances of collision when stations cannot all hear
one another (see Section 2.6.2), and the need for retransmission is diminished.
We mentioned in Section 2.3.2 that there is a limit on the number of retries
for a single frame. This number is different when the RTS/CTS mechanism
is used. The retry limit for transmissions that do not use this mechanism is
called the “short retry limit”, and its default value is 7. The limit for when
the RTS/CTS mechanism is used is called the “long retry limit”, the default
value of which is 4.
The effectiveness of the RTS/CTS mechanism is debated in the literature. In
[17] they investigate the effectiveness of this mechanism in ad-hoc networks
and show that in some situations it cannot function well. [18, 19] show that
the RTS/CTS mechanism is not as effective as expected in different network
scenarios and in some cases it is even worse than CSMA.
2.4 Enhanced Distribution Channel Access
IEEE 802.11e [12] introduces a new coordination function: the Hybrid Co-
ordination Function (HCF). Figure 2.3, taken from IEEE 802.11 standard
specification [20], depicts where HCF resides in the IEEE 802.11 architec-
ture. Within the HCF, there are two methods of channel access, similar
to those defined in the legacy IEEE 802.11 MAC: HCF Controlled Channel
Access (HCCA) and Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA). Both
EDCA and HCCA define Traffic Categories (TCs). For example, emails could
be assigned to a low-priority class (category), and Voice over Wireless LAN
(VoWLAN) could be assigned to a high priority class.
With EDCA, high-priority traffic has a higher chance of being sent than low-
priority traffic, which is achieved through the choice of contention parameters.
The protocol used is called TCMA, which is a variation of CSMA/CA using a
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Figure 2.3: IEEE 802.11 MAC architecture; taken from [20]
shorter arbitration inter-frame space (AIFS)7 for higher priority frames. The
exact values depend on the physical layer that is used to transmit the data. It
is defined by the formula AIFSN [AC]×σ+SIFS, where the AIFSN depends
on the AC (see Table 2.3) and σ denotes slot time.
EDCA also provides contention-free access to the channel through Transmit
Opportunity (TXOP). A TXOP is a period of time when a station has the
right to initiate frame exchange sequences onto the wireless medium without
contention. A TXOP is defined by a starting time and a maximum duration.
The TXOP is either obtained by the STA by successfully contending for the
channel or assigned by the hybrid coordinator. The use of TXOPs reduces the
problem of low rate stations gaining an inordinate amount of channel time in
the legacy IEEE 802.11 DCF MAC [21]. A TXOP time interval of 0 means it
is limited to a single MAC service data unit (MSDU) or MAC management
protocol data unit (MMPDU).
Priority levels in EDCA are called Access Categories (ACs). The CWmin and
CWmax can be set according to the traffic expected in each AC, as shown in
Table 2.2. Their effective values are calculated from the aCWmin and aCW-
max values that are defined for each physical layer supported by IEEE 802.11e.
For a typical of aCWmin=15 and aCWmax=1023, the resulting values are as
as shown in Table 2.3.
7AIFS replaces DIFS in EDCF. Its value varies for each access category (AC).
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AC CWmin CWmax
Background (AC_BK) aCWmin aCWmax
Best Effort (AC_BE) aCWmin aCWmax
Video (AC_VI) aCWmin+1
2
− 1 aCWmin
Voice (AC_VO) aCWmin+1
4
− 1 aCWmin+1
2
− 1
Table 2.2: Calculation of Contention Window boundaries
AC CWmin CWmax AIFSN Max TXOP
Background (AC_BK) 15 1023 7 0
Best Effort (AC_BE) 15 1023 3 0
Video (AC_VI) 7 15 2 3.008ms
Voice (AC_VO) 3 7 2 1.504ms
Table 2.3: Default EDCA Parameters for each AC in IEEE 802.11e
EDCA access parameters (AIFS, CWmin/CWmax, and TXOP) are set in each
STA in advance. They are also broadcast by the AP through beacon frames.
Upon reception of a beacon, the STA updates its EDCA parameters and uses
them to transmit frames. Thus the AP can control the EDCA parameters of
STAs that it is handling. There are also scenarios in which the data needs to
be protected from other data of the same class. Admission Control in EDCA
addresses these type of problems. The AP publishes the available bandwidth
in beacons. Clients can check the available bandwidth before adding more
traffic.
2.5 Additional Features
Each amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard introduces new methods to
improve its performance and usability. In this section we introduce some of
the additional features in IEEE 802.11g [11], IEEE 802.11e [12], and IEEE
802.11n[13].
2.5.1 Block Acknowledgements (BA)
PHY level data rate improvements do not increase user level throughput be-
yond a point because of IEEE 802.11 protocol overheads, such as inter-frame
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spacing, PHY level headers, and ACKs. Frame aggregation is a process of
packing multiple MSDUs or MPDUs together to reduce the overheads and av-
erage them over multiple frames, thereby increasing the user level data rate.
Two types of aggregation are defined: (i) Aggregation of MAC service data
units (MSDUs) at the top of the MAC (referred to as MSDU aggregation or
A-MSDU), and (ii) Aggregation of MAC protocol data units (MPDUs) at the
bottom of the MAC (referred to as MPDU aggregation or A-MPDU).
A-MPDU aggregation requires the use of block acknowledgements, or Block
ACKs. This feature was first introduced in IEEE 802.11e [12] as an optional
feature, and later was enhanced and made mandatory in IEEE 802.11n[13].
Using this feature, instead of sending an ACK for every single MPDU, a
single ACK is sent for a group of MPDUs. A block acknowledgement (BA) can
support up to 1024 data units (fragments). There are two types of Block Acks:
immediate, and delayed. With Immediate Block ACK, the BA is required after
the receipt of Block ACK Request (BAR) whereas with Delayed Block ACK,
the BAR itself is acknowledged (by the recipient) with a simple ACK frame
and the BA is sent later on separately which is also acknowledged (by the
originator).
2.5.2 No ACK
One of the QoS features of IEEE 802.11e is the QoSNoAck service class. In
QoS mode, service class for frames to send can have two values: QosAck
and QosNoAck. Frames with QosNoAck are not acknowledged. This avoids
retransmission of highly time-critical data. But note that a station cannot be
sure if a QosNoAck frame was successfully transmitted.
2.5.3 Direct Link Setup
Direct link setup (DLS) allows direct station-to-station frame transfer within
a BSS. This is designed for consumer use, where station-to-station transfer
is more commonly used. DLS provides an avenue for devices to perform
consumer station-to-station functions while simultaneously connected to an
enterprise WLAN.
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2.6 Challenges for the MAC
In this section we describe the challenges that the MAC layer in a WLAN
faces. The IEEE 802.11 protocol overcomes these challenges to some extent,
but some can still be kept in mind when implementing new algorithms on top
of IEEE 802.11.
2.6.1 RF Link Quality
On a wired Ethernet, it is reasonable to transmit a frame and assume that the
destination receives it correctly if there is no collision. Moreover, collisions can
be detected explicitly. Radio links are different, especially when frequencies
used are unlicensed ISM bands. The devices must assume that noise and
interference will exist and work around these problems. The designers of
IEEE 802.11 considered ways to work around the radiation from microwave
ovens and other RF sources. In addition to the noise, multipath fading may
also lead to situations in which frames cannot be transmitted because the
node moves into a dead spot.
To overcome this problem, the IEEE 802.11 DCF uses acknowledgements and
if any part of the transfer fails, the frame is considered lost. Acknowledgements
were explained in Section 2.3.3. This transaction is necessary since the link is
not reliable and the frame might be lost during transmission.
Radio link quality also influences the speed at which a network can operate.
Good quality signals can carry data at a higher rate. Available data rates for
different IEEE 802.11 protocols are listed in Table 2.4. Signal quality degrades
with range, which means that the data transmission speed of an IEEE 802.11
station depends on its location relative to the AP and the noise relative to
signal strength. Stations must implement a method for determining when to
change the data rate in response to changing conditions. Furthermore, the
complete collection of stations in a network must manage transmissions at
multiple speeds.
There are many rate adaptation algorithms introduced in the literature. An
old example is ARF [23], which decreases the rate on two consecutive trans-
mission failures, and increases it after receiving 10 ACKs without failure. It
also has a probing packet after each increase, the failure of which causes an
instant step-back. This is meant to prevent false-positives. Another example
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802.11
protocol
Freq.
(GHz)
Bandwidth
(MHz)
Data rate per
stream (Mb/s)
Modulation
— 2.4 20 1, 2 DSSS, FHSS
a
5
20
6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36,
48, 54
OFDM
3.7
b 2.4 20 1, 2, 5.5, 11 DSSS
g 2.4 20 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36,
48, 54
OFDM,
DSSS
n 2.5/5
20 7.2, 14.4, 21.7, 28.9,
43.3, 57.8, 65, 72.2
OFDM
40 15, 30, 45, 60, 90,
120, 135, 150
Table 2.4: Available rates and modulation schemes for different IEEE 802.11
protocols. For detailed information regarding modulation, see [22].
is SampleRate [24], which chooses the rate with the smallest average packet
transmission time, including loss recovery time. A good feature of this al-
gorithm is that it chooses a random rate every 10th packet to measure its
performance, therefore it never gets stuck in a low rate. A variation of Sam-
pleRate is called Minstrel [25], which is used in Linux drivers. It gathers
statistics from transmitted frames and calculates a probability of success for
each frame. It also spends a particular percentage of frames “looking around”
(i.e. randomly trying other rates) to gather statistics. This percentage is usu-
ally 10%. The distribution of lookaround frames is also randomized somewhat
to avoid any potential “strobing” of lookaround between similar nodes.
2.6.2 The Hidden Node Problem
In Ethernet networks, stations depend on the reception of transmissions to
perform the carrier sensing functions. Wires in the physical medium distribute
signals to network nodes. Wireless networks have fuzzier boundaries and nodes
might not be all interconnected as they would be in a wired network. Take a
look at Figure 2.4. In this figure, node 2 can communicate with both nodes
1 and 3, but something prevents nodes 1 and 3 from communicating directly.
This could be due to an obstacle or simply because they are far away from each
other. We call node 3 a “hidden” node from node 1’s perspective. As they do
not hear each other on the channel, CSMA/CA may fail to hear transmissions
and therefore it is highly probable that their transmissions will overlap each
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other, and node 2 cannot make sense of any of the transmissions.
Collisions resulting from hidden nodes may be hard to detect in wireless net-
works because, as mentioned before, wireless transceivers are generally half-
duplex. To prevent collisions, IEEE 802.11 allows stations to use RTS/CTS
signals to clear out an area. This mechanism was explained in Section 2.3.4.
Figure 2.4: The hidden node problem: Node 1 cannot directly communicate
with node 3, so it will not be able contend properly with it.
2.6.3 The Exposed Node Problem
From the same characteristic of a wireless network that is described in Sec-
tion 2.6.2, another problem might arise, and that is the situation depicted in
Figure 2.5. In this figure, nodes 2 and 3 are in each other’s range, but they
are not in the same network, or at least they do not intend to send to each
other. Node 2 is transmitting to node 1, while node 3 intends to transmit
to node 4. However, once node 2 begins transmission, node 3 should wait
because it hears something on the channel. But the truth is that if node 3
also starts transmitting, there will be no collision since it is not in the range
of node 1, and similarly node 2 is not in the range of node 4. Therefore both
transmissions could be received correctly by their corresponding destination
nodes even if sent at the same time, but this scenario would not arise because
nodes 2 and 3 are “exposed” to each other’s signals.
There has been interest in mitigating this effect in the literature. In [26]
they study both the hidden node and the exposed node problems and provide
schemes to remove or mitigate the effects. The exposed node problem is spe-
cially critical in ad-hoc networks and there are works like [27] that specifically
focus on this kind of network.
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Figure 2.5: The exposed node problem: node 2 is transmitting to node 1 and
node 3 wants to transmit to node 4.
The IEEE 802.11 RTS/CTS mechanism could help solve the exposed node
problem as well, only if the nodes are synchronized and packet sizes and
data rates are the same for both transmitting nodes. When a node hears
an RTS from a neighboring node, but not the corresponding CTS, that node
can deduce that it is an exposed node and is permitted to transmit to other
neighbors. If the nodes are not synchronized (or if their packet sizes or the
data rates are different) the problem may occur that the sender will not hear
the CTS or the ACK during the transmission of data of the second sender.
2.7 Under the Hood
In this section we will describe in detail a few things related to the standard.
Knowing these details will help the reader have a better understanding of the
technicality behind some implementations discussed in later chapters.
2.7.1 Timing in IEEE 802.11 MAC
Since we are using the timing mechanism in IEEE 802.11 broadly in our im-
plementations, we will briefly describe it here. As already discussed, time
between transmissions is slotted in the IEEE 802.11 standard. In order for
stations to operate correctly, the time slots for all stations should be aligned.
This can be tricky since each station uses different hardware and has a differ-
ent distance from other stations. So we need a way of synchronizing the time
stations see.
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Timing Synchronization Function (TSF) is specified in the IEEE 802.11 wire-
less local area network (WLAN) standard to fulfill timing synchronization
among users. The TSF keeps the timers for all stations in the same Basic Ser-
vice Set (BSS) synchronized. All stations maintain a local TSF timer. Each
station maintains a TSF timer with modulus 264 counting in increments of
microseconds.
On a commercial level, industry vendors assume the IEEE 802.11 TSF’s syn-
chronization to be within 25 microseconds. Timing synchronization is achieved
by stations periodically exchanging timing information through beacon frames.
Each station in the network adopts the received timestamp if it is later than
the station’s own TSF timer. We introduced beacon frames in Section 2.1.
All stations in the IBSS adopt a common value, normally noted as aBeacon-
Period, that defines the length of beacon intervals or periods. This value,
established by the station that initiates the IBSS, defines a series of Target
Beacon Transmission Times (TBTTs) exactly aBeaconPeriod time units apart.
Time zero is defined to be a TBTT.
2.7.2 Frame Format and Types
Throughout this thesis we will be discussing the implementation of different
tweaks and algorithms on IEEE 802.11 hardware and sometimes we will need
to identify frames and/or modify their information. For this reason we will
discuss IEEE 802.11 frame formats here briefly. A MAC frame contains all in-
formation needed to successfully land a piece of information on its destination
within the WLAN. Figure 2.6 shows the structure of an IEEE 802.11 frame.
The second diagram shows the three main sections of a frame.
The first diagram in Figure 2.6 corresponds to the PHY header. While we are
more interested in the MAC layer, there are some useful points regarding the
PHY level headers which we will discuss briefly here. The first component of
the PHY header is called the preamble. To put it simply, preamble is a signal
used to synchronize transmission timing. In other words it is used as a series
of transmission criteria to be understood as “somebody is about to transmit
data”. There are two different kinds of preamble used in IEEE 802.11, the
details of which are not in the scope of this thesis. Legacy IEEE 802.11 uses
a 128-bit SYNC in the preamble; this is called a long preamble. IEEE 802.11b
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Figure 2.6: IEEE 802.11 frame format. The length of SYNC is different for
short and long preambles.
and IEEE 802.11g also use an optional short preamble which has a 56-bit
SYNC.8
The PLCP header has some extra information about the frame that is about to
be transmitted. For our applications, the most important field in the PLCP
header is the LENGTH field, which determines the size of the frame. The
value is the number of microseconds required to transmit the remainder of the
frame, excluding the PHY header. For more detailed information regarding
PLCP header and the preamble, see [22] (section 18.2.3).
The part of the frame that is covered in the MAC layer is the MAC Protocol
Data Unit (MPDU). The structure of MPDU is shown in the middle diagram
in Figure 2.6. The first part of the MPDU is Frame Control. It contains
information about the type and some characteristics of the frame. The in-
formation contained in this field is shown in the bottom diagram. The most
important fields in Frame Control are the type and subtype fields. These to-
gether determine the nature of the frame. For example, beacon frames have
a management type, and a beacon subtype.
The next two bytes are reserved for the Duration ID field. This field can take
one of three forms: Duration, Contention-Free Period (CFP), and Association
8For example, IEEE 802.11g is required to support both short and long preambles.
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To DS From DS Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Address 4
0 0 Destination Source BSSID N/A
0 1 Destination BSSID Source N/A
1 0 BSSID Source Destination N/A
1 1 Receiver Transmitter Destination Source
Table 2.5: Meanings of different IEEE 802.11 address fields based on DS flags
ID (AID).
An IEEE 802.11 frame can have up to four address fields. Each field can carry
a MAC address and what they refer to depends on whether the frame is being
forwarded through the DS. Table 2.5 shows the address each field holds in
different scenarios.
The Sequence Control field is a two-byte section used for identifying message
order as well as eliminating duplicate frames. The first 4 bits are used for the
fragmentation number and the last 12 bits are the sequence number.
An optional two-byte Quality of Service control field was added with 802.11e.
The Frame Body field is the main information that is delivered. Its size
varies from 0 to 2304 bytes plus any overhead from security encapsulation and
contains information from higher layers.
The Frame Check Sequence (FCS) is the last 4 bytes in the standard IEEE 802.11
frame. Often referred to as the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), it allows for
an integrity check of retrieved frames. As frames are about to be sent the FCS
is calculated and appended. When a station receives a frame it can calculate
the FCS of the frame and compare it to the one received. If they match, it is
assumed that the frame was not distorted during transmission. For detailed
information regarding the FCS field and the CRC algorithm used, see [22]
(section 7.1.3.7).
2.8 Summary
IEEE 802.11 is the dominant protocol for WLANs. It allows stations to
communicate either in infrastructure mode, where all stations communicate
through a central node called the AP, or ad-hoc mode, where stations trans-
mit information to their neighbors as well as forwarding messages for other
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stations.
For the MAC layer, the IEEE 802.11 standard uses a method called DCF
which is based on CSMA/CA. The DCF ensures that different nodes in a
network can contend for channel access and all have fair chances of accessing
the channel and transmitting data. The collision avoidance mechanism in
DCF employs a binary exponential backoff mechanism. Stations originally
back off a random amount of time before sending, in order to avoid collisions.
They double their backoff windows each time their transmissions fail.
IEEE 802.11e enhances the mechanism by introducing HCF. With HCF, sta-
tions can contend in different ways according to the priority of their traffic,
adding Quality of Service (QoS) capabilities to the protocol.
Wireless MAC protocols face several challenges, the most basic one of which
is link quality. It is not as straightforward in a wireless medium to transmit
frames correctly as it is in a wired network. The second problem is called the
“Hidden Node Problem”, caused when two stations communicate with a third
party but they are not in each other’s range. In this case, they would not pause
their backoff and transmission and collisions would occur. The third problem
is called the “Exposed Node Problem”, which happens when a station can
practically transmit a frame to a second station, but its transmissions keep
being delayed because of received signals from a third party, even though
simultaneous transmission would not cause any harm (because receivers are
not hearing the other sender’s signals).
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Related Work
In this chapter we will discuss state of the art in the area we focus on in this thesis.
3.1 Introduction
The main focus of this thesis is to practically implement a form of traffic
shaping that is used to prevent selfish behavior in an IEEE 802.11 network.
This has different aspects, which include misbehavior detection and preven-
tion, protocol manipulation, and traffic shaping. In this chapter we discuss
what has been done before in each of these areas, and how the work in this
thesis relates to them. The focus will mainly be on IEEE 802.11, but other
technologies will also be looked at briefly where relevant.
3.2 Fairness and Compliance
Fairness is an important subject when it comes to resource allocation. In
wireless networks and IEEE 802.11 in particular, fairness has received special
attention, an old example of which is the proposed framework by Nandagopal
et al. [28] for modeling fairness models. As mentioned in said paper, achieving
fairness in the wireless medium is inherently more complicated than the wired
version because of its location-dependent contention, inaccurate state esti-
mates, and decentralized control. Besides, there is always a trade-off between
channel utilization and fairness [29], although some work aims to alleviate this
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by designing new variations of the DCF [30]. Other examples of works that fo-
cus on resource scheduling in wireless networks include the paper by Jamshaid
et al. [31] where they use a rate-based centralized scheduling techniques to
enforce max-min fairness (see Section 3.2.1). In this section we first discuss
different notions of fairness that have been introduced in the literature, and
how they are used. Then we move on to defining how fairness compares to
standard compliance.
3.2.1 Notions of Fairness
Fairness can have different, sometimes conflicting, definitions depending on
how it is measured and where it is applied. The DCF is designed to give equal
chances to all stations to transmit frames, and it is proven to provide this
degree of fairness in the long term [32]. When we hear fairness in computer
networks, the first thing that comes to mind is throughput fairness, which
means stations being able to send the same amount of data in a given time.
This is a notion of fairness used in works such as that of Lee et al. [33]
where they adjust contention window parameters to achieve fair bandwidth
allocation. But this notion is not always desirable. For instance, with multi-
rate networks, stations employing lower bitrates take more time on the medium
than stations with higher bitrates.
If we take time as the resource that needs to be shared between stations,
we come to the notion of airtime fairness [34][35]. The reason airtime is
commonly considered is that it is proven that in a multi-rate DCF network,
the network saturation throughput corresponds to the saturation throughput
of the station with the lowest bitrate [21]. In other words, such a station
will drag the performance of other stations down. That is why airtime is
an important measure. Joshi et al. [36] propose a protocol called time-fair
CSMA (TFCSMA) in which the contention window of each station is adjusted
in a decentralized manner to ensure airtime fairness. Tinnirello et al. take a
different approach, and use TXOP [37] to achieve temporal fairness. These
methods rely on the fact that airtime fairness does not imply throughput
fairness: stations with higher bitrates can send more data in the same period
of time.
A popular measure for fairness is Jain’s fairness index [38]. If xi is the amount
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of the desired resource allocated to i, then Jain’s index is defined as
J (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
n ·∑ni=1 xi2
which equals to 1 when all stations get the same amount of the desired re-
source, and less than 1 if they don’t. 1
n
is the worst value this index can
get (e.g. when one station gets all resources). It is worth noting that Jain’s
fairness index does not take the absolute level of achieved throughput into ac-
count. For instance, all stations getting 0.1 Mb/s is “better” than one getting
10 Mb/s and the rest getting 1 Mb/s as far as this index is concerned. In
other words, it does not indicate efficient resource utilization.
Another notion of fairness that has applications far beyond IEEE 802.11 net-
works is max-min fairness [39]. A resource allocation is max-min fair if and
only if it is feasible (i.e. possible in the network) and an attempt to increase
the allocation of any participant necessarily results in the decrease in the al-
location of some other participant with an equal or smaller allocation. The
resource in question is usually airtime or bitrate in wireless networks. Exam-
ples of works on max-min fairness are [40] and [41] propose methods to achieve
max-min fairness in a decentralized way in terrestrial wireless ad-hoc networks
and underwater sensor networks respectively. This fairness measure does not
have the limitation of Jain’s fairness index, and ensures optimal utilization of
resources.
As far as multi-rate networks are concerned, there is another notion of fairness,
introduced by Kelly [42], and studied in more recent works (e.g. [43][44]). In
this notion, a utility function ui(xi) is defined for each station, where xi is the
rate at which the station i sends. The goal is then to maximize the sum of all
utilities, given network constraints, for instance:
max∑
xi=c
∑
ui(xi)
A special case of utility fairness is called proportional fairness, which is studied
for IEEE 802.11 [45, 46] as well as earlier technologies such as Aloha [47]. The
(marginal) utility here is proportional to the bitrate the station already has.
The notion is based on the idea that the satisfaction of a station that is sending
at 11 Mb/s with additional 1 Mb/s will be less than that of a station sending
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at 1 Mb/s, because the bitrate of the latter would be doubled. In practice,
u(xi) = log(xi) is often used.
Proportional fairness can also be described in terms of cost: the utility function
is inversely proportional to the energy cost of sending at the given bitrate. A
newer example application of proportional fairness is described by Haiyang et
al. [48], where they use a higher layer scheduler in conjunction with IEEE
802.11’s rate control mechanisms to provide proportional fairness for DASH
(Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP).
Not all mentions of fairness correspond to sophisticated utility fairness notions.
What works, such as the paper by Jiang et al. [26] and the original policing
algorithm [6], often consider fairness is throughput fairness, as described in
the first paragraph of this section.
3.2.2 Short-term Fairness
Although much of the work in fairness focuses on long-term fairness, short-
term fairness is also of great importance, specially when it comes to real-time
applications; and this importance has been long recognized in the literature
[49]. IEEE 802.11 medium access mechanism is designed to provide fair access
to the channel in the long term. However, short-term fairness is not guaranteed
by the DCF [50] [51] (though Vlachou et al. [52] show that IEEE 802.11
provides more short-term fairness than the similar access protocol IEEE 1901
when the number of stations is less than 15).
Many methods and schemes have been introduced to achieve short-term fair-
ness in IEEE 802.11 networks. An example is iBEB by Almotairi et al. [53],
which employs an inverse exponential backoff mechanism, meaning that it
starts from the maximum backoff window and reduces the contention window
by half on each collision. They prove that their method improves short-term
fairness. An obvious downside of this method is low channel utilization, and
that is due to the large initial contention window of 511.
Kim et a. [54] introduce another method called renewal access protocol (RAP),
which is a simplified version of the DCF with fixed contention window and
an a priori backoff distribution. They achieve high short-term fairness and
optimal channel utilization through the choice of this distribution.
28
3.2. Fairness and Compliance
Another method for achieving fairness especially in the short term is oppor-
tunistic scheduling [55], which is used mainly for cellular networks. It was first
introduced by Knopp and Humblet [56]. In a pure opportunistic approach,
the scheduler always chooses the user in the best channel condition to use the
resources. Opportunistic scheduling depends on the multiuser diversity due
to random wireless channel impairments such as fading and multipath.
3.2.3 Fairness and Service Differentiation
Different stations in a wireless network have different needs. Take the differ-
ence between a voice call, and a file download as an example. Delay is less
tolerable in a voice conversation than it is for a file download, while frame
loss is better tolerated [57]. Since IEEE 802.11e, service differentiation was
introduced to the protocol, making it possible for different types of traffic to
be treated according to their specific requirements. Fairness in this case can
be more complicated to define and achieve, as it is no longer the question of
throughput or airtime fairness among different nodes, but also among different
traffic classes [58][59].
Bottigliengo et al. propose a method [60] to guarantee fairness in the presence
of service differentiation. Their method combines contention window adapta-
tion and transmission opportunity (TXOP) to guarantee quality of service for
flows of the same class. Qiang et al. use distributed scheduling at both the
AP and stations to achieve quality of service for each traffic class while main-
taining fairness among different classes [61]. AS-MAC [58] is another method
that simultaneously provides the absolute priority and successful transmission
time fairness
We will further discuss the impact of service differentiation on fairness in
Chapter 5 as we see the implications it has for the policing algorithm.
3.2.4 Standard Compliance
The original IEEE 802.11 standard is designed to give equal chances to all
stations to access the channel. However, the protocol is a decentralized one,
and stations can choose not to comply. Giri et al. describe some examples
of non-compliance and their effects [62], and Guang et al. introduce a model
[63] to compute the saturation throughput under both normal case and the
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case with the existence of selfish nodes. The fairness that is achieved by the
standard is only possible if all stations implement it correctly, so standard
compliance is closely tied with airtime and throughput fairness: if one station
maliciously takes up more channel time, it takes the opportunity away from
compliant stations (see Section 3.3 for experimental work on this subject).
In this thesis the focus is on standard compliance rather than fairness. The
idea is to enforce a compliant behavior while trusting the standard to provide
fair channel access. This can sometimes come at the price of lower channel
utilization but better throughput for compliant stations, so linking indirectly
to the trade-offs in max-min and utility fairness.
3.3 Node Misbehavior
The main contribution of this work, as described in Chapter 5, is the im-
plementation and experimental analysis of a misbehavior detection system,
and a method for determining the correct behavior. What we mean here by
misbehavior is non-compliance with standard, as described in the previous sec-
tion. Node misbehavior has received much attention in the literature, mainly
because of the decentralized nature of the IEEE 802.11 protocol, which ex-
poses it to selfish behavior. It can happen when users selfishly manipulate
their channel access parameters to gain a performance advantage. This can
severely degrade the performance of the users that abide by the standard
[64, 65]. Availability of open-source drivers such as MadWifi [66], and even
open-source firmware for some Wi-Fi adapters [67] makes this a real, rather
than theoretical, issue.
Research has proven that said issue is not limited to malicious users. Gior-
dano et al. [68] evaluate maximum achievable goodput using theory, simu-
lations, and experimental analysis. They find differences between different
IEEE 802.11b wireless adapters, and deviations from expected goodputs. In
[69], they take a step further and measure access parameters of different wire-
less card using a probe cards, and find the source of performance differences
between them to be in the MAC layer. Bianchi et al. [70, 71, 72] run ex-
periments with different wireless adapters and measure contention parameters
used by each of them and show that off-the-shelf adapters have deferring be-
havior, which sometimes deviates from standard, and that the unfairness in
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a heterogeneous wireless network is due to the protocol implementation on
different cards rather than environmental factors.
3.3.1 Types of Misbehavior
Although the focus of this work is on cheating via contention parameters,
there are various other kinds of attacks on IEEE 802.11 that are worthy of
consideration. In this section we go through some of these attacks and the
literature around them. Some of these attacks aim to degrade the performance
of the whole network without any gain for the misbehaving station, while
others seek benefit at the cost of the performance of others. The focus of this
thesis is on the latter, while also ignoring security and privacy attacks, which
are themselves subjects of broad research, which is not directly relevant to
this work.
3.3.1.1 Cheating on Contention Parameters
These series of attacks are very popular among researchers. The main reason is
that they are easiest to implement, and often most effective. In these attacks,
the associated station refuses to use the EDCA parameter settings broadcast
through the beacon frame (or the standard contention parameters for older
versions of the IEEE 802.11). Hoang et al. propose a model to estimate
the impact of this kind of misbehavior [73]. Many misbehavior detection
algorithms focus on these attacks (e.g. [64] [6][74]). We will discuss them in
further detail later. Possible attacks of this nature include: choosing a smaller
CWmin, choosing CWmax = CWmin, using a large TXOP time, and using a
small AIFS value, which can be equal to the previous attack if chosen small
enough. Example attacks presented in Chapter 5 are of this type.
3.3.1.2 Carrier Sensing Attack
Carrier sensing is a foundation of IEEE 802.11. Stations need to sense a
clear channel before they can begin to transmit. In reality, there is always
something on the channel, including noise, and clear channel is a relative
definition. Stations in an IEEE 802.11 network use a clear channel assessment
(CCA) threshold for received signal power below which they consider the
channel idle. A misbehaving station can increase its CCA threshold and thus
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get an advantage over other stations [75]. Pelechrinis et al. employ frequency
hopping to counteract this type of misbehavior [76].
3.3.1.3 Jamming Attacks
A malicious node can intentionally cause collisions either to degrade the net-
work’s performance or to gain advantage over other stations using so called
“selective jamming” [77] where the attacker targets specific frame types. Both
motives have been studied in the literature [78], and possible methods have
been devised to counteract jamming. For example, DeBruhl et al. [79] and
Konorski [80] use game theoretical methods to find optimal strategies of both
the jammer, and the victim (sender), for cases where the motive of the attack-
ers is to gain benefit. The focus of this work, is on the same motive.
An IEEE 802.11 sender needs an ACK to confirm successful reception of its
frame. An attacker can simply send signals to jam the receiver’s ACK mes-
sages, and thus degrade the performance of the sender by causing it to double
its contention window [81] [64]. A similar approach would be to jam CTS
frames after hearing RTS [64]. We can even extend this to jamming associ-
ation requests, which prevents any station from connecting to the AP, this
leaving the attacker alone in the channel.
3.3.1.4 Upper Layer Attacks
Some attacks in wireless networks target a layer higher than the one they
are performed. Jamming attacks, for instance, are performed in the physical
layer, but they use information from the MAC layer to jam the right signals.
This idea can be taken further, and to higher layers. For example, an at-
tacker can jam TCP ACKs and greatly affect the TCP’s congestion control
and thus the sender’s performance [64].1 An attack on the application layer
is also suggested in the aforementioned work by Raya et al.. Video streaming
software uses adaptive compression/encoding to conform to different band-
widths. If an attacker causes a compression fallback, it can benefit from the
extra bandwidth.
1For this attack to be effective, all MAC-level retries of a TCP ACK must be jammed,
which could be expensive for the attacker in terms of power consumption.
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3.3.1.5 Packet Forging Attacks
Previously we described the jamming of TCP ACKs. An attacker can be
smart, and rather than jamming, it can forge legitimate-looking packets and
gain benefit. A similar attack would be to forge TCP ACKs when the packet
has not been received correctly [82]. These false ACKs have a negative impact
on network’s operation, and are hard to detect.
This kind of attack can also target the MAC layer. For example, flooding
RTS/CTS handshakes on the channel causes other stations to wait longer
than they should, which gives the attacker more chances to access the channel
[82]. In the same work, Rachedi et al. also introduce another variation of
these attacks, which is sending forged beacons. The idea is to send beacons
with the wrong TSF time in an Ad-Hoc network to desynchronize stations.
3.3.1.6 Denial of Service (DoS)
Denial of service attacks are a common threat in computer networking, and
go way beyond IEEE 802.11. The victim of DoS attacks are usually servers
with multiple clients, and the goal of the attacker is to reduce service quality
by keeping the server busy. Different kinds of DoS attacks include bandwidth
depletion attacks [83][84][85] which flood the server with control, data pack-
ets, or requests, and resource depletion attacks which misuse protocol-related
packets to confuse communication parties [86]. Different methods have been
proposed to counteract DoS attacks, including swarm networks [87], TCP
probing [88], and probabilistic approach [89], which are all described and eval-
uated by Robinson et al. [90].
A form of DoS attacks in IEEE 802.11 is achieved by modifying the duration
field (see 2.7.2) of a sent packet to a large value. This causes other stations
to wait for the whole period, which gives the attacker more time to transmit
[91]. Partial deafness [92] is another form of DoS attacks, which is designed
to degrade the network performance in Ad-Hoc networks. In this attack, the
attacker refuses to send ACKs for received packets for enough times to cause a
rate fallback. Then, combined with the performance anomaly of IEEE 802.11b
networks [21], the network throughput is degraded. This of course depends
on the rate control algorithm used.
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3.3.2 Protection Provided by the Standard
IEEE 802.11 provides an encryption mechanism called Wi-Fi Protected Access
version 2 (WPA2) which, beside protection against eavesdropping, can disable
some of the attacker types we mentioned before. Packet forging and jamming
attacks, especially those targeting higher layers, depend on the ability to read
and analyze packet contents. With such encryption in place, those attackers
will not be able to operate, or their efficacy will be impaired. However, attacks
on the MAC and physical layers, such as contention parameter tweaking and
carrier sensing attacks will still be effective, and that is one reason they are
the most popular among research community.
3.3.3 Misbehavior Detection
In order to prevent or take action against node misbehavior, we first need to be
able to identify misbeaving nodes. Although protocols are flexible, they have
set rules for how the medium can be accessed (e.g. [12]). So, theoretically
we can have an estimate of how each station should perform given specific
set of QoS-related and channel parameters. The literature is no stranger to
misbehavior detection. Many of the papers described in the previous section
propose methods to detect the specific kinds of misbehavior they cover. In
this section the focus will be on the most prominent and easy-to-implement
form of misbehavior, which is the modification of contention parameters and
backoff behavior.
Many of the proposed schemes [93, 94, 95, 96] use statistical methods to iden-
tify misbehaving stations, and mainly focus on back-off distribution as the
only random component of CSMA/CA. Szott et al. for instance [96] use a
chi-square test on backoff values to detect non-compliant behavior. In [97] the
receiver dictates backoff value to the sender, and then counts backoff values
and compares them with the expected value with a threshold. The reason for
the threshold is that channel conditions have an effect on the performance of
each station, and a fixed value cannot be assumed. They also propose some
modifications to the IEEE 802.11 protocol which allows a form of message
passing between stations to facilitate detection. This could be a downside,
because in a real network, modifying all stations is not usually desirable or
possible.
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There are two main issues with the latter approach; (i) it requires modifica-
tions to the standard, namely changing from a decentralized binary exponen-
tial backoff (BEB) to a dictated backoff mechanism. (ii) there are edge-cases,
such as hidden terminals, which cause misdiagnosis. They propose to address
the latter using RTS/CTS: the receiver only considers a slot to be busy when
it has overheard an RTS/CTS frame. While this eliminates the original prob-
lem, it adds another, which is the possibility for senders to pose as hidden
terminals and gain advantage.
DOMINO [64] and the method proposed by Serrano et al. [98] on the other
hand do not involve a distributed implementation. They reside in or near the
access point and run statistical tests to measure the amount of deviation of sta-
tions’ behavior from the standard. DOMINO’s target statistics include AIFS,
backoff time, NAV, and retransmissions. The advantage of this algorithm is
the great insight it has over the stations’ behavior. However, DOMINO does
have some blind spots. An example of such a blind spot is again the existence
of hidden terminals, which causes false positives for misbehavior. Although
they propose a method to alleviate this problem, some extent of the effect is
inevitable given the statistics they use.
Radosavac et al. [99] use a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) [100] to sta-
tistically detect cheating on backoff behavior. They recognize their weakness
in the case when the sender and the receiver collude to gain benefit. Another
example of methods of this sort is the one proposed by Toledo et al. [101],
which uses statistical analysis of idle slots to identify non-compliant station.
All said methods (including DOMINO) use an “observer” station to measure
packet interarrivals. For this reason, they suffer from the effects of interference
and poor channel conditions, as they need to gather as much information as
they can, and this gets harder as channel conditions degrade. The method
introduced by Yanxia et al. [102] can be implemented so as to avoid this
problem for AP-based networks.
Dangerfield et al.’s policing algorithm [6] also uses statistics for misbehavior
detection, but the only metric it uses is throughput. While throughput equal-
ity is one type of fairness, it is not well suited for detecting misbehavior, as
different stations may have different throughput values depending on packet
size, traffic access categories, etc. In this work we extend this algorithm to use
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attempt rate, which is more closely related to the station’s behavior. Regard-
less of the statistic used, the simplistic approach of the algorithm makes it
agnostic to the type of misbehavior, and robust to the effect of hidden nodes,
and channel conditions. The reason is that it only focuses on the final and
concrete information available on the access point rather than possibly lossy
information gathered through observing the channel. However, the same sim-
plistic approach opens the algorithm to cases such as the existence of QoS,
where detection can be impacted by the indeterministic mix of contention
parameters.
Cardenas et al. introduce a method [103] to ensure backoff randomness in ad
hoc networks, and detect those deviating from it. The benefit here is that
channel conditions don’t affect the detection mechanism. However, like some
of the methods mentioned above, it needs message passing between stations.
Another shortcoming of their method compared to methods such as DOMINO
is that it requires at least one honest party in every transmission pair (either
the sender or the receiver) while DOMINO does not need that, as the observer
does not participate in the network. Another method is proposed by Djahel
et al. [104] for MANETs, which solves this problem of colluding stations
by having each station monitor all transmissions in its vicinity in case of a
degradation in its own throughput.
3.3.4 Traffic Shaping
Traffic shaping is the practice of regulating network data transfer to assure a
certain level of performance [105] or quality of service (QoS) [106]. This can
be through delaying packets or even dropping them as described in Chapter 5.
Works on this subject often attack the problem of increased residential user-
to-user traffic [107] [108], and they commonly use traffic shaping against bulk
flows such as peer-to-peer file-sharing networks [106].
Traffic shaping has also received attention in regard to IEEE 802.11. Vollero et
al. [109] use frame dropping to manage traffic to ensure quality of service for
multimedia communications. The same principle in different works [110, 111]
to mitigate the effect of the performance anomaly of IEEE 802.11b networks
[21]. This technique is also one of the building blocks of the policing algorithm
[6] introduced, where it is used as a countermeasure against stations that do
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not comply with the IEEE 802.11 standard. Frames from greedy nodes are
dropped just enough to reduce its throughput to that of a compliant station.
3.4 Policing
While much work has been done on misbehavior detection in IEEE 802.11,
only a limited number of proposals address counteracting greedy actions, and
these suffer from significant practical drawbacks. For instance, [103] requires a
reputation management system to prevent MAC layer misbehavior. Shi et al.
introduce a modified version of the DCF where the back-off value is dictated
by the receiver [112], but it does not go any further than this “prevention”
scheme that in fact cannot be enforced in practice. Kyasanur et al.’s method
goes a step further [97] with a penalty system, but a cross-layer interaction is
assumed in it to enable higher layers to restrict the traffic that non-compliant
clients generate. The penalty system involves assigning larger backoff values
to the receiver. Obviously this does not necessarily lead to compliance, but
can serve as a warning to the non-compliant station, and if it continues its
non-compliant behavior, the receiver may stop responding to its RTS frames.
We previously mentioned Djahel et al.’s method [104] as a detection algorithm
in MANETs. They also propose a countermeasure. Once a non-compliant sta-
tion is detected in a network, a special warning message is broadcast by the
receiver which, beside warning the non-compliant station, notifies all neigh-
bors to monitor its behavior. If the misbehavior persists beyond that, all
neighbors begin punishing the station by not responding to its RTS messages,
and refusing to relay any control message sent by the misbehaving node.
Both of the above methods employ a penalty system in which non-compliant
stations are removed from the network completely. This form of black-and-
white punishment suffers from a major drawback: false alarms can have a
severe effect on network performance. In the latter method they try to allevi-
ate this by introducing an accuracy factor, which is an small arbitrary value
removed from the interarrival time.
Giri et al. use a collective approach to disincentivize non-compliance [62].
In their scheme, all compliant stations estimate the level of misbehavior of
the selfish node, and try to replicate that misbehavior as a reaction response.
This method effectively disarms misbehaving nodes. However, aggressive non-
37
3.5. Experimental Evaluation
compliance could choke the network should all stations employ it. PAS [74]
takes a similar approach. However, they prove their algorithm is stable (by
conducting a Lyapunov stability analysis) and does not suffer the instability
caused by constantly increased punishments.
The policing algorithm [6] uses a different method against non-compliance. In
their method, it is assumed that we know the throughput of a compliant sta-
tion at all times. Using that value, they calculate the level of misbehavior of all
nodes, and employ a penalty system in which the punishment is proportional
to the severity of misbehavior. The penalty is inflicted by not acknowledging
received frames with a probability proportional to the aggressiveness of the
selfish node. An obvious shortcoming in their method is that we usually don’t
know the compliant throughput, as it depends highly on channel conditions.
The other drawback is that it depends on ACKs, and with new IEEE 802.11
features such as No ACK, this method could be less effective.
The work in this thesis refines the scheme from [6], looking at implementation
challenges, adapting the scheme to be resistant to a wider range of misbehav-
iors, and showing how to estimate compliant throughput.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
Experimental evaluation of wireless networks has become an essential part of
wireless research. The main reason is that, while mathematical models that are
based on standards [1, 113, 114] provide excellent tools to predict the behavior
of a network, they do not fully represent real networks. The reason is that there
are many factors that alter the expected behavior of a network, many of which
are often ignored or are just too complex to incorporate in a model. The more
obvious examples are issues like neighboring wireless networks that interfere
with each other, and reflection of electromagnetic waves from nearby walls.
Although some models such as [2] try to incorporate some characteristics of
real networks, but many factors are inevitably missing even from these models.
The concept of implementing ideas on radio hardware is not new. Software-
defined radio (SDR) has been used to implement many theoretical ideas and
processes in recent years (e.g. [16]). SDR is a radio communication system
where components that have been typically implemented in hardware are in-
stead implemented by means of software, which means total customizability
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of the radio system. The problem with SDR devices, however, is that those
with operating frequency ranges covering Wi-Fi frequencies are often very ex-
pensive. The use of commercial off-the-shelf wireless adapters in experimental
research is relatively newer, but it is getting more and more popular. This
is partly due to widely-available open-source device software [115]. Examples
of existing work include the work by Cardenas et al. [93], where they eval-
uate previously proposed schemes including DOMINO [64] and SPRT-based
schemes [103] by using experimental results from off-the-shelf devices to con-
firm the correctness of their theoretical analysis. There is a wide range of
other experimental work, from rate adaptation schemes [3, 4], to the paper by
Raman et al. [116] where they introduce and experimentally evaluate a new
MAC protocol suitable for long-distance multi-hop links. Another example
is the method proposed by Palletta et al. [117] to measure the saturation
throughput of commercial IEEE 802.11 access points. They then use it on
common devices such as the Ericsson A11d and Cisco Air 1200.
The flexibility of programmable Wi-Fi hardware has furthered their applica-
tions to those beyond IEEE 802.11. There are works that have taken advan-
tage of the carrier sensing in those devices for applications such as cognitive
radio [118] or detecting non-Wi-Fi sources of interference [119].
Although real implementation of algorithms is rewarding in terms of proof of
concept, it is not completely straightforward. It is widely understood in the
research community that debugging an implementation can take many hours.
Most of the available tools and approaches e.g. [120, 121] focus on protocol
level monitoring, and less on other interactions. At the end of this thesis we
show a tool for testing and debugging IEEE 802.11 hardware (Appendix A)
developed and used during this research, which shows an ongoing divergence
between the IEEE 802.11 standard and operational hardware. Read said ap-
pendix for further details.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This work is built upon the policing algorithm introduced by Dangerfield et
al. [6], which is a misbehavior detection and penalty scheme. Many detection
algorithms have been introduced in the literature. There are three reasons
for this choice to build on in the present thesis. First, this method does not
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modify the protocol and does not need any modification for stations, or any
message-passing. Second, it focuses on the detection of the performance of the
non-compliant station, rather than detecting the type of misbehavior, which
makes it flexible towards different types of misbehavior. Third, it introduces
a penalty system which is proportional the the greediness of misbehaving
stations.
The policing algorithm assumes we know the compliant throughput at all
times, which is not the case. In this thesis we introduce a method to estimate
the compliant throughput in any given channel condition. We also refine the
algorithm and explains its possible problems and shortcomings.
The other contribution of this work is experimental evaluation of the policing
algorithm. The implementation of methods and algorithms on real hardware
has recently received much attention. By implementing the policing algorithm
on commercial hardware we can show that it works in practice, and we can
observe how real channel conditions affect its performance.
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CHAPTER 4
Broadcom Chipset
Programming
In this chapter we discuss how the Broadcom BCM43xx wireless adapters work and
how we implement and evaluate algorithms on them. We also give a brief description
of the architecture.
4.1 Introduction
The use of commodity hardware to implement custom behaviors on IEEE 802.11
has recently attracted much interest. Work in this area falls into three main
categories.
The first category of work focuses on the study of the behavior of the wireless
adapters themselves through experimentation. These works do not modify the
behavior of wireless cards and minor modifications are made only if needed
to extract results. Examples include [72], [122] and [123]. For instance in [72]
they study the back-off behavior of common off-the-shelf wireless cards and
investigate the differences in their compliance with the standard.
Works in the second category evaluate their proposed models and algorithms
by implementing them on wireless adapters. Examples are [93], [4], [3], and
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[116]. In [3] and [4] they introduce new rate adaptation1 algorithms and back
their proposals up with experimental results; and in [116] they introduce and
experimentally evaluate a new MAC protocol suitable for long-distance multi-
hop links.
The third category of work implements new mechanisms and alternative func-
tionality on wireless adapters. Examples are [118] where they implement a
spectrum “sensor” on Atheros cards, and works from the European project
FLAVIA [124], [125, 126] where they propose a visually reprogrammable wire-
less adapter design and implement it on Broadcom BCM43xx chipsets.
Experimental validation is important because many models and algorithms
are designed to improve the current IEEE 802.11 networks, and experimental
validation would be a strong indication that they are useful. Different wireless
adapters have been used for this purpose in the literature. Examples are
Broadcom BCM43xx adapters, used in [125] and [126], Atheros chipsets, used
in [4], [3] and [118], and Digital RoamAbout adapters, used in [123].
Software-defined radio (SDR) has also become popular recently (see also Sec-
tion 3.5). SDR is a radio communication system where components that have
been typically implemented in hardware (e.g. filters, modulators/demodu-
lators, detectors, etc.) are instead implemented by means of software on a
personal computer or embedded system. Works like [127] use SDR as their ex-
perimental tool. However, using off-the-shelf devices is still relatively cheaper
and the results reflect an everyday network rather than perfectly crafted wire-
less components.
The availability of open-source wireless drivers is a great asset for our work.
Hardware manufacturers have always been reluctant to distribute the source-
code for the drivers of their products. This was mainly due to intellectual
property protection, and to protect their hardware from misuse. However,
with the growth of open-source software and new attention for drivers, some
manufacturers began to release open-source drivers. As far as wireless adapters
are concerned, Qualcomm Atheros chipsets and Broadcom wireless adapters
are common examples.
1Rate adaptation involves changing a station’s physical transmission rate adaptively in
varying conditions to achieve high throughput.
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The original open-source Atheros driver, namely MadWifi [66], consists of an
open-source driver on top of a proprietary Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL).
The latter is responsible for direct communication with the hardware. Using
the MadWifi driver you can modify queuing parameters of IEEE 802.11e with
simple shell commands on-the-fly, and you can change other aspects of the
IEEE 802.11 behavior by modifying the driver itself. MadWifi was succeeded
by ath5k which combined MadWifi and HAL to make a Free and Open-Source
Software (FOSS) driver for Linux. The release of the source code for HAL in
2008 was a driver for the development of ath5k. Qualcomm Atheros later
released ath9k, a fully open-source driver for their new IEEE 802.11n chips.2
Despite all the flexibility open-source drivers provide, these drivers lack the
low-level control that we need on the protocol. While MadWifi and ath9k
provide a reasonable control on the protocol stack, when it comes to the
hardware part, there is still little control. For example, the binary exponential
backoff procedure is hardwired and although some parameters can be modified,
the procedure itself cannot be altered. We use Broadcom BCM4318 wireless
adapters for our experiments. The choice of Broadcom over Atheros cards is
due to the higher flexibility and control. Similar to Atheros cards, there is
an open-source driver, called the b43 driver, available for Broadcom cards.
However, unlike Atheros, there is also an open-source firmware available. A
programmable firmware means control at the lowest level of the protocol. This
enables us to access features like carrier sensing, ACK generation, backoff
behavior, etc. The firmware we are using is a reverse-engineered firmware
called OpenFWWF [67] which is developed as a part of FLAVIA [124], and
used in their works.
In this chapter we will discuss the wireless card programming for Broadcom
BCM43xx chipsets. We explain how different software and hardware compo-
nents work together, and give an idea of how implementations are done by
altering the behavior of these components. The descriptions in this chapter
are based on the 4.xx series of the BCM43xx chipset by Broadcom.
2There is also a more recent driver named ath10k for Qualcomm Atheros QCA988x
family of chips, which support IEEE 802.11ac.
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4.2 Broadcom BCM4318 Chipset Basics
4.2.1 Processing
At the very bottom of the BCM43xx architecture is the “Backplane”. The role
of the Backplane is to interconnect between different cores available on the
chipset. It functions as a switch that can choose the active “core” to enable
or disable functionality. This is known as “switching to the core”. Each core
can be viewed as a light-weight CPU that handles a very specific task. When
a core is switched to, it can access its parameters (registers) as well as the
common registers on the Backplane.
Figure 4.1: The structure of the Backplane
On top of the Backplane, there are several cores, depending on the specific
card. This can be schematically drawn as Figure 4.1. As depicted in the figure,
each core has its own set of specific registers, depending on its functionality.
The number and nature of the cores on the chipset depends on the core revision
and the type of hardware. Two important examples of cores are “802.11” and
“NAND Flash”. In this chapter we are particularly interested in the former.
4.2.2 IEEE 802.11 Functionality
The IEEE 802.11 functionality of the device consists of the following compo-
nents.
802.11 Core is the main core on the BCM43xx chipset and is at the heart of
IEEE 802.11 functionality: it is where the firmware microcode is actu-
ally executed. We can break the features of this core into the following
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components: 802.11 MAC, 802.11 PHY, and 802.11 Radio. These com-
ponents consist of registers specific to their respective tasks. These reg-
isters make up the register set of the 802.11 core, along with additional
control registers. The purpose of the control registers is mainly to avoid
concurrent access to shared resources that may cause malfunction.
In modern processing units, calling external functionalities such as ra-
dio transmission is done through interrupts. In 802.11 core, these calls
are handled through registers. For instance, suspending the MAC 3 is
performed by writing a specific value in the “MAC Enabled” register.
To track the status of a previously accessed external function, there are
additional registers called “Interrupt Status” registers. There are two
such registers; one is called the “MAC Interrupt Status” and holds in-
formation about MAC function calls; the other one is called “DMA/PIO
Interrupt Status”. Reading and writing packet information is performed
using DMA to the memory of the host machine, and this can and should
be done in parallel with the normal MAC behavior because of its time-
consuming nature. The DMA/PIO status register provides the firmware
with the means to know whether the required information is ready or
whether the received packets are sent to the host.
Template RAM or FIFO RAM is 32KB in size and it can be accessed by the
802.11 core from the firmware code. For each transmission, the frame
is first written to Template RAM, and then the chip is instructed to
transmit the required portion of the data through control registers. As
stated in [128], Template RAM space is structured as shown in Table 4.1.
Address ranges are shown in hexadecimal format.
Writing to Template RAM is another example of the poll-based interrupt
handling in 802.11 core. To write to Template RAM, we first choose the
target offset using the “TX Template Pointer” register. Then we specify
the start and end of the source data (i.e. data that is going to be copied
to the target location) through the two designated “TX Template Data”
registers, which initiates the copy process. At this stage we keep checking
for the bit 1 of the pointer register to be cleared, which indicates that
the data is copied.
3Suspending MAC is temporarily disabling MAC functionalities of the card with the
intent of removing the device or for power saving purposes.
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Range Usage
0000 - 05FF Template for ACK (0000), beacons and probe response (0068, 0268, 0468)
0600 - 0EFF TX FIFO number 0, size is 0x0900
0F00 - 1BFF TX FIFO number 1, size is 0x0D00
1C00 - 25FF TX FIFO number 2, size is 0x0A00
2600 - 2DFF TX FIFO number 3, size is 0x0800
2E00 - 3AFF TX FIFO number 4, size is 0x0D00
3B00 - 3BFF TX FIFO number 5, size is 0x0100
3C00 - 43FF unknown but modifiable
4400 - 7FFF unknown but fixed, not modifiable
Table 4.1: The memory structure of Template RAM
Object Memory is a virtual address space used to access different kinds
of information on the chip. It is accessed by selecting an object type,
and a 16-bit address space. Object types include Microcode Memory,
Microcode registers, Internal Hardware Registers and Shared Memory.
The latter is what we use for bookkeeping and communication with the
host when implementing algorithms. It is a piece of memory that is
mapped to a portion of the host RAM that is assigned to the firmware
when we load the driver. It is 4 KB in size and our observations show
that a large portion of it is unused by the normal MAC behavior. We
will go back to shared memory later on in this chapter.
Firmware is the microcode run on the core, and what we use to implement
our algorithms. We introduce it as a main component of the MAC func-
tionality because it defines what the adapter does and how it behaves.
It can be easily written onto the NAND Flash when we load the driver.
4.3 Related Work
The Broadcom platform has previously been used by [125] [126] as part of
FLAVIA [124]. In these publications, a new mechanism is introduced for
wireless cards using which one can visually change the MAC behavior and
modify the state machine to run their designed algorithms. In [125] they
have implemented schemes such as Piggybacked ACKs, Pseudo TDMA, and
Multi-channel access using their framework.
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4.4 Programming for Broadcom IEEE 802.11
Adapters
Broadcom BCM43xx programming has two major components: the driver,
which is executed by the host CPU. It is characterized by fast processing,
large amount of available memory, and communication capabilities with the
card; and the firmware, which is executed on the 802.11 core in the chipset.
It is characterized by low latency, low-level control, and high processing time.
A typical 802.11 core on the Broadcom bcm4318 has a 8MHz clock. This is
definitely slower than the host machine’s CPU, which is typically faster than
1GHz. Most of the applications need modification on both the firmware and
the driver as we will discuss later.
4.4.1 Firmware Programming
The firmware is a piece of code written on the card’s NAND Flash and exe-
cuted by the 802.11 core. This code is responsible for the MAC/PHY/Radio
functionality of the card and is what defines how the card works. It can be
overwritten by software on the host machine. Firmware modification is nec-
essary whenever we need low-level control over the MAC behavior, and when-
ever changing functionality requires communication with the card through the
shared memory, which can be slow. More detail about this will be provided
when when we describe implementations in later chapters.
To program for Broadcom chipsets we need a set of tools called b43-tools,
which are available from the project’s git-hub4. A list of these tools and their
functions is shown in Table 4.2. Our main focus is on b43-asm to assemble
the firmware and b43-fwdump for debugging.
In order to modify the firmware, we should extract the microcode, disassemble
it, find the piece of code responsible for our specific task, and then modify as
we want it to work. This can be a difficult task. Extracted firmware is a
series of instructions, and finding relations and figuring out the information
flow in the code is time-consuming. Fortunately this has been done before. As
mentioned before, we use the open-source firmware OpenFWWF as a basis for
our firmware modifications. It is a firmware assembly code where information
flow has been reverse engineered and the code is “beautified” (see Table 4.2
4https://github.com/mbuesch/b43-tools
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Tool Usage
b43-fwdump Dumping shared memory, register values, and firmware microcode (see Sec-
tion 4.4.1.1)
b43-beautifier Replacing constant expressions in raw disassembled firmware code with human-
readable names
b43-asm Creating binary firmware from human-readable assembly code
b43-dasm Disassemble extracted firmware microcode into human-readable assembly code
b43-fwcutter Extracting firmware from binary Broadcom 43xx driver files
ssb_sprom Convenient modification of the Broadcom Sonics Silicon Backplane SPROM
Table 4.2: Tools for b43 firmware development and debugging
for some details) and documented in the project home page [67]. It is worth
noting that OpenFWWF is NOT the original firmware included with the b43
driver and it has fewer capabilities. However, the version we use has all the
functionalities required for IEEE 802.11b.
The assembly of the firmware microcode is also documented on the sip-solutions
website [128] and thus all building blocks required are available to program for
Broadcom cards. Different revisions of the 802.11 core have slightly different
instruction sets. Table 4.3 is a list of instructions available in core revision
5 which is the core revision of the cards we use. The instruction set is quite
simple and lacks operations such as floating point operators and even multi-
plication (the latter is available in core revision 11). However, it provides the
essentials for implementing IEEE 802.11 on the card.
As an example of the assembly code, what follows is a piece of code used in
device initialization to erase the shared memory. The code is extracted from
OpenFWWF and some descriptive comments are added. The first line puts
the address of the last word of the shared memory in an offset (base) register5.
It is then followed by an inverse loop that clears the words one by one. This
code snippet is just to have an idea of how we program for Broadcom chipsets.
mov SHM_LAST_WORD, SPR_BASE5 // index = MEMORY_END
erase_shm: // Loop entry
orx 7, 8, 0x000, 0x000, [0x00,off5] // Set the word to zero
sub SPR_BASE5, 0x001, SPR_BASE5 // index = index - 1
jges SPR_BASE5, 0x000, erase_shm // While index > 0
5Offset registers are used for relative addressing of the shared memory, and as an alter-
native to using constant hard-coded addresses.
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Mnemonic Operands Description Operation
Arithmetic and logic instructions
add A,B,rD Add rD = A+B
add. A,B,rD Add, set Carry rD = A+B Save Carry
addc A,B,rD Add with Carry rD = A+B + Carry
addc. A,B,rD Add with Carry, set Carry rD = A+B + C Save Carry
sub A,B,rD Subtract rD = A−B
sub. A,B,rD Sub, set Carry rD = A−B Save Carry
subc A,B,rD Sub with Carry rD = A−B − Carry
subc. A,B,rD Sub with Carry, set Carry rD = A−B − C Save Carry
Branch instructions
jand A,B,l Jump if binary AND if(A&B)PC = l
jnand A,B,l Jump if not binary AND if(!(A&B))PC = l
js A,B,l Jump if all bits set if((A&B) = A)PC = l
jns A,B,l Jump if not all bits set if((A&B) 6= A)PC = l
je A,B,l Jump if equal if(A = B)PC = l
jne A,B,l Jump if not equal if(A 6= B)PC = l
jls A,B,l Jump if less (signed) if(A < B)PC = l
jges A,B,l Jump if greater or equal (sign.) if(A ≥ B)PC = l
jgs A,B,l Jump if greater (signed) if(A > B)PC = l
jles A,B,l Jump if less or equal (signed) if(A ≤ B)PC = l
jl A,B,l Jump if less if(A < B)PC = l
jge A,B,l Jump if greater or equal if(A ≥ B)PC = l
jg A,B,l Jump if greater if(A > B)PC = l
jle A,B,l Jump if less or equal if(A ≤ B)PC = l
jdn A,B,l Jump if diff is < 0, no carry if(nc(A−B) < 0)PC = l
jdpz A,B,l Jump if diff is ≥ 0, no carry if(nc(A−B) ≥ 0)PC = l
jdp A,B,l Jump if diff is > 0, no carry if(nc(A−B) > 0)PC = l
jdnz A,B,l Jump if diff is ≤ 0, no carry if(nc(A−B) ≤ 0)PC = l
call lrX,l Store PC, call function lrX = PC;PC = l
calls l Store PC, call function PC− > stack;PC = l
ret lrX,lrY Store PC, ret from func lrX = PC;PC = lrY
rets ret from function stack− > PC
jzx M,S,A,B,l Jump if zero after shift + mask
jnzx M,S,A,B,l Jump if nonzero after shift+msk
jext E,A,B,l Jump if External Condition true if(E)PC = l
jnext E,A,B,l Jump if External Condition false if(!E)PC = l
Bitwise instructions
sra A,B,rD Arithmetic rightshift rD = A >> B fillup sign
or A,B,rD Bitwise OR rD = A|B
and A,B,rD Bitwise AND rD = A&B
xor A,B,rD Bitwise XOR rD = AB
sr A,B,rD Rightshift rD = A >> B
sl A,B,rD Leftshift rD = A << B
srx M,S,A,B,rD Shift right over two registers
rl A,B,rD Rotate left rD = lrot(A,Bbits)
rr A,B,rD Rotate right rD = rrot(A,Bbits)
nand A,B,rD Clear bits (notmask+and) rD = A&( B)
orx M,S,A,B,rD OR with shift and select
Other instructions
nap none Sleep until event
Table 4.3: The instruction set of 802.11 core revision 5
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Something worth noting in the previous code snippet is the use of a compli-
cated instruction like orx 6 for setting a memory word to zero. One can argue
that this can also be carried out using a simple mov instruction, but sometimes
instructions like this are used in the firmware not only to perform the desired
task, but also to control the flow of the core (clearing the pipeline, etc.). In
cases like this, using the trivial approach might lead to unexpected behavior
that has roots in the architecture of the device.
When modifications are made, we take the steps below to install the new
firmware. If you are using OpenFWWF, you can simply execute make &&
make install in the source directory instead of steps 2 and 3, as these proce-
dures are incorporated in the Makefile that is included with the OpenFWWF
source.
1. Disable the driver by executing: modprobe -r b43.
2. “Compile” the firmware assembly using b43-asm.
3. Copy the assembled firmware files to the firmware directory in Linux
(typically /lib/firmware).
4. Enable the driver again, leaving QoS disabled (as it is not supported by
OpenFWWF) by executing: modprobe b43 qos=0.
4.4.1.1 Debugging Firmware Code
Testing and debugging are essential parts of software development in gen-
eral, and they are even more crucial when it comes to firmware programming.
Modifications we make to the firmware code might cause malfunction or even
kernel panics if we affect the integrity of the communicated content between
the firmware and the driver. However, debugging firmware code is more com-
plicated than debugging a piece of software on a PC.
Using modern debuggers, one can halt a running program at any point in
code, and observe the values of different symbols and variables. This helps
programmers find bugs in their code. They can also choose to execute their
6The orx instruction takes four arguments. The first two arguments define two adjacent
bit ranges on the word and the bits in each of the two ranges are then ANDed with the
corresponding bits of the following two arguments respectively.
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code line by line to see where an exception occurs or an unexpected behavior
initiates.
Unfortunately, these sophisticated features cannot be implemented for code
running on a chipset like BCM4318. The most important reasons for this
are: (i) firmware code runs on a single-threaded machine with memory and
processing power limitations; (ii) there is no external control on the flow of
the program, and even if this was somehow implemented into the firmware
itself, the resulting firmware code would be too large for the allocated space;
and (iii) there is no hardware support and capacity for running instructions
remotely. If there was such possibility, all firmware code could be handled by
a debugging program running on the host machine, and instructions could be
handed in to the 802.11 core one by one.
Although we cannot implement a sophisticated debugger for BCM43xx-based
chipsets, debugging them is not completely impossible. There is a very useful
tool in b43-tools, namely b43-fwdump, that facilitates debugging to some
extent. The tool can be used to dump shared memory, register values, and
even firmware assembly. In order to use this tool, a kernel module called
DebugFS must be installed, and the corresponding virtual file system must be
mounted. What exactly this module does is out of the scope of this chapter.
We will discuss DebugFS in more detail in Chapter A.
If b43-fwdump is executed without any arguments, it simply lists the values of
all general-purpose registers, offset registers, and the program counter (PC).
You still cannot pause the code at an arbitrary point, but you can practically
have the values of your variables at any time instant, as they are all stored in
general-purpose registers. Adding -s to the tool’s command line also prints
out the shared memory. Listing 4.1 is a partial example of b43-fwdump output.
Tracing registers and the shared memory can help us understand the firmware
operation. As we will discuss in coming chapters, a large portion of the 4 KB
shared memory is unused, which makes it convenient for storing traces, coun-
ters, or any other sort of information from within the firmware, which can
help us debug the code.
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Listing 4.1: Example b43-fwdump output. This is just the first page of the
trace. The complete output is lengthy as it prints out the whole shared mem-
ory. Each word in the architecture is 2 bytes long, which is why hexadecimal
representations of the data are grouped into 16-bit (4-digit hexadecimal) num-
bers in this output.
--- B43 microcode state dump ---
PC: 030 PSM -COND : 0000
Link registers :
lr0: 039F lr1: 03 EC lr2: 0059 lr3: 041D
Offset registers :
off0 : 041E off1 : 0504 off2 : 0370 off3 : 0391
off4 : 010E off5 : 011E off6 : F15F
General purpose registers :
r00: 000E r01: 0000 r02: 0000 r03: 000F
r04: 03 FF r05: 001F r06: 0007 r07: 0004
r08: FFFF r09: B382 r10: 0000 r11: 0001
r12: 0000 r13: 0000 r14: 0035 r15: 0000
r16: 001F r17: 4021 r18: 0035 r19: 0035
r20: 0105 r21: 0000 r22: 0000 r23: 0000
r24: 0000 r25: 0000 r26: 0000 r27: 0000
r28: 0000 r29: 00 A3 r30: 4789 r31: EB2C
r32: 0000 r33: 75 A0 r34: 0802 r35: 013F
r36: 9C6A r37: 0000 r38: 0008 r39: 0000
r40: 0000 r41: 0000 r42: 0000 r43: 0001
r44: 0001 r45: 0000 r46: 0000 r47: 0000
r48: 0000 r49: 0000 r50: 0000 r51: 0000
r52: 0000 r53: 0000 r54: 0000 r55: 0000
r56: 0000 r57: 0000 r58: 0000 r59: 0000
r60: 0000 r61: 0000 r62: 001F r63: 03 FF
Code :
<No binary supplied . See --binary option >
Shared memory :
0 x0000 : 9A01 7008 1A75 0A7C 0000 0000 C000 0A00 ..p..u .|........
0 x0010 : 1400 0000 8000 0900 4700 4700 8301 6400 ........ G.G...d.
0 x0020 : 3009 C0FC 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0103 0...............
0 x0030 : 0001 0000 0200 0200 0100 0400 1E00 0000 ................
0 x0040 : 0200 0000 0300 0200 0E00 4700 0028 0000 .......... G ..(..
0 x0050 : 0700 0200 C0FC 7E05 167F 7F7F 0A00 8300 ......~.........
0 x0060 : 0001 0000 0300 0000 0000 0000 0000 1200 ................
0 x0070 : 7F7F 7F7F 0100 0000 0000 0000 2C15 2258 ............ ,." X
0 x0080 : 0600 1027 0100 7391 1212 1010 5401 0702 ... ’..s ..... T...
0 x0090 : 0000 0000 6009 FA00 090D 0A08 0D01 0000 .... ‘...........
0 x00A0 : 0E00 0000 0000 3F01 FFFF 0000 0000 0000 ......?.........
0 x00B0 : 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 B403 B403 ................
0 x00C0 : 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0 x00D0 : 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0 x00E0 : 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0 x00F0 : 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0 x0100 : 0000 0000 26 F9 0000 0000 0000 9072 0000 ....&........ r..
0 x0110 : 7E08 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 92 B0 33 F9 ~.............3.
0 x0120 : 0000 0000 0000 9B05 5300 0000 0000 0000 ........ S .......
0 x0130 : 0000 0000 2CEF 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .... ,...........
0 x0140 : 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0 x0150 : 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0 x0160 : 4252 434D 5F54 4553 545F 5353 4944 0000 BRCM_TEST_SSID ..
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4.4.2 Driver Programming
The driver is a piece of software that is installed as a module on the host ma-
chine. The role of a driver is to communicate with the wireless card and bring
information from the card to the host machine and vice versa. In a Wi-Fi
card, this information is basically sent and received frames. The communi-
cation takes place through the shared memory. The term is generically used
for any piece of memory that provides communication between applications.
When used in the context of device drivers, it is also called Memory-mapped
I/O (MMIO)7. Figure 4.2 illustrates shared memory mechanism. As depicted
in the figure, a piece of host memory is mapped to an internal memory on
the chipset designated for this purpose. MMIO is a channel for the host and
the device to communicate. Each time either of the two counterparts of the
shared memory is modified, the modification is also applied on the other side,
although this does NOT happen instantly. In fact, this communication can
often be lengthy and sometimes unreliable if communication time exceeds the
validity period of the communicated information. Hence we cannot solely rely
on the driver for our implementations, especially if we have actions that need
to be performed within microseconds, such as ACK generation.
Figure 4.2: An illustration of shared memory
We use a package called compat-wireless [129] for the driver part. It is a
collection of open-source driver modules that build the wireless sub-system for
Linux, and it includes the b43 driver. In order to modify a driver, it is worth-
7This term is also used for memory-mapped file I/O, which should not be confused with
what we are discussing here.
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Stub Broadcom Implementation Function
tx b43_op_tx Transmit a frame
conf_tx b43_op_conf_tx Set transmission parameters
add_interface b43_op_add_interface Add an interface
remove_interface b43_op_remove_interface Remove an interface
config b43_op_config Change bands, channels, power, etc
bss_info_changed b43_op_bss_info_changed Act upon BSS info. change
configure_filter b43_op_configure_filter Configure filtering capabilities
set_key b43_op_set_key Set encryption key
update_tkip_key b43_op_update_tkip_key Update TKIP key
get_stats b43_op_get_stats Retrieve operation statistics
get_tx_stats b43_op_get_tx_stats Retrieve TX queue statistics
get_tsf b43_op_get_tsf Retrieve TSF timer
set_tsf b43_op_set_tsf Update TSF timer
start b43_op_start Initiate the driver
stop b43_op_stop Stop the driver
set_tim b43_op_beacon_set_tim Set TIM for beacon frames
sta_notify b43_op_sta_notify Notify the AP of station updates
sw_scan_start b43_op_sw_scan_start_notifier Start notifier for scanning
sw_scan_complete b43_op_sw_scan_complete_notifier Complete notifier for scanning
rfkill_poll b43_rfkill_poll Poll rfkill hardware state
Table 4.4: Broadcom implementations of mac80211 sub-system functions.
while first having an idea how drivers work under Linux. Each IEEE 802.11
driver in Linux consists of an implementation of a set of operations. These
operations are defined in the mac80211 module which is a part of the wireless
sub-system and is also included in compat-wireless. Table 4.4 shows a list of
these functions. The b43 driver has additional internal functions apart from
those required by the mac80211 sub-system. One example of such functions is
do_periodic_work, which is triggered periodically. The calling interval can
be modified in the driver source code. As you will see in later chapters, we use
this function to export periodic reports and to perform periodic calculations
related to our algorithms. The driver also provides the means to read from
and write to the shared memory, which is very useful for us.
4.5 Implementing and Testing Algorithms
In this section we will describe the process by which an algorithm is imple-
mented for use on a testbed using Broadcom adapters. Since implementing
algorithms is difficult and time consuming, we make sure algorithms have been
validated through analysis and often simulations before moving to this stage.
The first step is to think which parts of the algorithm can be implemented
in the driver, and which parts in the firmware. The speed/capacity trade-off
should always be kept in mind when making this decision. A task involv-
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ing heavy calculations on large amounts of data is an example of what is best
assigned to the driver. The firmware runs on an 8 MHz core and some instruc-
tions can take up to 4µs to execute. This makes heavy workloads unsuitable
for the firmware. Other tasks that should be assigned to the driver are report
generation and information dump. The reason for this is simply because the
host machine has access to all the resources and output devices required to
print out information or consume reports.
Tasks such as carrier-sense-based decision-making, ACK-dropping, and device
fingerprinting are implemented in the firmware. The reason is that these tasks
require access to the lowest level of the architecture, or save communication
overhead if done in the firmware.
The next step is to design a communication mechanism. We mentioned earlier
that any communication should be through MMIO, and we also mentioned
that this communication can be slow, and unreliable in the sense that changes
may not be mapped immediately. Therefore, we should minimize this com-
munication and also plan it so that delays in MMIO communication do not
cause misbehavior. Thus, deciding how much information should be shared
between the driver and the firmware and how this information will be shared
and consumed by either side is an important design decision.
After choosing how to split the algorithm and designing a communication
framework, we move on to the implementation. We usually finalize the driver
first, since it takes much longer to compile and deploy. Adding some runtime
signals and parameters8 to the driver can make things much easier and elim-
inate the need to recompile when small changes are necessary. The firmware
side should then be developed in line with the implementation of the driver
part. In our experience, the driver might also require some changes at this
stage, but a careful design helps us avoid this as much as possible. Program-
ming the firmware is more difficult, but deploying changes usually takes a
matter of seconds. Thus, the firmware can be developed and tested continu-
ally with little overhead.
The final step is testing and reporting. In order to see whether what we see
8Signals are anything that can be monitored by the driver, such as creation of a new
file. Linux drivers also have a capability of handling start-up parameters. The modprobe
command can send parameters to drivers as they start up.
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from the wireless card is what we should see, we need some reports. Report
generation is usually programmed into the driver and is aided by some shell
scripts. Deciding what reports are required depends both on the purpose of
the implementation, and on implementation details. We need reports to infer
results as well as reports to check the sanity of the implementation. The reason
we implement reporting at the end is that implementing reporting alongside
algorithm implementation brings more complication to both sides, and may
cause implementation mistakes.
The execution of tests and the collection of experimental results is accom-
plished using scripts. These scripts vary between simple shell commands that
connect wireless nodes and send traffic between them, and more complex
scripts that analyze and digest the information reported by the driver.
4.6 Conclusions
Experimental validation of wireless algorithms and protocols is important be-
cause we can see how they work in real world scenarios. Open-source drivers
for IEEE 802.11 adapters are now widely available and enable us to manip-
ulate the behavior of Wi-Fi cards. Some researchers have been using them
alongside theoretical validation and simulations. Broadcom BCM43xx wire-
less adapters have the advantage of facilitating low-level manipulation of the
protocol stack. There is open-source firmware available for these chipsets and
this makes them an asset in experimental validation. We briefly reviewed the
architecture of the Broadcom chipset and the development process around it.
The implementation of a behavior on a card consists of making two main de-
cisions. One is how to break the implementation into tasks handled by the
firmware and the host machine (driver); the other is deciding how these two
parts communicate and how much memory should be allotted to this commu-
nication. For evaluation of algorithms, we also need a reporting mechanism
implemented in the driver.
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CHAPTER 5
Policing Algorithm
With the increasing availability of flexible wireless IEEE 802.11 devices, the po-
tential exists for users to selfishly manipulate their channel access parameters and
gain a performance advantage. Such practices can have a severe negative impact
on compliant stations. A policing algorithm has previously been introduced that
enables the access point to counteract these attacks in wireless networks, and drives
misbehaving users into compliant operation without requiring any cooperation from
clients. In this chapter we discuss this algorithm and propose amendments to it by
the present work, which are aimed to overcome its shortcomings.
5.1 Introduction
Computers equipped with Wi-Fi devices that follow the popular IEEE 802.11
specification [5] employ a decentralized Medium Access Control (MAC) pro-
tocol to coordinate their transmissions on the channel. By design, this mech-
anism ensures compliant users connecting to a wireless network receive equal
opportunities to access the medium and in this sense share resources in a
fair manner.1 Each client station, however, operates independently and thus
anyone could act more aggressively in order to gain performance benefits if
changes can be made to the protocol behavior. This already occurs in practice
1This means equal channel access in the original version of the IEEE 802.11 protocol.
For later versions that include QoS, however, this equality is limited to traffic belonging to
the same access category.
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when network interface cards are not designed correctly as reported in [72],
where they find that the behavior of the card may even change depending on
the number of contenders. More critically, it can happen when users selfishly
manipulate their channel access parameters to gain a performance advantage
(see e.g. [97]). This can cause significant unfairness, with the performance of
the users that abide by the standard severely degraded [64, 65]. Such MAC
misbehavior attacks are of increasing concern as open-source device drivers
(e.g. MadWifi [66], compat-wireless [129], etc.) are prevalent and allow users
to modify the protocol rules either from the command line or with basic pro-
gramming knowledge. Looking ahead, the trend is towards introducing even
further flexibility, e.g. versatile architectures that allow changing the MAC op-
eration of commodity hardware by reprogramming the protocol state machine
with the help of simple visual tools [126].
For said reasons, misbehavior detection has received much attention from
the research community (see e.g. [103, 97, 64, 101, 98, 96, 95]). Existing
work, however, largely focuses on how undesired behavior can be achieved
with current cards and on engineering solutions that assist the AP in identify-
ing disobedient users, as well as the nature of their misbehavior. As discussed
previously in Chapter 3, only a limited number of proposals address counter-
acting greedy actions, and these suffer from significant practical drawbacks.
Dangerfield et al. propose an effective policing scheme [6] for IEEE 802.11
WLANs that overcomes the above limitations, since it does not require any
modifications to the protocol stack of client stations. It is implemented com-
pletely in the access point. By design, a key benefit of their policing algo-
rithm is that it does not require any information about the number of nodes
or the nature of their misbehavior. Thus it is effective against a broad class
of misbehaviors. With their policing scheme, the AP controls the through-
put of misbehaving stations by acknowledging their frames with a probability
that depends on the deviation of the stations’ throughput from the compliant
value. Decreasing the probability of acknowledgement causes a client sta-
tion to backoff its contention window, thereby reducing their throughput and
restoring fairness provided by IEEE 802.11 protocol.
An important feature of this approach is that it only requires measuring the
throughput of each client station, which is straightforward as all traffic passes
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through the AP in the infrastructure operational mode, and does not require
identification of the specific type of attack being used (e.g. shorter backoff,
frame bursting, etc.).
There are, however, shortcomings to their approach. An important unsolved
problem in the original work is the computation of the compliant throughput.
This throughput highly depends on network characteristics (e.g. number of
stations and volume of transmissions) and channel conditions. This value is
assumed to be known in the original work, and in their simulations, they have
precalculated it for each point. One of the main contributions of this thesis
is the introduction of a method to calculate this value on-the-fly, given any
network condition. The main importance of this addition is that it makes the
algorithm practical, and paves the way for its implementation on real hard-
ware. Another shortcoming of the policing algorithm that is addressed in this
thesis is that the punishment inflicted on non-compliant stations degrades the
network throughput as a whole, as those stations keep retrying their trans-
mission. This issue is solved by equalizing transmission attempt rates instead
of throughputs.
The last problem in the policing algorithm is that it can be gamed by a
smart station that is aware of the algorithm. In collaboration with P. Patras
and D. J. Leith, we have modified the policing algorithm so it is immune to
gaming. This will also be discussed in this chapter, along with the rest of the
aforementioned amendments.
The solution proposed in this chapter leverages the algorithm designed in [6],
but differs in that (i) it aims to control the attempt rate instead of throughput,
thus seeking to equalize stations’ channel access opportunities by driving the
channel access probabilities of all clients to the same value, regardless of the
contention parameters they employ, we effectively preserve short-term fair-
ness; (ii) it carries forward penalties, thus also achieving long-term fairness
provided by the standard; and (iii) it guarantees that the mechanism can-
not be gamed by attackers that detect its operation. In addition to all these
changes, we then introduce the Virtual MAC, a novel technique for estimating
the transmission attempt rate of a compliant station, and provide sufficient
analysis to demonstrate its efficacy. This concept has been previously used
in other contexts, such as service differentiation [130]. But in this work we
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extend the idea to compliant attempt rate estimation.
5.2 Policing Algorithm
In this section we explain the class of attacks that the policing algorithm
tackles and detail the operation of the policing algorithm. We also point out
the amendments this work proposes to the algorithm. We consider WLANs
with a single-AP (or, alternatively a group of co-operating APs) operating
in infrastructure mode, i.e. all packets are transmitted through the AP, as
this is the default and most widespread operational mode of today’s Wi-Fi
deployments.
5.2.1 Class of Attacks
In Section 3.3.1 we discussed different types of attacks on IEEE 802.11. Our
focus here is on IEEE 802.11 MAC layer attacks. We do not consider lower
layer PHY attacks such as ACK jamming, or higher layer attacks, such as
TCP ACK manipulation or station association attacks. We also confine con-
sideration to attacks that seek to obtain performance benefits, rather than
simply to disrupt the network operation through e.g. signal jamming [131], or
exploiting security vulnerabilities [132].
Our interest in this class of greedy MAC attacks arises from the observation
that they can be especially easily realized with currently available open-source
drivers, which allow manipulation of the MAC layer parameters (CWmin,
CWmax, AIFS and TXOP [5]), sometimes simply by issuing a single com-
mand on the system console (see e.g. iwpriv for Atheros-based cards). Each
of the attacks considered in this chapter correspond to the modification of
one of the aforementioned MAC layer parameters. Thus, they constitute an
exhaustive collection of possible attacks in this class.
Note that, despite the possibility of broadcasting set EDCA configurations
by means of beacon frames from the AP, non-compliant clients are free to ig-
nore any of the contention parameter values assigned through this (advisory)
mechanism and the prevalence of such open drivers provides them sufficient
incentives to do so.2 We assume WLANs implement an authentication mech-
2Consequently, earlier TXOP-based airtime allocation approaches (e.g. [35, 37] do not
provide effective policing when stations are misbehaving.
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anism such as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA2) [133], that prevents short and
repeated aggressive sessions facilitated by MAC address spoofing techniques.
Note also that the IEEE 802.11i standard ensures replay protection through
several mechanisms, of which the use of CCMP (Counter Mode Cipher Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol) or TKIP (Temporal Key
Integrity Protocol) procedures are particularly relevant to our scheme. Thus,
a selfish user will be unable to impersonate compliant clients and jeopardize
their reputation.
This can be adapted to open-access networks by augmenting it with a signal-
strength based MAC layer spoofing detector [134] or a passive device finger-
printing tool [135]. The resilience of the policing algorithm to more sophisti-
cated security attacks can be further strengthened if used in combination with
fine-grained PHY layer information [136].
5.2.2 Controller Operation
To tackle this class of attacks, the policing algorithm’s AP exploits the fun-
damental nature of the ACKs within the ARQ mechanism of IEEE 802.11.
Specifically, it uses the fact that stations will usually increase their contention
window and re-attempt to deliver a frame that was not acknowledged, be-
fore sending the next packet. By appropriately suppressing ACK generation
for non-compliant users, the AP can reduce their transmission rate and drive
them into compliant operation. We consider, for example, WLANs that op-
erate in a commercial setting where the service provider seeks to monetize
connectivity.
A naive solution that simply disassociates users with marginal, possibly acci-
dental, misbehavior (see e.g. [72]) would be operationally unacceptable. In-
stead, the goal is to effectively correct such behaviors. It is possible, though,
that a misbehaving station does not increase its contention window despite
not receiving ACKs. For such blatantly and deliberately misbehaving stations,
it is not possible to use ACK suppression to drive the station to compliant
operation and instead the policing algorithm adapts to drop all ACKs and
associated data packets, reducing the goodput of such misbehaving stations
to zero.
The key to the performance of this algorithm is the manner in which the
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rate of ACK suppression P iACK is adjusted for user i. Algorithm 1 details the
proposed approach.
Algorithm 1 Determining the rate of ACK suppression.
1: Initialize t = 0, pit = 0, P
i
ACK,0 = 0 for client station i,∀i.
2: loop
3: Estimate the maximum compliant transmission attempt rate x¯t,
given the current network conditions;
4: for each associated client station i do
5: Measure transmission attempt rate xit of the station; Update the
penalty:
pit+1 = max
(
0, pit + α
(
xit
x¯t
− 1
))
, (5.1)
where 0 < α < 1 is a parameter that drives the speed of
reaction to deviations from the compliant behavior;
6: P iACK,t+1 = min{pit+1, 1};
7: t← t+ 1;
8: end for
9: end loop
For each station, the algorithm works as follows. At each step t, it compares
the measured station attempt rate xit against the compliant value x¯t. The
meaning of attempt rate will be described in further detail in the next subsec-
tion. When the value of this metric is above the compliant value, the rate of
ACK suppression is increased, and vice-versa when the attempt rate is below
the compliant value. Thus at a fixed point we have x
i
t
x¯t
− 1 = 0, i.e. xit
x¯t
= 1 and
the station’s attempt rate is driven to the compliant value.3
Figure 5.1 shows an example of the policing algorithm in operation. In this
example we consider an IEEE 802.11g WLAN with three stations: two stations
use standard IEEE 802.11g parameters and the third uses a smaller value of
CWmin. The time evolution of the stations’ throughputs are illustrated as
the policing system operates, with the throughputs modeled using a two-class
Bianchi-like model described in [137]. Observe that while the more aggressive
station initially claims more throughput due to the increased transmission
attempt rate, the policing algorithm quickly adjusts the ACK drop probability,
so that the aggressive station receives lower performance.
3Note that to streamline notation, we will often drop the i superscript from now on,
provided there is no scope for confusion.
62
5.2. Policing Algorithm
5.2.3 Throughput vs. Attempt Rate
One might notice a difference between the original policing controller and the
one presented here. Dangerfield’s policing algorithm looked like the following
(notations have slightly changed to better match those described here):
P iACK,t+1 =
[
P iACK,t + α
(
Stc,i
Stf
− (1− γP iACK,t)
)]
0,1−ǫ
(5.2)
where Stc,i is the throughput of client node i and S
t
f is the maximum through-
put of a well-behaved node. This controller ensures that the throughput of
non-compliant stations is reduced until it converges to Stf . However, the non-
compliant station still sends packets, whether or not they are acknowledged,
and this takes channel time, and consequently degrades channel utilization.
The design parameter γ in the original algorithm aims to mitigate this issue
by adjusting the size of the penalty.
In the present work we take a different approach, and use transmission at-
tempt rate instead of throughput. This is the proportion of MAC layer slots
(with Bianchi’s definition) that the station attempts transmission in.4 The
rationale behind using this metric rather than the original throughput is that,
by design, the policing algorithm ensures standard compliance rather than
throughput fairness (see Chapter 3 for more information regarding fairness
and compliance). And transmission attempts and their timings are what de-
termine the standard compliance of a station. Hence the new metric better
fits the operation and the goal of the algorithm. Moreover, with this metric
in place, the γ parameter, which was originally added to address this channel
utilization issue, becomes superfluous and hence is omitted.
The algorithm requires an estimate of the maximum compliant transmission
attempt rate. That is, the TX rate that would be achieved by a client station
employing the standard recommended IEEE 802.11 MAC configuration. We
discuss in detail how to estimate this quantity in Section 5.3.
4Note that this attempt rate is different from the PHY modulation and coding rate used
by individual packets.
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Figure 5.1: Performance in a network with three stations, two using standard
IEEE 802.11g parameters, and one with CWmin = 16. The policing algorithm
is applied with α = 0.1, packet size is 1500 bytes and the stations are saturated.
5.2.4 Penalty Carry Forward
Since P iACK,t is a probability value, it can only take values in [0, 1], but for
aggressive attacks P iACK,t reaches 1 quickly. However, as we do not impose an
upper bound on the update of pit, we also consider a version of the algorithm
that allows to carry forward and accumulate the penalty when pit−P iACK,t > 0,
until the greedy station reverts to compliant operation or is otherwise disasso-
ciated. Thus we prevent gaining long-term advantage over compliant stations.
The effect of this change is discussed detail in Section 5.2.5.2 when the ro-
bustness of the modified policing algorithm is proven.
5.2.5 Mathematical Analysis
In this section, we first present an analysis for the convergence properties of
the policing algorithm. We prove convergence for Algorithm 1, but similar
results hold for the version that carries forward the penalty. Then, we study
the robustness of the proposed solution under attacks that seek to game its
operation with the goal of achieving long-term performance benefits.
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5.2.5.1 Convergence
We begin by establishing general conditions under which Algorithm 1 con-
verges to a fixed point. For well-behaved stations we have the following im-
portant result.
Theorem 5.2.1 (Well-behaved stations). For stations satisfying xt ≤ x¯t(1−
cPACK,t) for some c > 0, Algorithm 1 ensures limt→∞ pt = 0. That is, for
well-behaved stations the policing algorithm does not drop any ACKs.
Proof: First note pt ≥ 0 and if pt = 0 then subsequent terms are zero. If
the sequence does not become constant at zero, then the max with zero is not
active in Algorithm 1, and we consider two cases:
1. if 0 < pt ≤ 1, then
pt+1 = pt + α
(
xt
x¯t
− 1
)
≤ pt − αcpt;
2. if pt > 1, then
pt+1 ≤ pt − αc.
So, at each step, pt decreases by at least αcmin(pt, 1). Thus pt is non-
increasing and bounded below, and so convergent. As pt − pt+1 → 0 we
see αcmin(pt, 1)→ 0, and thus pt → 0.
Using a model such as [1], we can see that a station following the DCF standard
meets the conditions for a well-behaved station in Theorem 5.2.1. The attempt
rate will be proportional to the transmission probability (Bianchi’s τ) which we
can calculate as a function of PACK , the collision probability for the station
and other (fixed) MAC parameters. Figure 5.2 shows that for a range of
collision probabilities, these can be bounded with c ≤ 0.4. Note that with this
choice, αc < 1 and thus pt+1 cannot become negative in case 2) above.
We now show that in many reasonable situations with misbehaving stations
Algorithm 1 also converges. Firstly, for misbehaving stations whose transmit
attempt rates remain sensitive to ACK suppression we have the following.
Theorem 5.2.2 (Moderately misbehaving stations). Suppose the transmit
rate of a station satisfies the following conditions:
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Figure 5.2: Normalized attempt rate, xt/x¯t, for a standard compliant station
under a range of network conditions.
i) xt/x¯t > 1 when PACK,t = 0,
ii) xt/x¯t < 1 when PACK,t = 1 and
iii) xt/x¯t is strictly decreasing with PACK,t and Lipschitz with a constant
smaller than 2/α.
Then Algorithm 1 converges to a point where xt = x¯t.
Proof: Since xt/x¯ is strictly decreasing, there exists a unique value of PACK,t
where xt/x¯t = 1. We call this value P . Let Vt = (pt − P )2. Note that Vt is
positive definite and radially unbounded in pt and
Vt+1 = (pt+1 − P )2 ≤
(
pt − P + α
(
xt
x¯t
− 1
))2
.
Expanding, we find
Vt+1 ≤ Vt + α
(
xt
x¯t
− 1
)
(pt − P )

2− α
(
xt
x¯t
− 1
)
pt − P

 .
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Note that α > 0 and (xt/x¯t − 1)(pt − P ) is strictly negative except when
pt = P , so if
2 > α
(
xt
x¯t
− 1
)
pt − P ,
then we can ensure that Vt converges asymptotically to zero as t→∞. How-
ever, this condition is ensured by requiring xt/x¯t be Lipschitz in PACK,t (and
consequently pt) with a constant smaller that 2/α. Thus, as Vt → 0 we have
pt → P .
In the case of highly-aggressive stations for which the transmit attempt rate
cannot be made fair using ACK suppression alone (e.g. when backoff of the
MAC contention window has been disabled), we have the following.
Theorem 5.2.3. For stations where ∃c > 0 such that xt ≥ x¯t(1 + c) for all
PACK ∈ [0, 1], Algorithm 1 ensures PACK,t → 1.
Proof: By assumption, xt/x¯ > 1. Hence, pt+1 ≥ pt + αc. It follows that pt
increases to a value greater than 1 and so PACK,t → 1.
Of course, some non-compliant stations may not meet the smoothness condi-
tions for convergence of PACK . Indeed, the station might randomly choose an
attempt rate at any time. However, in the next section we show that in this
case the station cannot gain from any such strategy, even if does not converge.
5.2.5.2 Robustness
Next we consider a scenario where an attacker becomes aware of the policing
algorithm running at the AP and attempts to game its operation with the goal
of achieving a long-term benefit in terms of throughput. We demonstrate that
our scheme is robust to such sophisticated attacks by showing that, by design,
the algorithm will penalize any strategy that deviates from the compliant
behavior.
Suppose that the attacker seeks to maximize its goodput and we run the algo-
rithm that carries forward the penalty. The mean goodput over the interval
[0, T ] is given by
S(T ) :=
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt(1− pt) = x¯
T
T∑
t=1
(1 + yt)(1− pt) (5.3)
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where yt = xt/x¯− 1. Note, our policing update becomes
pt+1 = max (0, pt + αyt) , (5.4)
and if we iterate this backwards to the previous time t∗ where pt was zero, we
see
pt+1 = max
(
0, α
t−1∑
k=t∗
yk
)
.
Suppose there is a time T ∗ > 0 with pT ∗ = 0 but pt > 0 for 1 ≤ t < T ∗. Then,
we see
∑T ∗−1
k=0 yk ≤ 0, so the average attempt rate of the station up to time
T ∗ is less than that of a compliant station. As pT ∗ = 0, we may remove this
interval from our consideration and consider just the times from T ∗ onwards.
By repeating this argument, we see that we only need to consider the potential
non-compliant behavior of stations where p0 = 0 and pt = α
∑t−1
k=0 yk > 0 for
1 ≤ t < T . We have the following result.
Theorem 5.2.4. For policing Algorithm 1, suppose α
∑t−1
k=0 y ≥ 0 for 1 ≤
t < T . Let Y be an upper bound for yi and let ∆ > 1/α + Y be a positive
integer. Then, if T > ∆ and we consider the values of S(T ) as we vary
y1, . . . , yT−∆ and hold the other yi fixed, we find S(T ) is maximized by choosing
y1 = . . . = yT−∆ = 0.
Proof: With policing update (5.4) we have
pt+1 = α
t∑
k=1
yt,
and we consider terms in S(T ) as follows.
S(T ) = x¯+
x¯
T
T∑
t=1
yt︸ ︷︷ ︸
goodput gain
− x¯
T
T∑
t=1
(1 + yt)pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
goodput cost
(5.5)
Now,
T∑
t=1
(1 + yt)pt =
T∑
t=1
(1 + yt)α
t−1∑
k=1
yt
=
T∑
t=1
ytα
T∑
k=t+1
(1 + yk).
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So, the net relative gain is bounded by
T∑
t=1
yt −
T∑
t=1
ytα
T∑
k=t+1
(1 + yk)
=
T∑
t=1
yt(1− α(T − t))− α
T∑
t=1
T∑
k=t+1
ytyk.
Taking the derivative with respect to yi we get
(1− α(T − i))− α∑
t6=i
yi = α
(
1
α
− T + i−
T−1∑
t=i
yt + yi
)
which is negative when i ≤ T −∆ < T − 1/α− Y , as the sum is non-negative
and yi ≤ Y . Thus, to maximize the gain, we choose the smallest possible
values of yi subject to the constraint on the partial sums being non-negative.
Thus y1 = . . . = yT−∆ = 0.
This results confirms that no benefit can be obtained by deviating from the
compliant behavior over T − ∆ steps. Note however that an attacker could
potentially attempt to use a more aggressive transmit rate over the last ∆ iter-
ations before leaving the network, seeking to gain a small throughput benefit.
But the fact that we allow for the penalty to carry forward to future times
and consider networks that employ authentication prevents the occurrence of
such situations.
5.3 Compliant Attempt Rate Estimation
The main analytical contribution of this thesis is an estimation method for
compliant transmission attempt rate. As mentioned before, to decide whether
to police an associated station, our algorithm measures their performance and
compares this to the maximum transmission attempt rate a compliant client
would attain under current network conditions. The fact that network setup
and channel conditions affect this value, makes it impossible to be precom-
puted and hard-coded into the AP, and we need another way to find it at
each step. If we did have a compliant station in the network that was send-
ing saturated traffic, we could use its attempt rate as our measure. However,
this is almost never the case in a real network: real network traffic is often
bursty and sporadic. Deliberately adding such a compliant saturated station
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to the network is also undesirable because it wastes airtime with unnecessary
transmissions, and this has a severe negative impact on channel utilization.
The existence of service differentiation makes said scheme even less practical,
since we would need to have a saturated node for each traffic category.
5.3.1 Description of the Virtual MAC
According to what we have discussed so far, we need a mechanism for achieving
compliant attempt rate estimation non-intrusively, i.e. without injecting traf-
fic into the network or requiring message-passing between the AP and other
stations. To this end we run a virtual MAC instance at the AP that repro-
duces the operation of a compliant station, but does not release packets on the
channel. Instead, we monitor channel slots and check the outcome of “virtual”
transmissions, i.e. whether virtual attempts would have resulted in successes
or collisions. Based on these observations, the mechanism estimates the fail-
ure probability f experienced by a compliant station, which can be then used
to derive the attainable transmission attempt rate. Virtual MAC was first
introduced in [130] for service differentiation, as a tool for measuring packet
delays. We extended the Virtual MAC to additionally provide transmission
attempt rate estimation, to be combined with the policing algorithm.
We can run the estimator just like a normal DCF-based station, and replace
the transmission procedure by the procedure of observing the channel for the
slot the sending should occur. Thus a “virtual collision” is identified by the
channel becoming busy in that slot, and a virtual success is identified by the
channel remaining idle. However, we take an approach which is more suitable
for implementation on wireless adapters. We count idle and busy slots and
use them to calculate the transmission attempt rate using Bianchi’s model
[1]. According to this model, the probability of transmission τ of a compliant
station is defined
τ = 2
(1− 2p)
(1− 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1− (2p)m) (5.6)
where p is the probability of failure, W is the size of the minimum contention
window, and m is the maximum backoff stage (e.g. 5). Looking at this
equation, τ depends on the variable p, which in turn is dependent in the
number of contenders, channel conditions, etc.. In order to compute p, we use
the information collected by our Virtual MAC. Given the number of idle and
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busy “Bianchi slots”, p can be calculated as
p =
nb
nb + ni
where nb is the number of busy slots, and ni is the number of idle slots.
The logic behind this calculation is that transmissions fail if they collide with
other stations’ transmissions. So, if the virtual station were to transmit in
a slot already containing a transmission from another station, it would be a
collision. So it only considers that slot as a failure candidate, contributing to
p. Plugging the result in (5.6), we can calculate τ , and then the attempt rate
will be calculated as follows:
x =
τ(1− p)(nb + ni)
d
(5.7)
that is, the total number of slots that contain a successful transmission attempt
from the station per unit time (d is the duration of observation in the above
formula).5 This value can then be used as an estimate for x¯t in Algorithm 1.
In Section 5.3.2 we discuss in further detail whether and how we can use this
estimate.
Note, our Virtual MAC assumes all non-colliding transmissions are successes,
i.e. for chosen PHY rate there are no channel errors. This is the best case for
a real station, and so in the worst case we overestimate the attempt rate for
a compliant saturated station with channel errors. This will not result in the
punishment of a compliant station.
5.3.2 Mathematical Analysis
In this section we give a formal analysis of this approach and investigate
its accuracy. Suppose we have a network of n stations transmitting with
probabilities τ1, . . . , τn. Further, suppose that a station is saturated, for
instance station 1. Assume for now that this station is compliant. We can
write the failure probability due to collisions for this station as
f1 = 1− (1− τ2) . . . (1− τn). (5.8)
5A meticulous reader might note that (5.7) produces successful transmission attempts
rather than total number of attempts (i.e. including collisions). It is worth mentioning that
this is exactly what we are after. What we include as a failed attempt in our calculation for
policing is not a collision, but rather a successful attempt by a station that is deliberately
not acknowledged by the AP. With this definition, the Virtual MAC has no failed attempts.
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As the station is compliant,
τ1 = g(f1),
where g is a function mapping the failure probability to the transmission
probability and is given by [138]:
g(f) =
2(1− 2f)(1− fR+1)
W (1− (2f)m+1)(1− f) + (1− 2f)(1− fR+1)
+W2mfm+1(1− 2f)(1− fR−m) . (5.9)
In the above, W = CWmin, m is the maximum backoff stage and R denotes
the retry limit.
Consider now that the AP runs a saturated Virtual MAC instance. We can
similarly express the failure probability fv the Virtual MAC observes, as fol-
lows:
fv = 1− (1− τ1)(1− τ2) . . . (1− τn)
= (1− τ1)(1− f1) = 1− (1− g(f1))(1− f1), (5.10)
where the second line is derived from (5.8). g here is the compliant backoff
function given by (5.9). Note that if we know fv, we can solve the above for f1.
In Figure 5.3, we plot the relationship between the virtual and actual failure
probability of a saturated station. To add perspective, we also plot fv with a
dotted line. We observe that the difference between the two is relatively small
and reduces as the contention rate increases.
Since there is a one-to-one mapping from fv to f1, we could invert this6 to ob-
tain an exact value for the failure probability of a compliant saturated station
and apply (5.9) to compute the maximum achievable rate x¯ of a compliant
station. Another approach is to compute the virtual attempt rate, g(fv), and
scale this up by 14%, as numerical calculations of both the virtual and actual
maximum achievable attempt rate show this is a good estimate of their gap,
over a broad range of network conditions. To make this clearer, we plot τv
against τ1. As we just mentioned τ1 = g(f1) can be calculated using (5.9),
and τv is also a function of only f1, given by (5.10), so it can be calculated
similarly. Figure 5.4 shows this plot over its possible range. It can be seen in
6We can do it using a standard root finding algorithm, such as bisection.
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between failure probability of a virtual station and
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Figure 5.4: Relationship between failure probability of a virtual station and
that of a real compliant client.
the plot and the corresponding numbers that the difference between the two
lines never exceeds 13.5%.
On a more practical note, we can also see the effect of increasing network
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size on the transmission attempt rate of both the virtual STA and a saturated
compliant station, as network size is what actually affects failure probabilities,
and transmission probabilities as a result. We know that the transmission
attempt rate of a compliant station can be expressed as x1 = τ1(1−f1) frames
per slot. The error of the attempt rate of the virtual station Sv according to
S1, can be written as:
ev = 1− xv
x1
= 1− τv(1− fv)
τ1(1− f1) .
As this is a function of one unknown f1 and a function of just the behavior of
f of a compliant node, we can plot its possible range. Figure 5.5 shows the
evolution of attempt rates and the error, with increasing network size. As we
can see, the number of attempts decreases as expected while the Virtual MAC
estimation stays close to this measure. Even relative error in Figure 5.5b stays
small, less than the 14% we use.
The remaining question is how long should the channel observation period be
to ensure an accurate estimation of fv. To answer this, we regard the virtual
transmission attempt as a Bernoulli trial, whereby a failure is observed with
probability fˆv and a success with probability 1 − fˆv. By the central limit
theorem, if the number of observations N is large, the distribution of fˆv is
approximately normal with mean fv and variance σ2 = fv(1− fv)/N .
Say we want to compute the number of samplesN that gives us 95% confidence
that the estimated mean has precision ǫ, i.e. P (|fv − fˆv| > ǫ) < 0.05. The
confidence interval is fˆv ± zσ, where z = 1.96 is the z-score required for 95%
confidence. Since σ is unknown and fˆv(1− fˆv) ≤ 0.5, using this conservative
upper bound [139], N must satisfy
z
2
√
N
= ǫ.
Thus,
N =
(
z
2ǫ
)2
.
To translate this into an observation period required for a good estimation of
compliant performance before an update of the PACK probabilities, consider
the average slot duration in a network with saturated stations
E[Tslot] = Peσ + PsTs + PcTc,
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where Pe, Ps and Pc are the probabilities that a slot is empty, contains a
success, or contains a collision respectively, and σ, Ts and Tc are the corre-
sponding slot durations (see [1] for detailed calculations).7 Thus we compute
the observation interval that gives an accurate estimation of the mean as
Tupdate = N · E[Tslot].
To indicate the values Tupdate would take in practice for ǫ = 0.01, in Figure 5.6
we plot the necessary channel observation time for obtaining an estimate ac-
cording to the above requirements for different network conditions in terms of
number of saturated stations and assuming nodes send packets with 1000 byte
payload at 11 Mb/s (IEEE 802.11 HR/DSSS). We conclude, that an observa-
tion interval above 5 seconds will ensure a good estimation of the compliant
performance in many scenarios. In our experiments we conservatively use a
Tupdate = 10s for all tests. In what follows, we evaluate the performance of our
prototype in a real testbed and demonstrate its effectiveness under different
types of misbehavior.
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Figure 5.6: Observation time required to estimate fv vs. network size.
7Note that T [slot] is upper bounded by the length of a successful transmission Ts, which
is readily obtainable in practice from the “duration” field of correctly received frames.
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5.3.3 Adapting the Estimator to EDCA
We introduced Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA) in Section 2.4.
This DCF amendment introduces traffic categories, each of which can have
different contention parameters. With EDCA, high-priority traffic has a higher
chance of being sent than low-priority traffic: a station with high-priority
traffic waits a little less before it sends its packet, on average, than a station
with low-priority traffic. It might seem that the policing algorithm conflicts
with this scheme at first. We will explain here how this algorithm can be
adapted to work under EDCA without interfering with service differentiation.
We know that the goal of the policing algorithm is to ensure standard compli-
ance, and traffic with different priorities that still abide by EDCA standard
should not be penalized. To solve this problem, we recognize the fact that each
EDCA traffic category can have a different AIFS, and idle/busy slot counts
can be different. Different contention windows also cause variability in g calcu-
lation for different categories. A basic step in accommodating this variability
would be to introduce more than one instance of the Virtual MAC in the
AP: one for each traffic category. Thus, we can determine the attempt rate a
station can achieve in each AC. The next step would be dividing transmission
attempts of each station into different traffic classes, through TSPECs. So,
a station that sends traffic in two categories will be treated as two separate
stations by the policing algorithm, each of which judged by the corresponding
Virtual MAC estimate.
As the estimator uses Bianchi’s model [1], and said model is for a homoge-
neous network, it might seem challenging to extend the estimator to multiple
classes. However, it is more straightforward than it first appears. Bianchi’s
model of a Wi-Fi network has two components. One component relates the
probability of a station transmitting τ in an available slot to the probability
of collision, p, through a function, g that models the MAC. This is then com-
bined with a model of the network, which says the probability of no collision
is the probability no other station transmits.
Bianchi combines these in a homogeneous network to give τ = g(p) and 1−p =
(1−τ)n−1. The Virtual MAC only makes use of the function g to determine the
transmission probability τ from its estimate of the collision probability p, and
so does not depend on the homogeneous network assumption used elsewhere
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in Bianchi’s paper.
As access categories are determined by the MAC parameters CWmin, CWmax,
AIFS, and TXOP, we must show how to accommodate these in the virtual
MAC or estimator. The MAC parameters CWmin, CWmax and the maximum
number of retries are implicit parameters of the function g, and so can be
accounted for by selecting an appropriate g. The AIFS/DIFS MAC parameter
determines which slots should be considered when counting busy/idle slots,
and so can be accounted for by adjusting which slots are considered by the
Virtual MAC. Finally, TXOP changes the amount of time that can be used
for transmission, and this is accounted for by having the throughput estimator
count the extra time if a station exceeds its allocation.
To run the virtual MAC for multiple access categories, the Virtual MAC must
know the AIFS value for each access category i, and count the busy/idle slots
accordingly before calculating a per-access category collision probability pi.
Each access category will have its own function gi which accounts for the the
backoff parameters, so τi = gi(pi), allowing the calculation of the expected
throughput for that category. One barrier to this method, however, could be
implementation cost. As we will see in the next chapter, the driver runs the
algorithm, so it would be capable of running multiple instances of the Virtual
MAC. Nevertheless, the information needs to be stored on the shared memory,
which is relatively small. With EDCA in place, the memory required to store
station information will be multiplied by the number of ACs, which leads to
a reduced number of stations our algorithm can accommodate.
5.4 Limitations and Workarounds
In this section we discuss limitations of the policing algorithm. We discuss how
new IEEE 802.11 features affect the operation of the algorithm, and what can
be done to mitigate the effects. We also discuss the attacks that are immune
to the policing scheme.
5.4.1 New IEEE 802.11 Features
The policing algorithm was designed and analyzed for IEEE 802.11 b/g net-
works. However, these rather dated standards no longer rule the IEEE 802.11-
based WLANs. New amendments have introduced features that may make
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the policing algorithm less effective. In Chapter 2 we introduced some of these
features. Here we discuss how these features can affect the operation of the
algorithm, and how the algorithm can be amended to mitigate the effects.
5.4.1.1 Block Acknowledgements (BA)
As we described before, using this feature, instead of sending an ACK for
every single MPDU, a single ACK can be sent for a group of MPDUs. A
block acknowledgement (BA) can support up to 1024 data units (fragments).
Even with the modest 11Mb/s speed of IEEE 802.11b this many frames with
1024 bytes of payload would take less than a second to transmit, while the
policing iteration is usually much longer (see Section 5.3.2). Besides, data
rates in IEEE 802.11n are typically much higher than in IEEE 802.11b. So
the gap between ACKs does not create a problem for the algorithm, and
we can still achieve node policing by exploiting BlockACKs. A BA contains
a bit-map, each bit of which indicates the successful reception of a single
MPDU fragment. By distributing ACK-dropping samples over this bitmap,
we can implement the policing scheme. This is assuming that immediate
Block ACKs are used. Delayed Block ACKs are more complicated, because
there is no link between the frames and the Block ACK, which means that
the misbehaving station may have a long head start. However, this requires
further investigation, because of the choices left open to the implementor.
5.4.1.2 No ACK
This feature is intended for traffic that is time-critical. It prevents the retrans-
mission of such data, and corresponding frames are neither acknowledged by
the receiver, nor expected to be acknowledged by the sender. This feature can
be troublesome for the policing algorithm as it relies on the ACK mechanism.
With No ACK, the policing algorithm will not be able to operate normally
for that traffic class. A quick solution to this problem comes from the way
QoS works in IEEE 802.11. In order for a station to send a traffic stream
(TS) with specific QoS requirements, it should first send traffic specification
(TSPEC) for that TS. The AP can then choose to accept or reject the TSPEC
[140]. One solution would be to reject all TSPECs that include the QoSNoAck
policy, although it disables this feature altogether.
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Even if we don’t take this extreme measure, it does not mean that a non-
compliant flow will still gain benefit. Without the signaling provided by ACKs,
the station cannot be sure if the transmission was successful. Consequently,
it will be unaware of the punishment, and will not increase its contention
window. This leads to a persistent non-compliance which causes the policing
algorithm increase the ACK-dropping (or frame dropping in this case) proba-
bility to 1 and beyond, and eventually it can disassociate the station with the
non-compliant TS. Also note that frames will still be dropped, even though
there are no ACKs to be skipped.
5.4.1.3 Direct Link Setup
This feature can also disarm the policing algorithm at the AP, as there will
be no more central control when two stations in a BSS communicate directly.
The only real solution to this problem is again to disable this feature. In order
to setup a direct link, a station needs to send a DLS action frame to the AP,
and the AP needs to approve it. The policing-equipped AP can refuse all DLS
requests to always be in full control, or reject them from stations that have
exhibited significant misbehavior.
Another less elegant solution would be to implement the policing algorithm
in compliant stations. The AP can then use device fingerprinting [135] to
recognize trusted stations that are equipped with the policing algorithm, and
only allow DLS when at least one side of the pair is in the circle of trust!
However, this is a decentralized approach which is not in the spirit what the
policing algorithm is intended for.
5.4.2 Attacks That Are Immune
We described different types of misbehavior in IEEE 802.11 in in Section 3.3.1
of Chapter 3. In Section 5.2 we described classes of attacks the policing
algorithm covers and the reason behind that choice. In this section we put it
in perspective by describing attacks that can still be effective with the policing
algorithm.
Jamming attacks (see 3.3.1) are very good examples of attacks that are im-
mune to the policing algorithm. By jamming control frames, a station will
simply buy more time on the channel by continuously causing other stations to
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back off. The AP will not notice the misbehavior if the non-compliant station
uses correct EDCA parameters, and it will only assume that other stations
are not active. Packet forging attacks also have a similar results. Although a
smart AP can be programmed to detect packet forging attacks, the policing
algorithm alone cannot detect these attacks.
Furthermore, the policing algorithm neither targets nor is effective against
attacks that aim only to degrade network performance without an intended
gain for the attacker. Examples of these attacks include DoS attacks, and
those jamming attacks that don’t rely on higher layer information and frame
types.
While these attacks are hard or impossible to treat using the policing algo-
rithm, they are also hard to execute, and only a more highly skilled user
can implement them. The group of attacks we discussed in this chapter are
those that are both easy to implement and give the non-compliant station
throughput advantage.
5.4.3 Rate Control
The policing algorithm can have a negative impact on rate control algorithms
that rely on retries, as it forces retries. This can be a problem due to the
performance anomaly of IEEE 802.11 [21]. It is, however, compatible with
other rate control algorithms such as Minstrel [25]. The next chapter will
provide experimental results showing the impact of this algorithm on rate
adaptation algorithms.
5.5 TCP Traffic
As both the original and our extended version of the policing algorithm rely on
ACK-dropping for their operation, one might understandably ask the question
of whether this could have a negative impact on TCP’s congestion control. The
answer to this question is that TCP ACKs are on a higher layer than the IEEE
802.11 ACKs. For a TCP packet to be discarded, all MAC-level attempts to
send the corresponding frame must fail. For example if the IEEE 802.11 retry
limit is r = 7, then 7 consecutive frames must be dropped by the AP in order
for the TCP packet transmission to fail.
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So, the probability of a TCP packet being dropped will be P = P rACK = P
7
ACK ,
where PACK is the current ACK-dropping probability for the station. This
value is only 0.0078125 for PACK = 0.5, which is a relatively high ACK-
dropping probability. However, this also means that a station will lose about
1.5 packets on average if it sends 250 frames per policing iteration. For less
aggressive stations, this value will be even smaller, and marginally misbehav-
ing stations will see a healthy TCP link with reduced throughput due to lower
layer retries. This is desirable, as these limited losses will have little impact
on TCP’s congestion control.
For stations involved in significant misbehavior, the extra degradation caused
by TCP congestion control is not a big issue as it will reduce throughput and
our goal is to incentivize standard compliance. But we do not want to cause a
TCP backoff for compliant stations. As far as PACK is concerned, we will see
in the next chapter that it never goes above 5%, and is usually considerably
less in practice. For this ACK-dropping probability, the probability of a TCP
frame to be dropped is only 10−9, which we consider negligible. In Chapter 6
we run experiments to show the effect of policing on misbehaving as well as
compliant stations using TCP.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced a policing scheme that penalizes MAC misbe-
havior and preserves the fairness provided by the DCF in IEEE 802.11 wireless
networks. We chose this scheme because is executed at the AP and does not
require any modifications to compliant devices. We demonstrated the conver-
gence of our algorithm, and presented the proof for robustness to sophisticated
attacks that seek to game its operation.
We amended said policing scheme by adding a compliant attempt rate esti-
mator using a Virtual MAC mechanism, and showed that the estimation error
is limited and decreased when network size increases. We also calculated the
measuring interval required to achieve our desired accuracy.
The policing algorithm is designed to work under IEEE 802.11b/g. However,
it can also work with new IEEE 802.11e/n features such as block acknowl-
edgements, No ACK, and direct links, although in some cases solutions are
too complicated, or need decentralized control. Furthermore, while the algo-
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rithm treats greedy stations that do not comply with contention parameters, it
is not effective on jamming attacks and those attacks that aim only to reduce
network performance.
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CHAPTER 6
Experimental Evaluation
In the previous chapter we introduced an effective and robust policing algorithm to
counteract misbehaving IEEE 802.11 stations. This scheme is amenable to practical
implementation on existing commodity hardware. This chapter describes implemen-
tation details of the policing algorithm on such hardware, and provides a wide range
of experimental results which put the algorithm into test in different scenarios.
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the policing algorithm. As an important part
of the contribution of this thesis, we added a compliant transmission attempt
rate estimator to this algorithm, using a method called Virtual MAC (see Sec-
tion 5.3). With this mechanism in place, the policing algorithm is now feasible
for implementation on real hardware. To establish this feasibility, we present
a prototype implementation of the policing algorithm that uses off-the-shelf
hardware. We explain this prototype in great detail through flowcharts and
pseudocode. We validate the performance of our implementation by conduct-
ing extensive experiments over a wide range of misbehavior scenarios.
Experiments in this chapter are chosen to evaluate the performance of both
the policing algorithm and the Virtual MAC. We are interested in determining
whether the policing algorithm effectively penalizes attackers irrespective of
the network size, number of attackers and the parameters manipulated. We
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also want to show that our amended algorithm does not mistakenly penal-
ize compliant stations, even in complex situations where compliant stations
generate different volumes of traffic and so some clients consume the air time
underutilized by others. Further, we study the impact of the policing algo-
rithm on state-of-the-art PHY rate control algorithms.
As we discussed previously, the underlying principle behind the policing al-
gorithm approach is to control the throughput of attackers by censoring the
generation of MAC layer ACKs. Although this technique is used even in
works prior to the policing algorithm1, but to the best of our knowledge,
before present work, it has not been implemented with real devices, as this
fundamental operation is handled at the firmware level.
6.2 Implementation
To demonstrate that deploying the amended policing algorithm is feasible with
off-the-shelf hardware, in this section we present a Linux-based prototype im-
plementation that we developed and discuss details of the implementation
of the policing algorithm and the Virtual MAC technique for transmission
attempt rate estimation. You can see Appendix B for more information re-
garding the actual code.
6.2.1 Architecture
In order to implement the algorithm, we need to implement the suppression of
MAC ACKs with existing devices. This is a challenging task, since generation
of ACK frames is a basic operation that is handled at a low level within the
wireless stack, below the device driver. To tackle this challenge, we based
our implementation on an AP equipped with a Broadcom BCM4318 wireless
adapter that employs the OpenFWWF firmware [67]. The key advantage of
using this open-source firmware is that it allows modifying the MAC protocol
state machine running on the device, as already reported in [141, 125]. How-
ever, as we mentioned in Chapter 4, the firmware runs on a modest 8 MHz
processing unit on the network interface card. So the more computationally
demanding operations of the algorithm need to be managed by the driver
which resides on the host machine.
1ACK skipping has been suggested as an effective means to allocate bandwidth for
traffic prioritization in a network of well-behaved nodes [109, 110, 111]
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Figure 6.1: Schematic view of the policing algorithm implementation
Figure 6.1 illustrates the essential building blocks of our prototype. As shown
in the figure, the implementation is split between the firmware and the driver.
The former handles bookkeeping of per-station frame count, channel monitor-
ing and ACK generation, while the latter manages the TX rate computation
and updating the ACK suppression rate for each associated client based on
the policing algorithm. Note that the two parts can communicate using the
4 KB shared memory shared memory (see Chapter 4). Since a large portion
of this remains unused during normal operation of the card we use it to store
the information pertaining to each station and required by our algorithm. To
maximize the efficiency of this small memory and inherently time-consuming
communication, we design a data structure in the shared memory that holds
required information with minimum space requirement.
Figure 6.2 shows the structure of the memory allocated for policing. The
allocated memory starts with a hash map. This part of the memory block is
512 bytes long, and contains 256 words, each of which can contain a single
memory address. The addresses stored in this hash map point to memory
locations of the following record table, and are used for fast lookup in this
table.
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Figure 6.2: Memory structure used to store policing data. The hash map
items point to per-station information elements.
As you can see in Figure 6.2, each record in the table contains three pieces of
information. The longest piece of information is the station’s MAC address,
which is 3 bytes long. This is to confirm the address resolved by the hash
function. In case of a hash collision, a different slot is chosen using open ad-
dressing. The second part of a record is the current number of frames received
from the station, and the third part is the probability of ACK-dropping. This
field is not a floating point number, but rather a 16-bit integer. A value of 0
for this field corresponds to PACK = 0, and a value of 65535 corresponds to
PACK = 1.
To summarize the operation of the implementation, when a frame arrives, the
AP quickly looks up in the hash map, and creates a record in the table if nec-
essary. Then it uses the ACK-dropping probability field to determine whether
it should drop the ACK. It then increments the frame counter. Once every it-
eration, the P tACK needs to be updated for each record. The AP goes through
all valid records, and uses (5.1) to update the probability. Subsequently, it
also clears the attempts field (sets it to zero) to mark the beginning of the
next iteration. Next, this operation will be explained in further detail.
6.2.2 Firmware Implementation
We implement ACK handling in the firmware, as this is a highly time-sensitive
operation. Specifically, the decision whether or not to acknowledge a correctly
received frame must be made within SIFS time and thus must not be inter-
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rupted or delayed by other tasks. For each frame received with a correct frame
check sequence (FCS), the lookup routine hashes the source MAC address to
retrieve the pointer storing the information for the corresponding station. If
such record does not exist, this routine creates one, and returns the new record
instead. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode for the lookup routine.
Algorithm 2 MAC address lookup routine.
1: function Policing-Lookup(addr)
2: hash← h(addr);
3: if map[hash] not set then
4: list.size← list.size+ 1;
5: map[hash]← list.size;
6: return list[list.size];
7: else
8: while list[map[hash]].address 6= addr do
9: hash← hash+ 1;
10: end while
11: return list[map[hash]];
12: end if
13: end function
After finding the data record for the station, the firmware increments the
frame counter for the sending station. We then fetch the corresponding PACK
value, and use it together with the internal random number generator (RNG)
of the BCM4318 chipset to decide whether to generate or suppress the ac-
knowledgement. If the frame is not acknowledged, the memory allocated for
the packet is released and the state machine returns to idle state. Conversely,
if we decided to send an ACK, we jump to ACK generation from here. This
procedure is depicted in Algorithm 3. The Random function in this algorithm
returns the value of the internal 16-bit integral RNG register.
Virtual MAC is more complicated, as it must capture and interpret carrier-
sensing information. In b43 chipset, a special-purpose register called IFS_STATUS
always holds the current channel state. We can use this register to determine
when the channel goes busy and idle.2 Algorithm 4 shows a single iteration
of the VMAC operation within the firmware. This procedure is placed in
the firmware’s idle process, and is continuously called whenever the device is
2This register holds a bitmap of flags, and channel busy/idle status is only one of the
flags it provides.
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Algorithm 3 Policing firmware implementation.
1: procedure Police-Frame(frame)
2: sta← Policing-Lookup(frame.addr);
3: if frame.type 6= DATA then return ;
4: end if
5: sta.attempts← sta.attempts+ 1;
6: if Random < sta.P then
7: Discard-Frame(frame);
8: end if
9: end procedure
idle. It is normally called by the firmware every 1µs (for more information
regarding the firmware architecture, see Chapter 4).
Algorithm 4 Virtual MAC firmware implementation.
1: procedure Virtual-MAC-Iteration(time, state)
2: if first call then
3: store.start_time ← time;
4: store.cur_state ← INV ALID;
5: store.prev_state ← BUSY ;
6: end if
7: if mem[cur_state] = state then
8: return ;
9: end if
10: backup_state← store.cur_state;
11: store.cur_state← state;
12: diff = time− store.start_time;
13: if diff ≥ 50µs & store.prev_state 6= backup_state then
14: store.prev_state← backup_state;
15: if backup_state = BUSY then
16: store.busy_slots← store.busy_slots+ 1;
17: else
18: store.idle_time← store.idle_time+ diff ;
19: end if
20: store.prev_state← backup_state;
21: end if
22: store.start_time← time;
23: end procedure
Note the object called store in said algorithm. You can assume that members
of this object are preserved between calls, and can also be shared with the
driver. This imaginary object notation is solely for ease of understanding. In
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the real implementation, each field of this object is in fact a word in the shared
memory, and is accessed by its address within the firmware. The main output
values of this Algorithm 4 are store.busy_slots, and store.idle_time which
are later retrieved and used by the driver.
One thing you may notice in Algorithm 4 is that we ignore spikes that are
shorter than 50µs. This is due to the fact there are so-called “training se-
quences” in which the device tries to determine noise level. In a training
sequence, the signal is amplified and the hardware may show the channel as
busy, even though it is free. However, these spikes are always small, and
shorter than 50µs.
6.2.3 Driver Implementation
As we discussed in 4.5, the driver code runs on the CPU of the host and can
perform calculations more quickly. So, the policing update which controls the
penalty associated to each client is implemented in the driver. We modify the
b43 driver of the open-source compat-wireless [129] package to manage the
more computationally demanding operations of our algorithm.
The computation of the transmit rates and updates of the penalties according
to (5.1) are executed at configurable discrete time intervals3, when the driver
reads the information stored in the shared memory for each associated station
and performs the following operations: (i) computes the transmission attempt
rate of each station based on the frame count, (ii) estimates the compliant
attempt rate, and (iii) updates the ACK-dropping probabilities P iACK and
writes their values back into the corresponding blocks, and (iv) resets frame
counters.
So far we know how ACK-dropping probabilities are used in the firmware.
Algorithm 5 shows how they are assigned in the driver. It uses the principles
described in 5.3). Arguments store and list represent shared memory data
structures, and use the same notation as previous algorithms. You may have
noticed the use of a method Selective-Copy in this algorithm. This method
copies only the MAC address, and the attempt counter from a record, and
3To do this, we leverage a function called do_periodic_work in the b43 driver, which
is normally used to perform periodic driver-specific tasks.
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leaves the destination P untouched. The PACK is fully controlled in the driver,
and is never modified by the firmware.
Algorithm 5 Policing driver implementation.
1: procedure Policing-Iteration(list, store)
2: for i from 1 to list.size do
3: driver_list[i]← Selective-Copy(list[i]);
4: list[i].attempts← 0;
5: end for
6: x¯← Virtual-MAC-Estimate(store)
7: for i from 1 to driver_list.size do
8: sta← driver_list[i];
9: x← sta.attempts;
10: if x > 0 then
11: p← sta.P ;
12: p← max(0, p+ α(x
x¯
− 1));
13: sta.P = p;
14: list[i].P ← min(1, p);
15: end if
16: end for
17: end procedure
You may also notice that we go through the station record list twice. On the
first pass, we copy the whole list locally and reset the source counters, and on
the second pass, we do the actual work. The reason we don’t do everything in
one pass lies in the fast-paced nature of the firmware task. As new frames can
arrive every millisecond, we want to mark the beginning of a new iteration
(with zero attempt counters) as quickly as possible, before moving on to more
time-consuming tasks.
While above reason may justify local bookkeeping and its inherent redun-
dancy, there is another reason for this, which is as important. Remember
from Chapter 5 that the ACK-dropping probability can exceed 1, and our
driver implementation precisely handles that. However, the simple firmware
code cannot handle probabilities greater than 1. So, indeed we need two copies
of each probability: one that is handled by the driver as is unbounded from
above, and one that is reported to the firmware, and is bounded by 1. That
is exactly why Selective-Copy does not copy P from the shared memory, as
it could have less information than the local copy.
The final piece of the puzzle in Algorithm 5 is the Virtual-MAC-Estimate
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method, which is the driver part of the Virtual MAC. Algorithm 6 shows
the pseudocode for this method. In this algorithm, nbusy, tidle, ntotal, and
m represent the busy slots, idle time (in µs), total number of slots, and the
scaling multiplier (e.g. 1.14) respectively. Also, dAIFS and dSLOT represent
durations of AIFS and a time slot respectively.
Algorithm 6 Virtual MAC driver implementation.
1: procedure Virtual-MAC-Estimate(store)
2: nbusy ← store.busy_slots;
3: tidle ← store.idle_time;
4: Reset store values
5: if nbusy > 0 then ⊲ VMAC is in operation
6: ntotal ← nbusy + (nidle − nbusy ∗ dAIFS)/dSLOT ;
7: fv ← nbusy/ntotal;
8: Using Bianchi’s model [1]:
τv ← 2 1− 2fv
(1− 2fv)(W + 1) + fvW (1− 2fmv )
where W is the minimum contention window;
9: return mτv(1− fv)ntotal
10: else
11: return Alternate-Estimation-Method
12: end if
13: end procedure
6.2.4 Verification
Modifying the firmware and the driver may alter the normal behavior of the
wireless adapter in unwanted ways. In order to verify the correct behavior
of the updated software, we used the tool described in Appendix A. We used
a compliant device in the initial tests to only focus on whether the changes
have an impact on anything beyond their scope. For all measurements in this
section we used a compliant station sending saturated traffic with payload size
of 500 bytes.
First we measure the duration of the frame with the tool. The resulting aver-
age over 180 seconds was 603.1, with the expected value being 604.9 (see sec-
tion A.3.1 for information regarding the computation of the expected value).
We also measure the average inter-frame space, which was 15.7 over the three
minutes. Although this value differs from the expected value of 16, it was the
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Figure 6.3: Plan of the room where our testbed was situated
same with and without the modifications. Finally, we check the throughput,
which is 830.35 packets per second for the original firmware, and 830.33 for
our modified firmware. This compares to the expected value of 844.206. Ac-
cording to measurements such as the ones described above, we deduce that
the implementation has not had any effect on the normal behavior of the card,
and we move on to testing the algorithm itself.
6.3 Experimental Setup
Heaving designed and implemented the policing algorithm, we can now eval-
uate its performance in a real testbed. In this section we describe the testbed
and the environment we used for our experiments. The testbed was set up in
an empty office at the end of a corridor on the edge of Hamilton Institute in
the Rye Hall building in Maynooth University4. Figure 6.3 shows the plan of
the testbed room. Although there were some old computer equipment on the
desk at the bottom of the picture, the room was empty and dedicated to the
tests.
Our testbed consisted of 8 stations, and an AP. For the stations, we use Soekris
Engineering Inc.’s net4801 embedded PCs. Each of the stations is equipped
with a Atheros AR5001X+ chipset wireless adapter. The operating system
4Hamilton Institute has since moved to a new building.
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installed on the stations is Debian with kernel version 2.6.32.16, and they use
the ath5k driver. The ath5k driver is modified so the contention parameters
it uses can be specified on modprobe.
The AP is a Dell Dimension 3100C desktop computer with an Intel(R) Celeron(R)
CPU (2.80GHz), and 1 GB of main memory. The AP, too, runs Debian, and
it is equipped with two wireless adapters. A Broadcom BCM4318 adapter
is used for the policing algorithm, and an Atheros AR5004-based adapter is
used for sniffing packets over the channel. The latter is for the sole purpose
of debugging, and was not active during tests. For the Broadcom adapter we
use the b43 driver and OpenFWWF [67], with modifications presented in the
previous section.
The clients use Atheros AR5212 chipset adapters and the ath5k driver, which
are modified to allow manipulating the MAC parameters by simple commands
from the system console. All nodes employ the IEEE 802.11 HR/DSSS phys-
ical layer (IEEE 802.11b) and, unless otherwise stated, do not perform rate
adaptation. The reason we use IEEE 802.11b is mainly due to the fact that
the open-source firmware only works under this protocol. In Chapter 5 we
described how the algorithm can be adapted to newer versions of the IEEE
802.11 standard.
Unless otherwise stated, we consider all nodes to be backlogged and to send
unidirectional UDP traffic to the AP. In all cases, we measure the performance
of the stations when the network is operating with a standard AP and an AP
running the policing algorithm configured with the following settings: α = 0.2
and Tupdate = 10s. Table 6.1 shows an overview of all experiments conducted
in this chapter.
6.4 Controller Validation
First we study the impact of four types of attacks that can be easily im-
plemented with current hardware, whereby aggressive MAC settings are used.
Specifically, we investigate the scenarios where an attacker seeks to obtain per-
formance benefits by employing more aggressive configurations as follows: (i)
contending with a CWmin parameter half the default value (“CWmin Halved”),
(ii) disabling the Binary Exponential Backoff (BEB) mechanisms while keep-
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Parameter Figures Comments
MAC protocol
IEEE 802.11b All Fully supported by OpenFWWF
Packet Size
Fixed (∼MTU) 6.5–6.19, 6.27–6.31 MTU sized packets common, fre-
quently used for evaluation
TCP generated 6.20–6.26 TCP is most common transport
protocol
Application generated 6.26 Based on typical current applica-
tions
Number of Active Stations
2–8 all Small to medium network sizes
Traffic
Saturated/CBR 6.5–6.15,6.27–6.31 Basic type representing busy sta-
tion
Specific on/off 6.16–6.17 To show reactiveness of system
Periodic on/off 6.18–6.19 Basic strategy to game policing sys-
tem
TCP 6.20–6.26 Both long file uploads and shorter
transfers
Application 6.26 Specific to selected applications
Station Behaviour
Compliant all Baseline behaviour, also used to
verify baseline is not penalised.
Incorrect CWmin/
AIFS/CWmax /TXOP
6.5–6.25 Adjustable MAC parameters in
many drivers.
Rate Adaptation
Fixed (11Mbps) 6.5–6.26,6.31 Typical rate used for evaluation of
802.11b for evaluation without dy-
namics
Minstrel 6.27–6.30 Default rate controller for Linux
mac80211 layer
PID 6.29–6.30 Other implemented controller for
Linux mac802.11 layer
Table 6.1: Summary of Experiments
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S3 (compliant)
S2 (compliant)
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Figure 6.4: Network topology
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Figure 6.5: Performance under different types of attacks. Throughput shown
above, attempt rate below. Experimental results.
ing a smaller CWmin setting (“CWmin=CWmax”),5 (iii) using a shorter inter-
frame space post-backoff (“AIFS = SIFS”),6 and (iv) retaining the access
to the medium for 6.413ms by violating the TXOPlimit parameter (“Large
5Note that compliant devices employ CWmax > CWmin settings to reduce failure prob-
ability upon subsequent attempts, thus being less aggressive.
6AIFS ≥ 2σ+ SIFS is the amount of time a station is required to sense the channel idle
before entering the backoff procedure. SIFS=10µs is the short inter-frame space. σ is the
duration of an idle slot.
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TXOP”), thus being able to transmit multiple frames upon a single attempt.
In these scenarios we consider a simple network topology with one attacker
sharing the medium with two compliant stations that contend for the channel
using the default MAC parameters specified by the IEEE 802.11 standard
(i.e. CWmin = 32, CWmax = 1024, AIFS = DIFS = 50µs, TXOP = 0). The
network setup used for these experiments is depicted in Figure 6.4. Each client
is saturated and transmits 1000-byte UDP packets to the access point for a
total duration of 3 minutes. We measure the throughput and attempt rate
performance of each station under each scenario, with and without the policing
algorithm running at the AP, and repeating each test 13 times to compute
average and 95% confidence intervals with good statistical significance.
Figure 6.5 shows the throughput and attempt rate attained by each client in
each of the scenarios considered, both with and without our policing algo-
rithm running at the AP. To add perspective, we also plot with a dotted line
the performance of one station when when all clients behave correctly (“All
Compliant”). Observe that an attacker using a smaller CWmin attains nearly
twice the throughput of complaint stations if not policed, while reducing the
throughput and attempt rate of the compliant stations (“CWmin Halved”, light
bars). When we activate the policing algorithm (dark bars), this behavior is
effectively counteracted, as our solution equalizes the attempt rates, while
the attacker sees its throughput performance reduced. If this attack becomes
more aggressive (“CWmax = CWmin”, light bars), e.g. the non-compliant sta-
tion uses a fixed contention window and thus does not backoff upon failures,
the policing algorithm rapidly increases the ACK-dropping probability corre-
sponding to that client to 1, thereby disassociating the attacker from the AP.
This is reflected in both the attempt rate and throughput performance, which
are effectively zero when policing is applied (dark bars).
A more subtle attack could employ a short post-backoff inter-frame space,
e.g. the greedy station only waits SIFS before a new attempt, which is the
minimum time separating two consecutive frames. Although less significant
(since the attacker can sometimes randomly select a large backoff counter and
wait more than other stations that wait DIFS plus a short backoff value),
the attacker still achieves performance gains to the detriment of the other
stations in the network (“AIFS=SIFS”, light bars). Once again, if we execute
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the policing algorithm at the AP, the transmission attempt rates are equalized.
Lastly, if the attacker transmits several frames upon a single channel access
(“Large TXOP”), their throughput performance is significantly higher than
that of the compliant stations if no action is taken. In contrast, with our polic-
ing algorithm, attempt rates stay equal and the attacker sees their throughput
throttled down below the value corresponding to compliant operation.
Let us now take a closer look at the behavior of the controller implemented
by our scheme. Specifically, we are interested in validating the convergence of
the algorithm under different attacks. For this purpose, we examine the time
evolution of the network performance for all scenarios. We begin by the case
where all stations are compliant. In our tests, not a single frame was dropped
by the AP, although p was slightly increased at some points. Figure 6.6
shows this change. The error bars are calculated over thirteen experiments.
Their large size shows that there are only random spikes of slightly positive p.
The reason for these spikes is that, although we overestimate the compliant
attempt rate, the virtual station is still contending with stations that use
random backoff. Hence there are isolated instances that those stations get a
slightly higher share of the channel than the virtual MAC.
Further, Figures 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10 show throughput and attempt rate for
the attacker and a compliant station, as well as the penalty applied by the
algorithm. Most of these cases converge in 5 to 6 iterations. We can reduce
the convergence time by either using a shorter iteration time (10s is relatively
high, and is used only to reduce randomness in the graphs), or a larger α
value, which determines the rate of adaptation.
In most cases, observe that the policing algorithm successfully brings the
attempt rate of the attacker down to that of a compliant client (middle graph),
while their throughput is reduced (top graph). An exception to this is the
CWmin=CWmax case (Figure 6.8), where the penalty is increased much further
than 1, and the station can no longer get any frames through. This is a good
example of the case where we have an option to disassociate the station.
However, we don’t do that in our tests and. The result is that the station still
sends some traffic bursts every once in a while, which fail due to the high p
value.
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Figure 6.6: Time evolution of penalty when all stations are compliant.
What is also important to remark is that the algorithm is close to convergence
after a few steps. Based on the results, within 5 iterations, p is within 10% of
its long-term value. Convergence time is shorter for more aggressive attacks
(i.e. with manipulated TXOP), and it can be further reduced by choosing a
larger α parameter.
6.4.1 False Alarms
Further, we verify that our algorithm does not unnecessarily penalize com-
pliant stations, i.e. does not trigger false alarms, due to the channel access
randomness inherent in 802.11 DCF. Results we discussed previously show
little or no penalty for compliant stations.7 To put this in perspective, we
examine the time evolution of a station’s attempt rate, the maximum achiev-
able attempt rate estimated by our algorithm, and the penalty applied to each
client. We investigate these with the same network settings (three backlogged
stations) in two scenarios, namely all stations compliant and respectively one
of them misbehaving with a CWmin half the default value. As we show in
Figure 6.12, our estimate closely follows the actual performance attainable
by a compliant client, and consequently the penalty applied to these exhibits
only small variations above zero. To put things in perspective, we plot a 0.02
7In all experiments in this chapter, the controller adds 14% to the Virtual MAC esti-
mation. See Section 5.3.2 for the explanation of this amount.
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Figure 6.7: Time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and penalty for a
compliant and a non-compliant station (CWmin halved).
100
6.4. Controller Validation
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
[Fr
am
es
/s]
Attacker
Compliant STA
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180
At
te
m
pt
 R
at
e
[Fr
am
es
/s]
Attacker
Compliant STA
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180
p
Time [s]
Attacker
Compliant STA
Figure 6.8: Time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and penalty for a
compliant and a non-compliant station (CWmin halved and CWmax = CWmin).
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Figure 6.9: Time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and penalty for a
compliant and a non-compliant station (AIFS = SIFS).
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Figure 6.10: Time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and penalty for a
compliant and a non-compliant station (TXOP = 6.413 ms).
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penalty threshold and confirm that the percentage of times the penalty applied
to compliant clients exceeds this value is zero in all scenarios.
6.4.2 Impact on Network Throughput
While the policing algorithm is designed to enforce standard compliance and
ensure the fair channel access provided by the standard, it does have a negative
effect on overall airtime utilization. In this section we study this impact and
its implications. We use the experiments presented in Figure 6.7, when a
non-compliant station uses half the standard minimum contention window.
Figure 6.11 shows the effect of policing on network utilization. It compares
two scenarios, (i) the original scenario where there is one misbehaving and 2
compliant stations, and (ii) where all three stations are compliant. As shown
in the top graph, the network throughput decreases when we begin policing
the misbehaving station, and this decrease brings it to a lower value than
when all stations behave normally. The reason is that the AP drops ACKs for
more frames as p increases, but those frames still take up channel time.
However, the middle graphs shows that compliant stations still return to what
they would get in the all-compliant case after a few iterations of the algorithm
(within 5 iterations, the error bars overlap), so this network degradation does
not impact compliant stations at all. To understand where the extra through-
put goes, note the throughput evolution of the non-compliant station in the
same graph. This station gets a penalty that reduces its throughput to a
much lower value than if it was compliant. The high penalty value helps put
the expense of lost channel time solely on the non-compliant station. There-
fore, while policing does impact network throughput, this only affects non-
compliant stations. This is why we use attempt rates instead of throughput
or successful frame count, as we discussed previously in Section 5.2.3.
6.5 Impact of Other Stations
Increased network size affects the estimate provided by the Virtual MAC as
well as the impact of non-compliant nodes on compliant ones. In the previous
chapter, we provided proof that in fact the estimate is improved as the number
of stations in the network increases. In this section we are interested in the
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Figure 6.11: The impact of policing algorithm on network throughput in prac-
tice, comparing network throughputs when non-compliant stations are present
and absent (top), throughput of a compliant client in the presence and ab-
sence of a non-complaint one (middle), and the evolution graph for p when
in the presence of a non-compliant station (bottom). The non-compliance is
question is choosing half the standard CWmin value.
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impact of network size on the performance of the policing algorithm as a
whole, when the network is a mix of attackers and compliant stations.
6.5.1 Hiding in the Crowd
We now investigate whether an attacker could “hide in the crowd” as the
number of network users increases. For this purpose, we consider a network
with one non-compliant station employing a CWmin based attack and we vary
the number of compliant stations while we examine the performance of both.
In each case, all clients are backlogged and send 1,000-byte packets for a total
duration of 3 minutes. We repeat each experiment 13 times and compute again
average and 95% confidence intervals for the attempt rate and throughput
obtained by each station.
In Figure 6.13 we show the throughput and attempt rate of the attacker and
a compliant client, with a standard AP as well as with an AP executing our
algorithm. Observe that the performance of the attacker decreases as the
network size increases from 2 to 8 STAs (to be exact, from the average of 464
frames per second for the smallest network to 165 for the largest), but is always
significantly above that of a compliant client if no action is taken to counteract
the greedy behavior. In contrast, when the AP runs the policing algorithm,
the attempt rate of the attacker never exceeds that of a compliant client
(observe the overlapping lines in the top sub-figure), while their throughput
performance falls below that of compliant clients in all circumstances.
We can conclude that the network size does not impact the performance of
the policing algorithm, which effectively penalizes attackers even in denser
topologies.
6.5.2 Multiple Attackers
In what follows, we study the performance of the proposed policing algorithm
when multiple attackers are present in the WLAN. Here, we aim to understand
whether the presence of a large number of attackers could influence the penalty
update of our algorithm. We demonstrate that, despite its prevalence, such
behavior will not be regarded as compliant by the proposed policing scheme.
We use the same methodology as in the previous subsection, running 3-minute
tests for each experiment and getting 10 measurements for each case in order
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Figure 6.12: WLAN consisting of three saturated stations. The AP runs the
proposed policing scheme (α = 0.2). Time evolution of the attempt rate and
compliant rate estimate (top), and penalty applied (bottom) when all clients
are compliant (left), respectively one employs a CWmin of half the default
value.
to measure the performance of both compliant stations and attackers in terms
of attempt rate and throughput.
First let us consider the case where only one station is compliant and in-
crease the number of attackers present in the network. The results of these
experiments are depicted in Figure 6.14, where we plot the attempt rate and
throughput of the compliant station and one attacker, with and without the
policing algorithm running at the AP. We observe that also in this setting,
the policing algorithm equalizes the attempt rate of all stations while the
throughput performance attained by attackers is reduced.
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tal results.
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110
6.6. Dynamic Network Conditions
6.5.3 Fixed Network Size
So far we have examined the effect of increased network size, when additional
nodes are either non-compliant or compliant stations. We now take a step
closer to fully isolating the type of stations added from the network size. To
this end, we examine a network with a fixed number of clients (n = 8) and vary
the proportion of compliant and misbehaving stations. The performance of
one client within each category is shown in Figure 6.15, which further confirms
the effectiveness of our proposal in the presence of several attackers. Notice
the equalized attempt rate, and the difference (of 40 frames per second on
average) between throughputs of a compliant station and that of an attacker
when policing is applied.
6.6 Dynamic Network Conditions
We next consider two scenarios to demonstrate the effect of network dynamics
on the behavior of the policing algorithm. Our goal here is twofold: (i) verify
that our proposal adapts quickly to changes in the network topology, and (ii)
demonstrate the algorithm carries forward the penalty of selfish users when
they leave the network. The access-point runs the policing controller, for
which measurement and parameter adjustment iterations are 5 seconds apart.
In the first experiment, two compliant stations connect to the WLAN and start
transmitting to the AP at t = 0s. After 100s, a misbehaving station (S3) joins
the network, contending with a CWmin parameter half the standard value. At
t = 200s another standard-compliant station (S4) connects to the WLAN.
Finally, S3 leaves the network after transmitting for 200s and S4 disassociates
100s later.
The result of this experiment is depicted in Figure 6.16 where we plot the time
evolution of the attempt rate, throughput and penalty corresponding to each
client. We can see clearly that our algorithm quickly detects and starts pe-
nalizing the misbehaving station, equalizing the attempt rates in 5 iterations.
As the fourth client joins, our solution re-estimates the maximum achievable
attempt rate and continues penalizing the selfish user, without affecting the
performance of the new station. Lastly, as the non-compliant station leaves
the network, the penalty is preserved and carried forward to be applied when
this client reconnects. Thus we confirm that the performance of our algorithm
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Figure 6.16: Scenario 1: two compliant stations are joined by a misbehaving
one (CWmin half the default value) and subsequently by a third compliant
client. Stations S3 and S4 transmit for 200s each and then leave the network.
The AP runs the proposed policing scheme. Time evolution of the attempt
rate (top), throughput (middle) and penalty applied by the proposed policing
algorithm (bottom) for each client. Experimental data.
is not affected by network dynamics and penalties are successfully carried for-
ward.
In the second experiment, we have 3 standard-compliant stations transmitting
saturated traffic at 11 Mb/s. At time 100, station 4 associates to the network
and starts transmitting saturated traffic with half the standard contention
window. The policing algorithm adjusts the penalty accordingly to equalize
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S4’s attempt rate with the compliant value. The penalty for behaving stations
is always around zero, with little variation caused as a result of real-time
estimation. Even so, the probability is always below 0.05.
After 100 seconds of transmitting, station 4 disassociates and re-associates
with correct parameters. The penalty is maintained while this is happening
(taking about 10 seconds) and the station is still penalized even after it joins
with good behavior. But soon as the compliant behavior is observed, the
penalty is reduced to zero in a few iterations (5 to be exact). Following 100
seconds of standard behavior, the station is reconfigured again not to comply
and re-associates. Fig 6.17 shows the response of the policing algorithm to
these changes.
6.6.1 Non-compliant station with Bursty Traffic
In the experiments presented so far, all the contenders, whether compliant
or non-compliant, transmitted saturated traffic. Indeed misbehavior becomes
problematic under heavy network loads, since the performance of compliant
users suffers as a result of the gains achieved by the non-compliant clients.
However, it is also useful to verify that our algorithm can detect misbehav-
ing clients that transmit on/off (bursty) traffic, since intuitively the average
attempt rate of these might fall below the expected maximum compliant value.
We note that the robustness analysis described in Section 5.2.5.2 guarantees
that no transmission strategy can game the operation of the policing algo-
rithm, though verifying this in practice with such bursty traffic is a useful
demonstration. To this end we conducted additional experiments where a
misbehaving client alternates periodically between silent and active periods,
while sharing the network with two complaint stations. Figure 6.18 shows
results when these periods are 10s long, and Figure 6.19 shows them when
they are 20s long.
These results demonstrate that the algorithm reacts quickly to such bursty
traffic, noticing misbehavior within one iteration, and recognizing its bursty
nature with a gradually increasing p over time. Further, the selfish user does
not gain any long-term throughput advantage from employing this strategy
(i.e. the mean throughput for the misbehaving stations in these experiments
is less than that of compliant stations, as we illustrate in the middle sub-plots
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Figure 6.17: Scenario 2: the effect of changes in behavior on policing. Exper-
imental data.
with dashed lines). The results confirm that the extended policing scheme
is robust to selfish users generating bursty traffic, as the algorithm detects
rapidly their deviation from compliant behavior and penalizes them accord-
ingly.
6.7 Real Traffic
So far we have only tested the policing algorithm mostly for constant bitrate
(CBR) traffic. In this section we demonstrate the performance of the polic-
ing algorithm in more realistic scenarios. First we consider a scenario where
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Figure 6.18: WLAN with three client stations. S1 transmits on/off traffic,
alternating between silent and active periods of 10 seconds with CWmin halved.
S2 and S3 always have packets to transmit. The AP runs the proposed policing
scheme (α = 0.02). Stations’ attempt rates and the maximum achievable
compliant attempt rate as estimated by the algorithm (top), instantaneous and
average throughputs (middle), and penalties applied to each client (bottom).
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Figure 6.19: WLAN with three client stations. S1 transmits on/off traffic,
alternating between silent and active periods of 20 seconds with CWmin halved.
S2 and S3 always have packets to transmit. The AP runs the proposed policing
scheme (α = 0.02). Stations’ attempt rates and the maximum achievable
compliant attempt rate as estimated by the algorithm (top), instantaneous and
average throughputs (middle), and penalties applied to each client (bottom).
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stations upload files to a remote server, and then we consider one with mixed
traffic.
6.7.1 FTP File Upload
File upload is a good example of real uplink traffic on the Internet. It is also
a valuable test for the policing algorithm as it is a non-CBR traffic over TCP.
So, we can study the effect of policing on TCP’s congestion control. In the
following tests we have two compliant stations and one non-compliant station
which is the same network as that of the previous tests. All these stations
send a very large file to a remote server8 through FTP. We run each test 13
times and plot the results with error bars (95% confidence). Before the tests,
we pinged the server 1000 times with each station, and the average round-trip
time (RTT) was 87.3± 0.1ms for all stations, without any loss.
First we examine a mild attack by the non-compliant station, namely AIFS
= SIFS, which we know is contained at around p = 0.18 through results
presented in Figure 6.9. Figure 6.20 shows the time-evolution of attempt rate,
throughput, and ACK-dropping probability for this test. Notice that there is
no noticeable change in the performance of any of the stations, and Figures
6.9 and 6.20 are very similar. The throughputs (and attempt rates) are less
in Figure 6.20 due to the different nature of the test, which involves sending
TCP packets to a remote server, rather than CBR UDP datagrams to a nearby
host. The unchanged behavior means that the probability is low enough not
to affect TCP’s congestion control.
Next, we try a more aggressive attack, namely CWmin halved. This leads to
a higher p for the non-compliant station, and as you can see in Figure 6.21
it makes the time evolution graph quite variable. You can identify the effect
of the policing algorithm on TCP congestion control for the non-compliant
station: when the probability gets high enough, the chances of losing TCP
packets because of reaching the IEEE 802.11 retry limit increases, and once
a loss happens, we see a large drop in the throughput of the non-compliant
station. As a result, p also decreases in the next step, reducing chances of
TCP packet loss again. That is why we see an oscillatory pattern in the plots.
This pattern is even more visible in Figure 6.22. Both plot stacks contain
8annahid.com
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Figure 6.20: Time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and penalty for a
compliant and a non-compliant station (AIFS = SIFS), all sending FTP traffic
(over TCP). Experimental results.
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averages over all runs, and although the pattern stays the same, exactly when
the packet loss occurs may differ from one test to another, and that is why we
see large error bars. To get a better view of this effect, Figure 6.23 shows a
single run that contributes to Figure 6.22. Note the large drop in throughput
(and attempt rate) whenever p reaches approximately 0.4.
To compare the performance of the network in scenarios with non-compliance,
we have also run tests in the same network where every STA complies with
the standard. Figure 6.24 shows the results. We have plotted the station
that cheats in the other tests with a different line to demonstrate that it is
neither punished, nor gets a higher throughput if it is complying with the
standard. Comparing attempt rate and throughput values in this figure with
those previously discussed, we see little to no difference between that of the
compliant station in the non-compliance scenarios and that of these stations.
To aid comprehension Figure 6.25 shows the throughput and the attempt
rate of a compliant station in all scenarios we just described. Error bars are
omitted for the compliant case so as not to make the plot too crowded. Notice
that most error bars overlap with the compliant line itself (with momentary
exceptions such as t = 30). This means that the combination of the policing
algorithm and TCP’s congestion control mechanism does not have a negative
impact on the compliant station, even with the presence of an aggressively
non-compliant station.
6.7.2 Mixed Traffic
Next, we demonstrate the performance of the policing algorithm in another
realistic scenario with heterogeneous traffic. More specifically, we consider a
network with n = 4 clients, the first one uploading a large file, the second
generating web traffic, the third streaming a video file and the last performing
a system update. All stations are standard-compliant. Our goal here is to
verify that the policing algorithm will not unnecessarily penalize compliant
clients that have higher demands and attain higher transmission rates simply
due to the reduced activity of the other contenders.
To emulate the file upload, we generate saturated traffic using iperf on the
first client. The second station establishes finite size TCP connections, alter-
nating between periods of activity, during which a 2 Mbyte file is transferred,
and silent periods exponentially distributed with mean λ−1 = 60s [142]. The
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Figure 6.21: Time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and penalty for
a compliant and a non-compliant station (CWmin halved), all sending FTP
traffic (over TCP). Experimental results.
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Figure 6.22: Time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and penalty for a
compliant and an aggressively non-compliant station (which sets CWmin to a
quarter of the standard value), all sending FTP traffic (over TCP). Experi-
mental data.
121
6.7. Real Traffic
 0
 100
 200
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
[Fr
am
es
/s]
Attacker
Compliant STA
 0
 100
 200
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180
At
te
m
pt
 R
at
e
[Fr
am
es
/s]
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180
p
Time [s]
Figure 6.23: Single run time evolution of throughput, attempt rate, and
penalty for a compliant and an aggressively non-compliant station (which
sets CWmin to a quarter of the standard value), all sending FTP traffic (over
TCP). Experimental data.
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Figure 6.24: Time evolution of attempt rate, throughput, and penalty when
all stations are compliant and sending FTP traffic (over TCP). Experimental
results.
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Figure 6.25: Time evolution of attempt rate and throughput for the compliant
station in Figures 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, and 6.24. Error bars are omitted for the
all-compliant case and the corresponding line is plotted with a thicker stroke
for better comparison with others. Experimental data.
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Figure 6.26: Performance under mixed traffic. Experimental data.
third station streams a MPEG-4 encoded version of “Resident Evil: Apoca-
lypse” at 1 Mb/s using the VLC media player9. To emulate the activity of
the fourth station, we use a backlogged iperf downstream session from the
AP to the client. We run this experiment for a total duration of 1 hour. In
this scenario, as the AP is always standard-compliant, we use the downstream
flow to estimate the compliant throughput.
In Figure 6.26 we plot a 30-minute snapshot of the network operation in this
experiment, showing the time evolution of the attempt rate of each client,
the throughput attained by each flow, as well as the penalty applied by our
9http://www.videolan.org/
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policing algorithm to each station. First, we observe that the penalty stays at
zero about 85%10 of the time, only with infrequent and small variations (below
0.05) above zero. Second, the medium-quality video flow sees its bandwidth
demand satisfied most of the time. Third, the bandwidth demanding upload
and download flows equally share the remaining available air time. Lastly, the
spurious web traffic experiences similar performance to that of the other data
flows whenever they are competing.
We conclude that the proposed policing algorithm does not penalize nodes
that generate more traffic than their competitors as long as they comply with
the MAC configuration defined by the IEEE 802.11 standard.
6.8 Non-ideal Channel Effects
Next we investigate the performance of our implementation under several chal-
lenging situations that occur frequently in practice. Specifically, we assess the
impact of our algorithm on rate-switching decisions taken by state-of-the-art
rate control algorithms and investigate the potential of our scheme to alleviate
unfairness issues that arise due to the PHY/MAC interactions occurring in
the presence of the capture effect.
6.8.1 Rate Adaptation
We study the behavior of a rate control algorithm executed at a greedy client
that manipulates their MAC configuration and is being penalized by our polic-
ing algorithm to counteract their misbehavior. Our goal here is to verify that
rate control (RC) algorithms will not wrongly interpret suppressed ACKs as
losses caused by poor channel conditions and thus will not trigger downgrades
of the PHY rate. This is particularly important, since unnecessarily select-
ing a lower modulation scheme can be wasteful of channel time and have a
significant impact on overall network utility [21].
Though there are many rate adaptation algorithms in the literature, mac80211
driver on Linux systems only implements Minstrel[25] and PID, with Minstrel
10This number is an average for all stations in this test. Values for individual stations
differ, with the highest belonging to the saturated station which is 36%, and the lowest
belonging to the video traffic for which the penalty is actually always 0. However, it does
not have a noticeable impact even for the station paying the highest toll, as the effect is
small and transient.
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Figure 6.27: Rate selection when policing is applied. Experimental results.
currently being the default. In our first test we consider a non-compliant sta-
tion that uses Minstrel. We examine the time evolution of the penalty applied
by the policing algorithm to the attacker, as well as the rate selected by Min-
strel during the operation of our scheme. We consider again a simple scenario
with two compliant clients and one attacker using a smaller CWmin param-
eter (see Figure 6.4). As shown in Figure 6.27, increasing the penalty does
not influence the rate selection decisions taken by the rate control algorithm,
since packets are transmitted almost always at the maximum rate (11 Mb/s)
and lower rates are only periodically sampled (approx. every 30s), with only
a couple of frames.
Further, to illustrate that the network utility is not affected when policing is
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Figure 6.28: Utility of a policed network, with and without rate control
applied, in Figure 6.28 we plot this metric for the same network configuration
when the attacker does not perform rate adaptation and respectively executes
Minstrel. Note that we compute the network utility as in [42], i.e. the sum of
the log of the individual throughputs, which is considered a good measure of
proportional fairness [46]. From the results in Figure 6.28 we conclude that,
indeed, our policing algorithm does not have a negative impact on the network
utility when clients run current rate control mechanisms.
Next we observe the impact of policing on stations’ throughputs when they
employ rate adaptation. In what follows we test the performance of stations
when they use Minstrel and PID rate adaptation algorithms. As we mentioned
earlier, these are two prominent rate adaptation algorithms in Linux drivers,
and they are the only options available in the ath5k driver. We use the same
scenario described above, and run the tests for 180 seconds. For each test, all
stations use the same rate adaptation algorithm.
Figure 6.29 summarizes the performance of the non-compliant station for each
rate selection strategy. You can see in the figure that when rate adaptation
is employed, lower ACK-dropping probability is enough to bring back the
station’s attempt rate to that of a compliant station. Also, the converged
throughput is larger as a result, which means that less channel time is wasted.
Figure 6.30 shows the performance of a behaving station in the same set of
tests. As shown in the figure, there is little to no difference in the performance
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Figure 6.29: Performance impact of the policing algorithm on the non-
compliant station when all stations employ rate adaptation algorithms. There
is one non-compliant station (CWmin halved) and two well-behaved stations
in this network. Experimental results.
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Figure 6.30: Performance impact of the policing algorithm on a behaving
station when all stations employ rate adaptation algorithms. There is one
non-compliant station (CWmin halved) and two well-behaved stations in this
network. Experimental results.
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Figure 6.31: Performance under capture effect. Experimental results.
of the compliant station with any rate selection strategy.
6.8.2 Capture Effect
Next we investigate a scenario where all stations obey the standard specifica-
tion, but experience different performance due to their placement relative to
the AP. Specifically, we are interested in checking whether our policing scheme
can improve fairness when a client that is located closer to the AP captures
the channel while transmitting simultaneously with stations that reside far-
ther away. This effect is frequently encountered in practical deployments and
may cause significant unfairness, as already documented in e.g. [143, 144].
For this purpose, we examine the performance of a network with three com-
pliant stations again, but this time with one station (S1) located next to the
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AP. As shown in the top plot of Figure 6.31, in this scenario an AP that
does not perform policing will take no action to correct the distribution of the
throughput among contenders. Thus S1 achieves significantly better perfor-
mance than the other two clients. On the other hand, when the AP executes
our policing algorithm, the attempt rate of the node positioned near the AP
is reduced and consequently all stations attain nearly identical throughputs.
Note that this correction comes at no network utility cost, as we show in the
lower plot of Figure 6.31.
We conclude that, though not designed to do so, the proposed extended polic-
ing algorithm not only combats MAC misbehavior, but can also be used to
mitigate unfairness that arises in real deployments due to the PHY/MAC
interactions.
6.9 Conclusions
In this chapter we implemented the policing algorithm and the Virtual MAC
estimator on off-the-shelf hardware and demonstrated the effectiveness of
policing by conducting experiments in a real network over a wide range of
scenarios. The results of these experiments show that our policing algorithm
drives non-compliant users into compliant operation, regardless of the type of
attacks employed (among those considered in this study), and does not penal-
ize compliant users that consume more airtime than lightly-loaded stations.
Additionally, the results showed that our proposal has no negative impact on
common rate control algorithms, and can also alleviate unfairness incurred by
the capture effect.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusions
In this chapter, we review and summarize the work presented in this thesis, draw
conclusions out of our analysis, and give recommendations for possible extensions
to this work.
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
As we discussed in Chapter 1, the wireless medium is not always as predictable
and easily examined as in simulations or analytical models. This makes ex-
perimental analysis difficult and time-consuming. In Chapter 4 we introduced
tools and methods that can facilitate this process. We provided an overview of
the Broadcom BCM43xx chipset architecture. We introduced the firmware as
a special-purpose piece of software that runs on the wireless adapter. We in-
troduced the assembly language used in the firmware of Broadcom devices and
concepts such as Template RAM and shared memory. Then we talked about
the driver and how it works and how it interacts with the device. Finally, we
described how we split the workload between the driver and the firmware.
The most important theoretical contribution of this thesis is the analysis and
amendment of the policing algorithm introduced in [6]. The IEEE 802.11 stan-
dard leaves room for stations to abuse the back-off mechanism to gain more
channel time and this causes compliant stations to have less. In Chapter 5 we
introduced said policing algorithm. Although the original algorithm detects
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such misbehaving stations and penalizes them proportionately, it does have
some shortcomings as mentioned before:
1. It does not provide a mechanism to estimate the throughput of a com-
pliant station, which is required in the policing controller.
2. The amount of penalty applied to a non-compliant station is enough to
equalize throughputs, but not to compensate for the network degrada-
tion induced by the non-compliance and the policing.
3. It is prone to gaming, and a station that is aware of the algorithm can
still choose a winning strategy using bursty traffic.
In this work we amend the algorithm to be more robust and effective, and
create an estimator for the compliant throughput. The new algorithm is ro-
bust to non-compliant stations trying to game it, and the estimator provides
sensible values in various scenarios that we have tested, regardless of the net-
work topology and configuration. These are proven both theoretically, and
through experiments on real hardware for various scenarios, including with
realistic network traffic (video transmission, TCP file download, etc). These
experiments and their results were presented in Chapter 6.
While the amended algorithm works for all scenarios conducted in IEEE
802.11b/g/a, this is not always the case. There are attacks that are immune
to this scheme, and there are later IEEE 802.11 amendments that mitigate its
effectiveness. Jamming attacks are examples of attacks that are immune. The
AP will not notice the misbehavior if the station uses correct EDCA parame-
ter, but jams control frames to buy time. Another example is packet forging
attacks, which is overlooked by the policing algorithm. Furthermore, the polic-
ing algorithm neither targets nor is effective against attacks that aim only to
degrade network performance without an intended gain for the attacker.
As for IEEE 802.11 amendments, service differentiation is one example that
can invalidate the policing algorithm as it stands in this thesis. However,
in Section 5.3.3 we described how it can be adapted to EDCA. Adapting it
to newer features can be more complicated. Examples are No ACK, Block
ACKs, and Direct Link Setup. Trying to make the policing algorithm work
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alongside these features will often mean canceling the performance benefit of
the features, or using complicated hardware-level measurements or unneces-
sary message-passing between nodes. So, while the algorithm can be amended
for a marginal benefit in modern IEEE 802.11 networks, it is not applicable
to those networks as it currently stands.
Rate adaptation is another potential source of problems for the policing al-
gorithm. Although we showed through experiments that the most common
rate adaptation algorithms will not get a negative impact by the policing al-
gorithm, we know that older algorithms such as AMRR that rely solely on
retries will perform poorly under policing.
During the course of this work, we learned that although experiments can be
very quick to perform in an ideal environment and they are helpful in validat-
ing algorithms and ideas, they can be very time-consuming when it comes to
debugging. A great portion of our time was always spent on debugging our
testbeds and figuring out causes of problems and unexpected behavior of the
network. The diagnostic tool was an attempt to help reduce this time and
bring focus to what’s more important, which is the validation process.
We also discovered that while current off-the-shelf wireless hardware can be
reprogrammed and ideas can be implemented on them, there has not been
enough interest in highlighting these capabilities. There are valuable works
like [125] and [126] that try to develop this idea, but it is still unknown for
many in the areas of research and development. This is partly because of
insufficient publicly available documentation. We hope Chapter 4 helps to
redress this lack of documentation.
7.2 Future Works
The present work opens the path to wider experimentation with Wi-Fi hard-
ware. As for the policing algorithm itself, we mentioned how it could possibly
be adapted to work alongside some of the new IEEE 802.11 features. Imple-
menting those changes could also be interesting, and keep the policing algo-
rithm relevant in the continuously evolving world of wireless communication.
With the power to modify the behavior of IEEE 802.11 wireless cards, not only
we are able to make changes to the state machine, as we did in Chapter 6, but
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we can also implement and test other protocols. An example of protocols that
can be conformed to wireless adapters is the power-line communication (PLC)
using the IEEE 1901 protocol[145]. PLC devices are used to carry network
traffic over the conductors used for electric power distribution. The benefit of
using these devices is that the existing electric backbone of a residence can be
used for setting up a network, rather than setting up new cables and switches.
The MAC protocol in IEEE 1901 is in fact very similar to that of IEEE 802.11,
with the exceptional of a counter called the “deferral counter” (see [146]). This
counter works as an extra collision avoidance measure, as collisions are more
costly in PLC. We have implemented the PLC MAC protocol on Broadcom
wireless devices. However, to see the real effect of the extra measures, we need
a relatively large testbed, which carries its own challenges on the inherently
noisy wireless medium.
Another interesting concept that can be implemented on a real testbed is
collision-free medium access. The idea of a distributed, collision-free MAC
protocol have been studied in [147], [148] (Learning BEB), and [149] (Learning
MAC). Learning BEB is a decentralized algorithm that stations in a wireless
network employ to pick time slots. Once a station finds a free time slot it
always transmits in that slot. This scheme replaces the random backoff used
in DCF. Learning MAC is an algorithm built on the same idea, with enhance-
ments on how it handles collisions. In [149] they prove that their method con-
verges if the number of stations is not too large, and achieves better network
throughput. We have a current implementation of the Learning MAC, which,
however, falls short on throughput expectations. With background noise and
internal delays of the wireless adapter, the desired goal is not achieved on our
testbed. A complete implementation could prove the concept practical as well
as efficient.
There are also other works whose implementation should be possible using
techniques we discussed in this manuscript, and we would like to evaluate
their behavior on a real testbed. Examples of such works include: [111],
where they use ACK-dropping to provide throughput guarantees to EDCA
stations in a network where legacy DCF stations also contend; [27], where
they attack the exposed node problem (see Section 2.6.3 using an algorithm
that allows concurrent transmissions when possible; and [138], where they
propose a scheme named DCF+ to enhance the performance of TCP over
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WLAN.
Apart from evaluation of algorithms, the flexibility provided by open-source
driver and firmware can be further cultivated for next-generation wireless
hardware that is easily and perhaps visually programmable without much
knowledge of assembly or driver programming. [126] is a significant step to-
wards this end. With such frameworks, researchers can easily create new MAC
protocol ideas and put them to practice and even competition with existing
or other MAC protocols.
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APPENDIX A
Designing a Diagnostic Tool for
IEEE 802.11 MAC
Experimental assessment has been an important part of IEEE 802.11 research,
however measuring the detailed behavior of the medium and hardware has been
challenging. A diagnostic tool for IEEE 802.11-based WLANs is designed in this
appendix, which helps developers and researchers monitor and analyze the wireless
signals and details such as backoff distribution in a user-friendly environment. This
tool is much cheaper and easier to use than existing tools, and provides more flex-
ibility by allowing users to add functionality. We then use WiFo to study several
aspects of some off-the-shelf hardware and their corresponding software drivers, and
show some interesting results regarding how they apply standard specifications.
A.1 Introduction
With ever increasing interest in WLANs, researchers have been trying to
improve current protocols (such as IEEE 802.11) in terms of performance
[149, 148, 150], security [151, 144], and scalability [152]. Mathematical anal-
ysis and simulations are common ways of evaluating new methods [95, 27].
The final step in evaluating a new method is putting it in practice on a real
network, which is what we have been discussing in this thesis.
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In order to implement and experiment with something on a wireless medium,
we need to understand the medium itself. Although protocol descriptions are
available in detail [5, 10, 11, 133, 12, 22, 13] and we can know what “should”
happen on the wireless medium per protocol, in most cases that is not exactly
what happens. Sometimes this is due to the implementational flexibilities
provided by the standard, and other times it is beyond those flexibilities and
we have deviations from standard. Even if we assume all wireless hardware
behaves exactly as the standards suggest, we still have other factors that
interfere with our expected results in an experiment. We discussed some of
these in Section 2.6. Besides, the truth is that our first assumption is also
wrong and many devices do not completely follow the standard [72].
In order to have controlled experiments, we need to know the hardware we
use and also channel conditions beforehand. For example, if a wireless device
has an unexpectedly high saturation throughput, we can infer that it is not
following the standard.1 However, without better diagnostics we cannot know
for sure which part of the standard is not being followed. It could be an
abuse of TXOP, or using a small contention window. This gets worse if it
is having an unexpectedly low throughput, as it can either be a hardware
failure, a protocol adoption error, channel interference, or something else. In
order to find out which one is the case, we need more information than just
the throughput. In order to identify the underlying problem, we need more
information.
One device that is designed for detailed analysis of the wireless medium is
a spectrum analyzer. A spectrum analyzer measures the magnitude of an
input signal versus frequency within its frequency range. By analyzing the
spectra of electrical signals, dominant frequency, power, distortion, harmonics,
bandwidth, and other spectral components of a signal can be observed that
are not easily detectable in time domain waveforms. Spectrum analyzers are
particularly useful for understanding the physical (PHY) layer of a transmitter
or receiver, such as power levels, distortion and interference. Some spectrum
analyzers even come with add-ons that characterize PHY symbols or packets.
Figure A.1 shows a spectrum analyzer.
We can use a spectrum analyzer to observe the IEEE 802.11 medium by simply
1This was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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Figure A.1: Spectrum analyzer
adjusting the frequency range to that of the specific channel we would like to
study. In Figure A.2 we have done this for Wi-Fi channel 14 while one station
transmits saturated traffic to an access point (AP) in this channel. The first
plot shows the maximum, minimum and current power observed, and the Wi-
Fi channel is clearly visible within the bump in the blue line that shows peak
power per frequency. The spectrum analyzer can also give us the changes in
power over a period of time using “zero span” mode. With zero span, we can
actually understand temporal aspects of the channel. Figure A.3a and A.3b
are snapshots from a spectrum analyzer screen on zero span mode while Wi-Fi
traffic is ongoing on channel 14.
While we can observe traffic using a spectrum analyzer, and it provides a num-
ber of ways to process the observed data, there are some downsides, including
financial cost. A spectrum analyzer is a versatile but relatively expensive de-
vice, and thus the expense may not be justified for a group developing Wi-Fi
drivers or analyzing some performance anomaly. In addition, because it is a
general-purpose device, many 802.11 properties are not recognized by a typi-
cal spectrum analyzer, or are only understood by specialist add-on packages.
When we study IEEE 802.11, we are often interested in things like backoff
period, throughput and transmission time. We often need to have numerous
samples in order to understand the stochastic behavior of the Wi-Fi MAC
and PHY. Although there are ways to export spectrum data using a spectrum
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Figure A.2: One station transmitting saturated traffic on channel 14 (center
frequency 2.484 GHz). Blue indicates peak power, black corresponds to the
minimum received power, and green is current status of the spectrum.
(a) A single beacon (b) Successful frame transmission and
ACK
Figure A.3: Spectrum analyzer: 44 MHz frequency span for (a), and zero span
for (b) and (c).
analyzer and process it later on a computer, the whole process is often not
easily automated or tailored to those studying Wi-Fi, and so experiments can
be difficult without human interaction.
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In this appendix we provide a solution that addresses both these problems
which are inherent in using a spectrum analyzer. While a spectrum analyzer
receives, digests and displays electronic signals, a cheap off-the-shelf wireless
adapter also receives all those signals, but it then uses them to provide data
transmission and reception over the medium. We leverage the fact that all
wireless adapters have the means of sensing the medium to make a test tool.
This feature of the hardware has been used before, for example to implement
spectrum sensing for cognitive radio [118] or to detect non-Wi-Fi sources of
interference [119].
We use carrier sensing of off-the-shelf wireless hardware in a different way;
rather than using data collected from the medium for one particular purpose,
we aim to export it to the application layer, where it can be analyzed using
high level tools. Works such as [72], where the study of existing wireless
hardware or software is intended or required, emphasize the need for the tool
we present.
We discussed OpenFWWF [67] in detail in Chapter 4. With the flexibility
provided by this open-source firmware, we use a Broadcom wireless adapter
to create an inexpensive tool for researchers and developers to study IEEE
802.11. What we want to develop is a tool that can monitor Wi-Fi traffic
and provide a visual representation of the received data, as well as statistical
studies on transmitted frames. The tool will sit just above the PHY layer and
focus on the interaction of PHY and MAC layers. Additional functionality
can also be introduced to the system through a plugin system.
A.2 Design and Architecture
This section covers implementation details of our wireless diagnostic tool.
As we mentioned before, we use a commercial off-the-shelf wireless adapter
to monitor the medium. To allow greater flexibility in the processing and
visualization, we transfer the data from the monitoring host using a small
TCP-based server to a front-end host. This separation of monitoring and
front-end hosts allows us to install the monitor on a small device, such as
a Soekris net4801 [153], while using a higher-powered device for storage and
visualization. Our front-end visualizes the data and allows the user to analyze
and study the data. Figure A.4 depicts the building blocks of our system. We
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Figure A.4: Simple architecture diagram of the diagnostic tool
Bit Meaning
15 Flip to 1 when time reserved for receiving PLCP has passed
11 Flip to 1 when RX’ing or TX’ing (same time receiver flips on, may 1µs after transmitter flips on)
10 Flip to 1 when RX’ing or TX’ing (same time receiver or transmitter flips on)
9 Flip to 1 when receiver has started decoding
8 Flip to 1 when transmitter is working
7 Flip to 1 when backoff is zero
4 Flip to 1 when time reserved for receiving MPDU has passed
3 Flip to 1 when channel is sensed free (phy+nav) for more than two slots
2 Flip to 1 when channel is sensed free (phy+nav) for more than one slot
1 Flip to 1 when channel is sensed free (physically)
0 Flip to 1 when channel is sensed free (virtually through NAV)
Table A.1: Important bits of the “IFS Status” register and their meanings
will discuss the different parts of this diagram in this section.
A.2.1 Firmware and Driver Modifications
The firmware is the software running directly on the chipset and the first layer
above the hardware. Signals from the medium are translated into a digital
representation and digested by different chips, the results of which are then
fed to the firmware. Unfortunately we do not have full access to the raw data
as we do using a spectrum analyzer. However, what we do receive from the
chipset is enough to observe what is happening on the channel. What we use
here is a set of flags stored in a register named the “IFS Status” register [128],
which holds current status information about the channel. Some of the most
important flags are listed in Table A.1. Using these indicators we can pretty
much know what is happening on the channel. As you can see we can know
when the card begins sending or receiving, and we can capture the occurrence
of several important timeouts.
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Given the completeness of the information on the IFS Status register, all we
have to do is to record its value over time and base our analysis on flips of the
flags. That is the fundamental idea of our implementation. As we mentioned
in previous chapters, we have about 4KB of shared memory, most of which is
unused by the normal workflow of the firmware. We use the available memory
in the form of a ring buffer, and whenever at least one bit of IFS Status flips,
we save its value along with a timestamp. Note that we only save a new record
whenever there is a change as this saves space compared to periodic recording.
One might ask where this procedure is actually inserted into the firmware.
Figure A.5 (a) shows the basic state machine of the OpenFWWF. Event han-
dling in this architecture is not interrupt-based and the firmware continuously
checks for events and handles them accordingly. Whenever there is no event,
the firmware calls a nap instruction to sleep for a short while as a power saving
measure, and then continues. This is the best place to insert any repeated
code. Figure A.5 (b) shows how we place our code. We simply replace the
nap instruction with our code. This is exactly what we did for the policing
algorithm in Chapter 5 as well.
There is a barrier to our approach, and that is memory limitation. The times-
tamp we use is 32 bits in size, filled with the least significant bits of the card’s
current TSF timer. With the register itself being 16 bits in size, 48 bits (6
bytes) are used per record. Even if we could use the whole shared memory,
we could only store 667 records, which is a very small number. A single frame
can trigger multiple bits of the register during its timespan. Some bits such
as bit 8 and bit 11 can be flipped 1µs apart from each other, which increases
the possible number of events per unit time. Moreover, the shared memory
is not completely free and putting aside the memory used for the firmware’s
normal workflow, we are left with space sufficient to accommodate only about
250 records. One solution is to mask out redundant flags and thus reduce the
number of triggered events. We couple this solution with the greater resources
available to the driver to get the most out of the information available to the
firmware.
The driver was discussed before in Chapter 4. The amount of memory avail-
able to the driver is usually much larger than the firmware as it is running
on the host machine which has more resources. Another useful feature of the
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Figure A.5: Simple flowchart showing (a) the main loop of the OpenFWWF
state machine, and (b) our modification for the diagnostic tool.
b43 driver is that it can do periodic work at relatively small intervals. We
use these in our advantage. In our implementation, we allocate a large ring
buffer in the driver, which can hold 10 times as many records as the firmware
can hold. We then read the shared memory periodically and add new records
to the ring buffer on the driver’s side. The period is chosen so every record
on the shared memory ring buffer can be read before it is overwritten. In our
experiments with saturated traffic, this proves to be 25ms; anything less than
this period will frequently read redundant information, and longer periods
might lead to loss of information.
A.2.2 DebugFS and Socket Server
The next building block of our diagnostic tool is a socket server. While we
are collecting state information from the wireless adapter, we want to let
external clients access this information. The main problem here is accessing
the information saved by the driver, which is located in the kernel memory,
from the user space. Fortunately Linux kernel provides us with a tool named
debugfs. It is a special file system that facilitates access to the kernel space,
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Function Application
debugfs_create_dir Create a directory or subdirectory in DebugFS
debugfs_create_u8 Create a file representing an 8-bit unsigned integer
debugfs_create_u16 Create a file representing an 16-bit unsigned integer
debugfs_create_u32 Create a file representing an 32-bit unsigned integer
debugfs_create_u64 Create a file representing an 64-bit unsigned integer
debugfs_create_bool Create a file representing a boolean variable
debugfs_create_blob Create a file representing an arbitrary-sized block
debugfs_rename Rename a file within the file system
debugfs_remove Remove a previously created DebugFS file
debugfs_remove_recursive Remove a DebugFS file and its subfiles
Table A.2: DebugFS API functions
and it is included in Linux kernel version 2.6.10-rc3 and higher. The main
purpose of DebugFS is debugging Linux modules, however, it is suitable for
our software solution.
Before we get to our specific application of DebugFS, we briefly discuss how
it works. This file system can be set up using a simple Linux command2. The
mounted file system is a form of RAM drive. Files in this RAM drive point
to pieces of kernel memory, and can be read or written into based on their
permissions. Drivers and modules that need debugging create directories and
files using the DebugFS programming interface, and provide pointer and per-
mission information for them. Table A.2 shows the most important functions
in the API. Beside name and destination information, all debugfs_create_
functions take permission information and those that create files take also a
pointer to the data that will be accessed through the file. This can simply be
a pointer to a global integer variable for a u32 file, or to a structure or array
for a blob file.3
General memory management rules should be taken into consideration, as De-
bugFS files will not provide access to anything other than what is explicitly
assigned to them. For example, a multi-dimensional array could cause a prob-
lem, as each of the arrays corresponding to its second dimension are separate
pieces of memory, not addressed by the file. A more obvious mistake is the
use of local variables for DebugFS files. Pointers to these variables are stack
pointers and will become invalid once their scope is removed from the stack.
2mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
3 Blob files can have arbitrary sizes and their size should be declared when creating the
file. This is done by passing a debugfs_blob_wrapper structure to the debugfs_create_blob
function, which contains data size and a pointer to the actual data block.
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Once files are created with persistent data pointers and sufficient access per-
missions, they can be treated as ordinary files from the user space. A u32
file will simply be a file with 4 bytes in size, containing a 32-bit integer. The
contents of this file constantly changes as the variable it points to changes
value in the kernel space.
We use a DebugFS blob to collect state information from the driver. We
mentioned earlier that we collectively store firmware state information in a
large ring buffer in the driver. This array is large enough to keep up with the
overwriting speed of the firmware ring buffer. However it is not, and need not
be, large enough to keep a full history. We choose to bring more work to the
user space, so we do not keep and export the entire history from the driver.
Instead, we design our server application so it dumps the exported information
periodically and leaves room for more information on the ring buffer.
Exporting the information to user space is our next step. The only change we
make on the driver side to do this is to create a DebugFS blob file that points
to the ring buffer array. On the application side, we read the whole array
from this file at an interval slightly less than it takes the driver to fill the ring
buffer and begin overwriting. For instance, we use 200ms for the driver we
described before, as it normally fills the DebugFS blob in 10 iterations (i.e.
250ms). This is to avoid missing data due to processing delays. Old items in
the array can be identified via each record’s TSF timestamp, allowing us to
remove items that are read twice.
The server application does not keep newly read items. It listens on a TCP
socket for incoming connections. Once a client application connects, it flushes
the data to the client over the network on each DebugFS read. The system
we described up to here can join the wireless adapter on a Linux box to a
sophisticated client on a PC or any other processing agent.
A.2.3 Front-end
A.2.3.1 Main Graphical Interface
In the previous subsection we discussed how a small server solution relays a
wireless card’s internal state information to an external client. The client we
use to receive this data is a graphical client named WiFo, which is developed
using the .NET framework, and typically runs on a Windows PC. It connects
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Figure A.6: Screenshots from the diagnostic tool’s front-end (WiFo).
to the server and displays the data it receives from it. Figure A.6 shows a few
screenshots from this application.
At its most basic state, you can use boolean expressions to monitor different
status bits as the wireless card works. These are displayed on a live chart called
the timeline. By choosing a suitable combination of bits to be displayed on
the timeline you can recognize frames, ACKs, and other activities that take
place on the channel. Figure A.7 shows the timeline. In this example we
have chosen bit 9 (RX engine busy status), the complement of bit 1 (which
corresponds to PHY busy status), and bit 8 (TX engine busy status). The
black line here represents bit 9. Therefore bumps on the black line represent
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Figure A.7: Transmission of a few packets captured on WiFo. The bottom,
middle, and top curves show busy status for the RX engine, the medium
(PHY), and the TX engine respectively.
frame transmissions. The diagnostic tool in this figure runs on the AP. This
suggests that bit 8 would be flipped on ACK or beacon transmissions. The
red line in the same image shows bit 8’s changes. As the figure shows, after
each black period we have a short period where the red line is up. The
duration of this flip is exactly the duration of an ACK, which confirms an
ACK transmission.
An interesting fact is visible in Figure A.7, and that is a limitation of the
system. One would expect to see SIFS periods on the blue line as it captures
PHY busy status, and PHY is idle during SIFS. Curiously we only see this
period only once in this figure, and it is for the first frame. The reason for this
lies in firmware operation. As we discussed in Section A.2.1 and as depicted
in Figure A.5, the firmware on the wireless chipset is constantly performing
its normal IEEE 802.11 operation and the monitoring work is an additional
task. The normal operation of the card requires it to sometimes halt until a
certain even occurs. Scanning the firmware code, we often find code snippets
whose only purpose is to delay the state machine. Listing A.1 is an example
of such code. These delays, along with delays associated with the additional
code, may sometimes cause a delayed capture of specific events. In some cases
these events might be so quick that we might just miss them. We believe this
is the reason why the SIFS period is missing from the timeline.
Listing A.1: A delay loop in OpenFWWF
add SPR_TSF_WORD0 , 16, GP_REG5
tx_frame_wait_16us :
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jext COND_TX_DONE , state_machine_idle
jne SPR_TSF_WORD0 , GP_REG5 , tx_frame_wait_16us
While these delays do not impair our debugging capabilities, but their effect
on the monitoring work can be mitigated by checking the IFS Status update
within each of these loops, depending on how precise we want our event cap-
turing to be. For normal studies such as those we do in this chapter, it is not
necessary to complicate the firmware code by running our code in any other
place than the idle state.
The diagnostic tool’s front-end can also measure time distance between two
events (top image in Figure A.6) to help you to further determine the nature
of those events, or mark a larger time frame to perform automated studies.
The application holds a full history of the data from the time it connects to
the server. This combined with zooming and panning functionalities help you
get various statistical data over large periods of time. The downside is that
this will require sufficient memory on the host machine. But since the client
is a separate piece of software, we can run it on a powerful machine. The
backup solution is to purge relatively old historical data periodically, which
the software does if it is short on memory.
A.2.3.2 Additional Functionality
Additional functionality can be added to WiFo through a plugin system with
APIs for both .NET Framework and Python. Placing a .NET class library or
a Python script in WiFo’s extensions directory will automatically activate it
on start-up. Extension developers do not need to worry about collection of
data, as it is passed in an accessible data structure to an extension; this is a
special-purpose enumerable list in .NET, and a list in Python. Each extension
can have its own settings and output formats, which can be integrated into
the user interface through the API.
There are currently two types of extensions. Studies are extensions that take
a subset of the data identified by a time range and produce results. These
results can be of any type and the API provides a flexible format to display
results. The bottom image in Figure A.6 shows an example of results produced
by a study. Results in the form of a plot can easily be displayed through the
API.
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Listings A.2 and A.3 show a very basic study extension written using the two
available APIs. It simply asks for an index from the user and shows the details
of the status record at that index. Figure A.8 shows the resulting GUI.
Listing A.2: C# for the ‘SimpleStudy’ extension
public class SimpleStudy : IStudy
{
[ Browsable ( false )]
public string DisplayName
{
get { return " Simple Study "; }
}
[ Browsable ( false )]
public string Author
{
get { return " Hessan Feghhi "; }
}
public void Perform ( RecordList records , IWiFoContext wifo )
{
int? i = wifo . AskInt (" Enter a record number ", 0);
if (i != null )
wifo . ShowResults (" Record Information ",
records [( int)i]);
}
}
Listing A.3: Python code for the ‘SimpleStudy’ extension
def displayname ():
return ’Simple Study ’
def author ():
return ’Hessan Feghhi ’
def perform ():
i = wifo . askint (" Enter a record number ")
if not i:
return
results = {}
results [’Time ’] = wifo .data [i]. time
results [’State ’] = wifo .data [i]. state
wifo . dictbox ( results )
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Figure A.8: Example of a result displayed by the ‘SimpleStudy’ plugin
Timeline view extensions are replacements for the original timeline view. They
have access to the graphics canvas of the timeline and the state information,
and they can offer a different representation of the existing data, or combine
it with external data sources to give more insight. For performance reasons,
the API for timeline views is currently only available for .NET Framework.
WiFo provides some default extensions, including packet recognition and an
inter-frame space (IFS) distribution calculator. The former simply uses the
state information to count packets in a given time frame and provides statistics
(e.g., bottom image in Figure A.6). The latter generates a bar plot for the
distribution of the inter-frame space (e.g. Figure A.13). We will discuss
these plots in detail in Section A.4. For example, recognizing successfully-
received packets is performed by scanning through all records and looking for
the following pattern:
1. RX engine becomes busy for longer than 192µs
2. RX engine becomes idle
3. TX engine becomes busy after 10µs
4. TX engine becomes idle (after an ACK duration)
This pattern represents the transmission and acknowledgement of a single
frame if WiFo’s back-end runs on the receiving access point. For other receive
cases, the final two steps examine the RX bit. In practice, WiFo checks both
cases. Note also that these two steps will also be absent if the frame is not
acknowledged. The inter-frame space can be calculated as the time difference
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from one match of this pattern to the next. Starting from the first two, the
time differences between the above steps correspond to frame duration, SIFS
and ACK duration respectively.
A.2.4 Linking to PCAP Data
When studying network information, tools such as tcpdump are invaluable.
These tools monitor the medium through a network adapter and capture
frames as they are observed. The type and important parts of every frame are
recorded and can later be filtered and studied.
There are differences between traffic capturing software and our diagnostic
tool. One of the differences is that tools like tcpdump only capture frames
that are transmitted successfully or at least key parts of which can be decoded.
Our system on the other hand captures every activity on the channel, whether
or not it is a successful frame. Even the noise from a microwave oven (MWO)
can be seen using our tool as it triggers the decoder on the wireless adapter
(see Section A.3.3).
Another important difference between our diagnostic tool and capturing tools,
which is a disadvantage of ours, is that our tool only sees state changes. While
this information is enough for determining where packets are situated on the
timeline, it cannot tell us who each packet belongs to and who it is destined
to. This makes our system less useful if the network has multiple stations.
On the contrary, capturing software does give us this extra information along
with everything else we need to know about the packets. We can even set
them to record full-sized packets so we can read application-level data as well.
If we use radiotap headers, we can access further information such as receiver
power levels and modulation.
Each of these systems have their own advantages as we discussed. With the
positive aspects of both put together, we can have a complete debugging tool
that can observe every aspect of the medium. That is what we do in our final
system. Tools like tcpdump and tshark save captured data in a common format
called PCAP. There are APIs available in almost every programming language
to read from and write to this format. We use the API for .NET Framework4
to develop a PCAP extension for the system. This extension displays the
4SharpPCAP/PacketDotNet
153
A.3. Validation
PCAP information on the timeline, by aligning TSF and timestamp values. 5
This helps verify frame transmissions and have extra information to perform
further analysis.
PCAP data used in our tool can come from any source and we usually use
a second wireless adapter on the same machine as our main wireless receiver
just to capture. The reason why we do not use the same card for both tasks is
that our open-source firmware does not provide promiscuous mode, which is
a requirement for capturing network packets. This also avoids burdening the
firmware with additional work, which might result in missing more events.
A.3 Validation
Before we begin debugging wireless adapters, we need to make sure our system
is robust and captures IEEE 802.11 signals correctly. We can examine many
aspects of the system. In this section we present the most important validation
tests we performed on our system.
A.3.1 TX Duration
One of the fundamental aspects of the system is the timing of flag changes,
the correctness of which is crucial to any application of the diagnostic tool. To
this end, we verify the effect of varying frame sizes on the observed duration
of their transmission. We run a series of tests with different payload sizes,
from 100 bytes to 1400 bytes (with granularity of 100 bytes). The diagnos-
tic tool measures the duration of frames by using the pattern described in
Section A.2.3 and measuring the time the RX engine remains busy for that
frame.
We use saturated UDP traffic at 11Mb/s for all tests, and for each payload
size we average transmission duration over 2500 frames. We use long preamble
in these tests (192µs PLCP). We also calculate the expected duration D(l)
for each payload size l as
D(l) = dPLCP + df (l). (A.1)
5BCM43xx chipset internally uses a TSF timer that is never synchronized with the
network. Instead, a register keeps the difference between the internal and network TSF, the
value of which is updated each time a beacon is received. We use this value to align signal
records, which hold the internal TSF, with TSF values from PCAP data.
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where dPLCP = 192µs is the duration of the preamble and the PLCP header
and df (l) is the time required to transmit the payload and protocol headers
associated with different layers, which is calculated as
df (l) =
8(l + lH,LLC + lH,IP + lH,UDP + lH,802.11 + lFCS)
r
.
Here lH,x is the length of the header associated with layer x, lFCS is the length
of the FCS, all in bytes, and r is the data rate used to transmit the frame.
For example, for a payload size of 1000 and with our experiment settings,
df (1000) =
8(1000+4+20+8+30+4)
11×106
≈ 7.75× 10−4s. Further, this translates to the
following for D(l) in microseconds:
D(l) = 240 + 0.727l. (A.2)
Figure A.9 shows average durations as observed by the AP as well as the
calculated expected duration for each payload size. In fact, the measured
packet lengths are tightly clustered around the mean, with variations of only
a single microsecond. As shown in the figure, the expected and observed
values closely match. Fitting a straight line through measured data gives us
the following for D(l):
238.055 + 0.725l.
which is very close to (A.2). Slight changes are expected given firmware delays.
This verifies the system’s pattern matching capabilities and the timeliness of
flag changes.
A.3.2 Throughput
Throughput is an important metric for IEEE 802.11 networks, as it can be an
indicator of different network aspects such as performance and fairness. For
this reason, it is important for our diagnostic tool to identify all transmitted
frames and to measure network throughput correctly.
To validate the diagnostic tool’s throughput calculation, we run a fresh test
on the same network as previously described, but this time we do not use
saturated traffic. Instead, we run a single UDP flow with PHY data rate of
11Mb/s with payload size of 1400 bytes for each frame for 30 seconds, and
have the tool calculate the throughput. We use a arrival rate of 100 packets/s
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Figure A.9: Duration with increasing payload size.
for the first test, and for each subsequent test we increase the arrival rate, up
to 800 packets/s.
The expected throughput is calculated simply by multiplying the transmission
rate by the payload size. However, rate should not exceed the saturation
throughput. We calculate saturation throughput S as
S =
1
D(l) +DSIFS +DACK +DDIFS +Dbo
=
1
Dt
, (A.3)
where D(l) comes from (A.1), DACK is the duration of the ACK, Dbo is the
average backoff duration, and DDIFS is the duration of DIFS (50µs). Dt is
used to denote the total duration of a successful frame transmission, including
its ACK and average backoff. We will be using this notation later. Also,
note that in our experiments we use a fixed packet size l and hence D(l) is a
constant.
Figure A.10 depicts the observed and expected throughput values. As you can
see, the two values match closely; and the small difference after saturation
may be explained by the backoff behavior of the chipset as we will discuss
in Section A.4. The reason this difference does not exist before saturation is
that packet inter-arrival times are usually larger than the maximum backoff,
eliminating the effect of the backoff mechanism.
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Figure A.10: Throughput with increasing packet-arrival rate.
A.3.3 Microwave Interference
In this section we show that we can see microwave interference using our tool.
To demonstrate this, we test two scenarios on a channel where only the AP
transmits beacons and there are no other stations or any interference from
other Wi-Fi networks. In our first test we use a microwave oven to introduce
interference, and for the second test we turn it off. Note, the interference
generated by the oven is bursty. The top image in Figure A.11 shows a single
microwave oven burst captured by a spectrum analyzer. The duration of this
pattern is approximately 8ms and it is repeated at intervals of about 20ms
(see bottom Figure A.11), which is related to the mains frequency of 50Hz.6
Figure A.12 shows what we observe using WiFo for both tests. The bottom
plot is taken on a free channel with only beacons, which show as periodic
spikes. Note that as the monitoring runs on AP the TX engine remains busy
during the transmission of a beacon. The top plot is taken with running
microwave oven. There are periodic spikes on the RX engine’s activity. The
duration of these spikes is around 140µs, which is the time required by the
decoder to distinguish noise from Wi-Fi signal. The RX spikes are separated
by two slightly different distances which alternate. The shortest distance
between the spikes is 8ms, which is the burst size. This suggests that the
6These observations are made with kitchen microwave ovens. Commercial ones that are
used in restaurants, as stated in [154], make pulses twice as frequent as the ones we use.
Moreover, the resulting interference has different characteristics.
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Figure A.11: Waveform of a single microwave oven burst (top), and a sequence
of bursts (bottom).
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Figure A.12: Channel activity observed by AP running WiFo’s backend when
a microwave oven is working (top) and when it is turned off (bottom). Vertical
lines are 10ms apart in both images.
beginning and the end of each burst triggers the chipset’s decoder, which
soon identifies it as noise and the decoder is deactivated. More generally, any
interference on the channel triggers the decoder temporarily.
A.4 Debugging Examples
In this section we introduce a few examples of how our diagnostic tool can help
debug wireless hardware. The main purpose of this tool is to help examine
wireless networks closely and figure out deviations from standard and reasons
behind unexpected behaviors. This is especially useful for driver and firmware
developers, as it can help them verify the performance of the wireless cards
and debug their implementations. It can also be a good practical research tool
as it can visualize information that is otherwise hard to notice in a wireless
network.
A.4.1 Contention Window
One of the most important parts of the standards which ensures equal oppor-
tunities for all the stations to use the channel is the contention window. The
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contention window is sometimes misconfigured by wireless card vendors [72]
and it is also the easiest to tweak as we discussed in Chapter 5. This makes
the ability to detect possible misconfiguration or misbehavior very important.
In this section we manually adjust the contention windows of the wireless
adapters to standard and non-standard values and then use our system to
observe the differences.
The diagnostic tool can scan through the received signals and measure the
inter-frame space. Through this value it calculates the backoff slots the station
chooses to wait and generates a distribution graph. We use this feature to see
whether we can detect misconfigured stations.
In our next experiments, we use the same network setup that we used in Sec-
tion A.3 and we send saturated UDP traffic using packets with 1000 bytes of
payload, and we alter the contention window for each experiment. The dura-
tion of each experiment is again 30 seconds. Figure A.13 shows the resulting
plots for three different values of the minimum contention window, namely 8,
16 and 32. We can see the number of times each backoff value is selected and
the range of values in use.
Note that as we use IEEE 802.11 channel 14 for our experiments and we
have little to no interference, the station almost never moves on to the second
backoff stage, and what we have here is only the first backoff stage. It is also
worth noting that observed values for the same backoff value are often 1µs
apart as a result of firmware delays. We bin the results into 20µs bins to get
a cleaner image, but even if we did not do that, they would appear as isolated
spike groups rather than spread all over the time frame.
Using these plots we can easily distinguish where the wrong CWmin is selected.
They can also help us see how evenly the backoff is chosen. As this value should
be chosen completely at random, we expect a flat distribution graph. Although
what we see in the plots are well distributed, they are not completely even.
This could be due to the way the RNG works on the device, and it could
also be the result of the small delays we mentioned previously. Table A.3
shows the chi-squared test values for these results, comparing them to uniform
distribution (the null hypothesis is that the results are not uniform). As the
table shows, p-values are too large, so it seems unlikely that the backoffs are
truly uniform.
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Figure A.13: Backoff distribution for CWmin = 32 (top), CWmin = 16 (mid-
dle), and CWmin = 8 (bottom), as recorded by our diagnostic tool. STA uses
Broadcom BCM4318 chipset with b43 driver and OpenFWWF.
161
A.4. Debugging Examples
CWmin χ
2 p-value
32 26.3006 0.70680
16 16.2286 0.36702
8 5.6899 0.57639
Table A.3: Chi-squared test for results in Figure A.13. We use CWmin − 1
degrees of freedom to obtain the p-value.
Standard-compliance is not solely the role of hardware and firmware, and
differences could exist in the driver level. In the next study we use an Atheros
mini-PCI wireless adapter for our station and compare the backoff behavior
when using different drivers. One of the drivers we use is ath5k7, which is a
reliable driver for Atheros cards, and the other one is MadWifi8.
Both drivers provide a similar average throughput, from which one might guess
they both present a similar backoff distribution. However, our observations
prove otherwise. Figure A.14 shows the results obtained using the diagnostic
tool. As you can see in the figure, the ath5k driver hops between the two ends
of the contention window rather than a uniform distribution over the whole
window. According to [155], this does not give the station any advantage
in the long run, as the average backoff is unchanged. Nevertheless, it is an
obvious deviation from the standard and it may affect certain experiments
by changing the collision probability, especially when more than one station
behaves this way.
A.4.2 TXOP Burst
We introduced TXOP in Section 2.4. It is as a bounded time interval during
which a station can send as many frames as possible. Although TXOP is
advertised by the access point and stations can requested an RTS frame, there
is no central control on how stations use it. Once a station wins the contention,
it can practically send frames indefinitely, resulting in poor performance of
other contending stations. We actually discussed this as a form of attack in
Chapter 5. TXOP should normally not be used unless allowed by the AP or
within a contention-free period.
7Our ath5k driver is slightly modified to enable us change contention parameters. How-
ever, we do not use this feature for these tests and the rest of the driver code is unchanged.
8The MadWifi version we use is 0.9.4-r4173, and the only modification made to the
driver is disabling QoS.
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Figure A.14: Backoff distribution for Atheros chipset provided by MadWifi
(top) and ath5k (bottom)
In our next experiment we demonstrate our system’s ability to detect TXOP
bursts. For this test we increase the TXOP period, and use the diagnostic
tool to count the number of packets that come in a single burst. Our network
has only one station connected to an AP equipped with the diagnostic tool’s
monitoring code. The station is equipped with an Atheros card with the
MadWifi driver, and it transmits saturated traffic using frames with payload
size of 500 bytes for 5 seconds in each test. Figure A.15 depicts the results.
As the figure shows, as long as the TXOP period is smaller than the time
required to transmit one packet, the burst contains only one frame, i.e. there
is no burst. Each time a new frame can fit in the given period, the burst
size increases. In other words, we can calculate burst size using the following
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uses Atheros chipset with ath5k driver.
formula:
n = ⌈tTXOP
Dt
⌉
Where tTXOP is the TXOP time, and Dt comes from (A.3).
We can also measure the duration of a single frame transmission as the distance
between two bumps of n, which is measured 863µs based on the results used
to plot Figure A.15.
A.4.3 ACK Skipping
Acknowledgements are normally used as a success signal for the transmitter.
However, deliberately skipping ACKs can sometimes be desired, e.g. [109, 110]
or what we did in Chapter 5. In this section we implement a simple scheme
at the AP: we skip every other ACK for received frames, forcing stations
to always make two attempts for each frame. We use WiFo to sanity check
our implementation. For the experiment, we use one station connected to
the AP, and send saturated traffic at 11Mb/s for 30 seconds using MGEN.
Both the station and the AP use Broadcom BCM4318 wireless adapters with
OpenFWWF. The station uses minimum CW of 32. By dropping the first
ACK, we force it to double this value, and use 64. Figure A.16 shows the
resulting backoff distribution graph calculated by WiFo. For values in the
range [0, 32), the numbers are almost twice as much as [32, 64), which is exactly
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Figure A.16: Backoff distribution when the AP drops every other ACK.
what we expect; remember that, on the second backoff stage, the station
uniformly selects a backoff time within the range of [0, 64) slots. This not
only proves that the implementation works, but also demonstrates another
aspect of WiFo’s usefulness.
A.5 Conclusion
In this appendix we designed an extensible diagnostic tool for IEEE 802.11
wireless cards which can be used to test various aspects of the protocol and
detect standard compliance. The purpose of this tool is to give programmers
and researchers enough flexibility to test and debug wireless cards and drivers.
The diagnostic tool is made using only commercial off-the-shelf devices and
it can be more practical than its more expensive alternatives. With an API
to add new features to the application, the diagnostic tool can be virtually
programmed to do sophisticated analyses on the data. We presented PCAP
integration as an example of additional features that can be plugged in to
the system. We presented results to validate the sanity and reliability of our
system, and presented some experimental results that highlighted some of
possible use-cases of this tool.
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Firmware and Driver Code
This appendix provides samples of the code used to implement the policing algo-
rithm, and the Virtual MAC, with brief explanation of design decisions.
B.1 Introduction
Implementing algorithms on hardware and testing them can be a time-consuming
task. Many of the implementations described in this thesis are done by modi-
fying the C code for the Linux drivers of the wireless adapters, or the assembly
code for their firmware. In order to facilitate the reproduction of the present
work, this appendix provides important pieces of the code used for each part
of the policing code. As we mentioned in Chapter 6, each algorithm is bro-
ken into two components, one running in the driver, and one on the wireless
adapter’s firmware. Here we describe how each component of the system is
implemented.
B.2 Driver Implementation
The policing controller and the Virtual MAC both involve recurring events
that happen periodically. They only need to run on the driver once per iter-
ation. Fortunately, the b43 driver provides a mechanism to schedule periodic
works. This is performed using the do_periodic_work function in the main.c
file of the driver. We modified this function, and inserted our own schedules
into it. The original version of the function looks like this:
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static void do_periodic_work(struct b43_wldev *dev)
{
unsigned int state;
state = dev->periodic_state;
if (state % 4 == 0)
b43_periodic_every60sec(dev);
if (state % 2 == 0)
b43_periodic_every30sec(dev);
b43_periodic_every15sec(dev);
}
As one can see, the granularity of the period is not enough to run a task more
frequently than every 15 seconds. To increase this granularity, we modify the
b43_periodic_work_handler function, and insert the following code when it
calculates the delay:
delay = round_jiffies_relative(HZ * 1); // The default driver uses 15
We would then need to adapt the do_periodic_work, and schedule the polic-
ing algorithm controller:
static void do_periodic_work(struct b43_wldev *dev)
{
unsigned int state;
state = dev->periodic_state;
if (state % 60 == 0)
b43_periodic_every60sec(dev);
if (state % 30 == 0)
b43_periodic_every30sec(dev);
if (state % 15 == 0)
b43_periodic_every15sec(dev);
policing_iteration(dev);
}
Then we can define the policing iteration function, and implement the con-
troller, and the Virtual MAC.
B.2.1 Importing Information
Unlike the driver, the firmware is always working, logging information to be
used by the driver. So, in each iteration, the first thing we do is to fetch this
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information from the shared memory, and store them locally. This code goes
into the policing_iteration method.
u16 u;
unsigned int i, slist_end, ix = 0;
struct policing_per_sta* temp_sta_info;
if (min_samples == 0)
return;
// Read the position of the end of the station list
slist_end = b43_shm_read16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, POLICE_SLIST_END);
/*
* Read in accumulate special-purpose counters from the shared memory.
* Each counter represents a measure (such as busy slots, dropped packet count, etc)
*/
for (i = 0; i < POLICE_CTR_COUNT; i++) {
u16 temp_addr = POLICE_CTR1_HI + i * 4;
long police_ctr;
police_ctr = (unsigned int)b43_shm_read16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, temp_addr);
u = b43_shm_read16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, temp_addr + 2);
b43_shm_write32(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, temp_addr, (u16)0);
police_ctr = (police_ctr << 16) + (unsigned int)u;
saved_police_ctr[i] += police_ctr;
}
curSamples = (curSamples + 1) \% min_samples;
// If the iteration interval (in seconds) has passed
if (curSamples == 0) {
// TODO: Run policing and the Virtual MAC!
}
The constant POLICE_SLIST_END above is the shared memory location of the
word where the location of the last station item is stored. Next we begin filling
in the TODO part.
B.2.2 Policing
The first thing we need to do in order to execute the policing controller is to
fetch station data from the shared memory.
// Go through the list (starting from the constant location POLICE_SLIST_BEGIN).
while (i < slist_end) {
ix = (i - POLICE_SLIST_BEGIN) >> 3;
temp_sta_info = sta_info + ix;
temp_sta_info->pk_ptr = i;
temp_sta_info->retries = b43_shm_read16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, i + 2);
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temp_sta_info->attempts = b43_shm_read16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, i + 4);
temp_sta_info->packets = b43_shm_read16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, i + 6);
all_packets += temp_sta_info->packets;
b43_shm_write16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, i + 2, 0);
b43_shm_write32(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, i + 4, 0);
i += 8;
}
ix++; // So it contains the count
// TODO: Use Virtual MAC to estimate the compliant attempt rate.
We get to the virtual MAC in the next subsection. Here we assume that the
estimate is ready, and stored in the variable p_Sf. The controller has now all
the required information to perform.
for (i = 0; i < ix; i++) {
sf->data[i] = sta_info[i].attempts;
if (p_Sf > 0 && sta_info[i].attempts > 0) {
// Now calculate the new PK
int pk = sta_info[i].pk;
pk = pk + ALPHA_NOM * ((long)hflt_div(sta_info[i].attempts - HFLOAT_ONE) /
ALPHA_DENOM;
/*
* Limit the calculated p value to the range [0, 1], and write it to the
* shared memory for firmware use
*/
if (pk < 0) pk = 0;
sta_info[i].pk = pk;
if (pk > 0xFFFE) pk = 0xFFFE;
b43_shm_write16(dev, B43_SHM_SHARED, sta_info[i].pk_ptr, (u16)pk);
}
}
The two constants ALPHA_NUM and ALPHA_DENOM together represent the α value
for the algorithm. Note that floating point numbers are not allowed in Linux
drivers. Also, the pk member of the station information structure represents
the PACK value for the station. That is why we have also implemented a
special float handling that corresponds the values between 0 and 65535 to the
floating point range [0, 1]. The code for these functions will be listed at the
end of this appendix.
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B.2.3 Virtual MAC
In Chapter 6 we discussed how the Virtual MAC estimates the compliant
attempt rate. Here we provide the actual code. The driver component in
this implementation is responsible for using the information collected in the
firmware to compute the estimate. The code below replaces he TODO line in
the policing code presented earlier.
#define BUSY_SLOTS saved_police_ctr[0]
#define IDLE_TIME saved_police_ctr[1]
#define BEACONS saved_police_ctr[2]
#define DROPPED_PACKETS saved_police_ctr[3]
unsigned long total_slots, _tau, _p;
total_slots = BUSY_SLOTS + (IDLE_TIME) / 20 - BEACONS;
_p = hflt_div(BUSY_SLOTS, total_slots);
/*
* The tau formula from Bianchi’s paper
* (we have two versions as we cannot have negatives)
*/
if (2 * _p > HFLOAT_ONE)
_tau = 2 * hflt_div(2 * _p - HFLOAT_ONE,
(2 * _p - HFLOAT_ONE) * 33 + 32 * hflt_mul(_p, (hflt_pow(2 * _p, 5) -
HFLOAT_ONE)));
else _tau = 2 * hflt_div(HFLOAT_ONE - 2 * _p,
(HFLOAT_ONE - 2 * _p) * 33 + 32 * hflt_mul(_p, (HFLOAT_ONE - hflt_pow(2 * _p,
5))));
p_Sf = FIX_MULTIPLIER_NOM * (hflt_mul(hflt_mul(_tau, HFLOAT_ONE - _p), total_slots)) / 100;
// Reset the counters for the next iteration
for (i = 0; i < POLICE_CTR_COUNT; i++) {
saved_police_ctr[i] = 0;
}
B.3 Firmware Implementation
Firmware implementation is more difficult because it is in assembly, and there
are far less hardware capabilities available to use. However, the firmware is
the last point from where frames are transmitted, and the first point of frame
reception. This is why things such as ACK generation and frame counting are
best implemented on the firmware. In this section we present the code for the
firmware part of the policing algorithm and the Virtual MAC.
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B.3.1 Policing
The policing algorithm implementation on the firmware involves mainly ACK
transmission decision, and that is where it resides. However, there are helper
functions it uses in its operation. One of these functions is a lookup function
used to fetch a record from the hash table described in Chapter 6. Below is
this function. The code is in the assembly of the BCM B43xx chipset (revision
5).
// HANDLER: policing_lookup
// PURPOSE: Looks up a MAC address in the STA list, or adds it if non-existent
policing_lookup:
srx 7, 0, POLICE_M3, 0x000, POLICE_TEMP1
srx 7, 8, POLICE_M3, 0x000, POLICE_M3
xor POLICE_M3, POLICE_TEMP1, POLICE_TEMP1
mov POLICE_SLIST_INDEX, POLICE_TEMP2
add POLICE_TEMP2, POLICE_TEMP1, POLICE_OFFSET
je [0x0, POLICE_OFFSET], 0, policing_create_item
mov [0x0, POLICE_OFFSET], POLICE_OFFSET
jext COND_TRUE, policing_lookup_complete
policing_create_item:;
mov POLICE_SLIST_POS, [0x0, POLICE_OFFSET]
mov POLICE_SLIST_POS, POLICE_OFFSET
add POLICE_SLIST_POS, 4, POLICE_SLIST_POS
sl POLICE_SLIST_POS, 1, [POLICE_SLIST_END]
mov 0x000, [0x0, POLICE_OFFSET]
jext COND_TRUE, policing_lookup_complete
The other helper function is used to discard a frame. It is used when we need
to refuse to send an ACK.
// HANDLER: policing_discard
// PURPOSE: Discards a received frame (without sending an ACK)
policing_discard:
/*
* The following two lines increment the discarded frame counter
* as a 2-word (32-bit) value.
*/
add. [POLICE_CTR4_LO], 1, [POLICE_CTR4_LO]
addc [POLICE_CTR4_HI], 0, [POLICE_CTR4_HI]
jext COND_TRUE, rx_discard_frame
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With these helper functions, the policing algorithm firmware has enough in-
formation to operate. The code we are going to present runs when a new
frame is received, and before an acknowledgement is created. This would be
directly after the following two lines in the OpenFWWF[67] code.
send_response:
jext COND_RX_ERROR, rx_complete
And the code itself looks like the following. Descriptive comments are added
to the code to aid comprehension.
// Save the MAC address of the sender in our registers
or [RX_FRAME_ADDR2_1,off1], 0x000, POLICE_M1
or [RX_FRAME_ADDR2_2,off1], 0x000, POLICE_M2
or [RX_FRAME_ADDR2_3,off1], 0x000, POLICE_M3
// Backup offset register (a shared use global pointer)
mov POLICE_OFFSET, POLICE_TEMP0
// Call the policing lookup/create helper function
jext COND_TRUE, policing_lookup
policing_lookup_complete:;
// Don’t discard if not a data frame
jzx 0, 2, POLICE_FLAGS, 0x000, policing_dont_discard
nand POLICE_FLAGS, 0x4, POLICE_FLAGS
add [0x2, POLICE_OFFSET], 1, [0x2, POLICE_OFFSET]
// Save PK in temp1
mov [0x0, POLICE_OFFSET], POLICE_TEMP1
// If PK >= RND then continue to call the discard frame helper function
jle POLICE_TEMP1, SPR_TSF_Random, policing_dont_discard
// Restore offset register
mov POLICE_TEMP0, POLICE_OFFSET
jext COND_TRUE, policing_discard
policing_dont_discard:;
// Add 1 to STA’s sent packet count
add [0x3, POLICE_OFFSET], 1, [0x3, POLICE_OFFSET]
// Restore offset register
mov POLICE_TEMP0, POLICE_OFFSET
B.3.2 Virtual MAC
The firmware part of the Virtual MAC is responsible for counting the number
of idle and busy slots. This is handled in the firmware’s idle state logic.
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Normally, the firmware sleeps for a while when it gets to this state, before
polling for new events:
orx 7, 8, 0x0FF, 0x0FF, SPR_MAC_MAX_NAP
nap
state_machine_start:
We remove the first two lines to buy time for the Virtual MAC. Then we call
our Virtual MAC estimator function under state_machine_start. Below is
the body of this function. Descriptive comments are added to the code for
better readability.
// HANDLER: hessan_vmac
// PURPOSE: Run the Virtual MAC code and return
hessan_vmac:
// Are we initialized?
jne r62, 0, vmac_inited;
// Set up our start time variable
mov SPR_TSF_WORD0, EST_START_TIME0;
mov SPR_TSF_WORD1, EST_START_TIME1;
// CurrentState = INVALID
mov 0xFF, EST_CURRENT_STATE;
// Set initialized
or r62, 1, r62;
vmac_inited:
// Temp1 = Channel idle flag
and SPR_IFS_STAT, 0x1, POLICE_TEMP1
// if(CurrentState == Temp1) return
je POLICE_TEMP1, EST_CURRENT_STATE, tracker_end;
// Backup = CurrentState
mov EST_CURRENT_STATE, POLICE_TEMP3;
// CurrentState = Temp
mov POLICE_TEMP1, EST_CURRENT_STATE;
// Calculate time difference
sub. SPR_TSF_WORD0, EST_START_TIME0, POLICE_TEMP0
subc SPR_TSF_WORD1, EST_START_TIME1, POLICE_TEMP1
// If difference > 65535 (the second word is non-zero), it is long enough!
jg POLICE_TEMP1, 0, vmac_not_too_short;
// If difference > 49 it is long enough (idle)
jg POLICE_TEMP0, 50, vmac_not_too_short;
vmac_too_short:
// This part is to ignore short spikes
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je POLICE_TEMP3, 0, vmac_too_short_busy;
jext COND_TRUE, final_step;
vmac_too_short_busy:
// Jump to final step
jext COND_TRUE, final_step;
vmac_not_too_short:
// If LastState is the same as Backup, it is a continuation.
je EST_LAST_STATE, POLICE_TEMP3, vmac_too_short;
// If we just ended a busy slot (Backup == BUSY)
je POLICE_TEMP3, 0, count_busy_slot;
// Otherwise IdleTime += difference
add. [POLICE_CTR2_LO], POLICE_TEMP0, [POLICE_CTR2_LO];
addc [POLICE_CTR2_HI], POLICE_TEMP1, [POLICE_CTR2_HI];
// We have processed the slot
jext COND_TRUE, slot_counted;
count_busy_slot:
// Add one to the busy counter
add [POLICE_CTR1_LO], 1, [POLICE_CTR1_LO];
slot_counted:
// It is safe to put Backup in LastState
mov POLICE_TEMP3, EST_LAST_STATE;
final_step:
mov SPR_TSF_WORD0, EST_START_TIME0
mov SPR_TSF_WORD1, EST_START_TIME1
// Jump back to the caller location (the label is defined just below the call)
jext COND_TRUE, tracker_end;
In the above code, POLICE_CTR1 is the first counter (counter index 0 in the
driver code), which holds the number of busy slots. POLICE_CTR2 (counter in-
dex 1 in the driver code) holds idle time in microseconds. Both these counters
consist of two words (LO and HI words), because they hold 32-bit numbers
while the firmware words are 16 bits long. The code ignores short spikes as
they often correspond to antenna training and not real idle/busy switches.
B.4 Floating Point Helpers
As mentioned previously in this chapter, floating point operations are not
allowed in driver code. For this reason, we implement a form of fixed-point
arithmetic in the driver. We use the integer range [0, 65535] as a representation
of the real range [0, 1] to have enough granularity in that range, and because
a word in the chipset is 2 bytes, and it would be easier to store numbers this
way. All operations are the defined in accordance with this representation.
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What follows is the code used to handle floating points in throughout the
implementation:
#define HFLOAT_DENOM 65536 /* Scale denominator used for calculations */
#define HFLOAT_ONE (HFLOAT_DENOM - 1) /* The value representing probability 1 */
unsigned long hflt_mul(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) {
return (a * b) / HFLOAT_DENOM;
}
unsigned long hflt_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b) {
return (a * HFLOAT_DENOM) / b;
}
unsigned long hflt_pow(unsigned long a, unsigned int pow) {
unsigned int i;
long result = a;
for (i = 0; i < pow - 1; ++i)
result = hflt_mul(result, a);
return result;
}
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